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Abstract 
 
 
The main objectives of this thesis are to provide a description, analysis and criticism 
of the existing international instruments for the promotion of respect and protection 
of human rights, as well as to provide suggestions for the adoption of an additional 
legal instrument through the United Nations mechanism as a complementary 
procedure in order to strengthen judicial review of state actions and legislation. 
This, in turn, should serve to increase pressure upon State governments to bring 
their internal legal systems into line with international standards for the protection 
of human rights. 
 
While there is some limited degree of international “review” of States’ compliance 
with their international human rights obligations, it is argued in this work that the 
current international procedures available to individuals alleging that their human 
rights have been abused by a State are no longer sufficient, and therefore it is 
appropriate to discuss whether another procedure should be introduced.  
 
The thesis considers this issue of increased judicial review by focusing on one of 
Australia’s closest neighbours, Indonesia, as an example of a State whose conduct 
remains largely “untouchable” under current international mechanisms. Despite 
gross and systematic violations of human rights, one could argue that the Indonesian 
government is still immune due to its “executive-heavy” legislative system, restricted 
judicial review as a result of a corrupt judiciary, and high level of impunity of the 
government and other state agencies. 
 
The thesis firstly concentrates on the procedures available at an international level 
for dealing with individual complaints alleging human rights violations. Different 
procedures both under Charter and Treaty provisions are analysed in an attempt to 
describe their advantages and disadvantages. Two Charter-based procedures dealt 
with in the discussion cover the communication procedure under the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which includes the “1503” procedure. 
Treaty-based procedures, including the procedure before the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination  
 
ix
(CERD), the Committee against Torture (CAT) and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) are given special attention 
in this thesis. 
 
There follows a critical appraisal of these procedures which highlights their 
limitations and weaknesses, followed by the suggestion that an additional procedure 
to complement the current mechanisms available to individuals seeking remedies for 
human rights violations would be highly desirable – both theoretically and in 
practice. Among the most prominent limitations of these procedures are the non-
binding nature of most of the decisions involved and the real obstacle that the 
admissibility requirement of “exhaustion of domestic remedies” presents. 
 
Finally, the thesis considers the possibility, as has started to be discussed among 
some international scholars, of an “International Judicial Review” procedure by 
which a State’s legislation could be examined in order to determine whether or not it 
is in conformity with international human rights standards and norms. It will be 
suggested that this power of review be given to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) as the “principal judicial organ of The United Nations”.  
 
 Chapter 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.  Introductory Remarks 
 
The real test of the effectiveness of any legal system for the protection of human rights is 
whether judicial review procedures are available to control legislation
1 or acts by a state 
official for violation of these rights. Such procedures entitle individuals who believe that 
their rights have been violated to seek remedy either from a national or, where possible, 
from an international institution.  
 
The interests of individuals are supposed to be protected by the State of which they are 
nationals. However, many studies and commentators have noted that this does not always 
work satisfactorily- especially in the area of human rights, where the great majority of 
cases in which the rights of individuals have been and might still be violated are the direct 
result of legislation or actions of government officials or agencies. 
 
Effective control over government activities and legislation not only serves to protect 
human rights from being abused but also maintains public confidence in the legal order. 
Moreover, this control is also in the interests of the government itself. The awareness that 
the government too is bound by the law and is subject to supervision nationally and, under 
certain conditions, internationally, strengthens confidence in the governmental apparatus 
and thus enhances the efficiency of its administration. 
 
                                                 
1 Although reference will be made throughout this thesis to the judicial review of legislation, this is also 
meant to include the possible revision of constitutional provisions.  
 
2
Problems will arise if a State does not include in its constitution any provisions for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which should form the basis of 
review of the legality and constitutionality of government activities. Problems are also 
likely to arise if there are provisions regarding the protection of human rights that are 
inconsistent with those of international legal norms or principles as set out in, for 
instance, the International Bill of Rights.
2 
 
Another situation might be that a State’s legislation – or its constitution – is in line with 
the international legal norms on human rights in some respects, but in others does not 
make provisions for judicial review. There is now a very urgent need to make available 
international judicial review procedures by which all legislation of a State may be 
examined in terms of its conformity with international legal norms. Such international 
procedures would enable a determination of whether or not a particular State violates the 
international provisions for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
It is therefore very important to study the possibility of making available such procedures 
in order to provide better legal protection for individuals against activities which abuse 
human rights, and against a government's excessive use of power. Besides, as a member 
of the international community of “civilised nations” under the United Nations system, 
every Member State has pledged itself “to achieve, in cooperation with the United 
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”
3 
 
                                                 
2 In major human rights literature, it is widely accepted that this refers to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR) along with its Protocol 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
3 Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
3
Many commentators may think that such procedures for control of government activities 
and legislation are not really necessary. Some may even think that this could weaken the 
powers of the government and interfere with State sovereignty to such an extent that the 
function and duties of the government would be distorted and unduly restricted. 
 
However, both common sense and the ultimate goals of maintaining legal order as well as 
the international legal obligation of States to promote and encourage respect for and 
protection of human rights, dictate that it is clearly necessary to adopt a constructive and 
positive attitude to the question of an individual’s access to international remedies. 
Failure to fulfil this obligation means failure to fulfil one of the principal functions of the 
State at the national level, and the glorious duty of the United Nations at the international 
level. 
 
This thesis does not attempt the impossible task of proving that an international judicial 
review mechanism is currently feasible – clearly that is still a distant evolutionary step, 
given that States generally jealously try to preserve their sovereignty. Its objectives are far 
more modest: to underline some of the reasons why, from a legal point of view, such a 
development is desirable for reasons illustrated with the example of Indonesia, and why 
the idea must be the object of consideration in order for this possibility to become part of 
discussions amongst various segments of society. 
 
It should also be remembered that while this sort of mechanism may seem outlandish 
given that many, maybe even most, States would not eagerly embark on the creation of an 
international judicial review mechanism because of the potential effects on their own 
sovereignty, the development of international law does not require prior approval of all or  
 
4
a majority of States: binding legal instruments such as the protocol which established the 
African Court of Human Rights only required a rather small number of ratifications (15) 
before entering into force. If it was possible in Africa, there is no reason why an initially 
small number of states could not be motivated to proceed with an international tool of 
judicial review in the area of human rights. 
 
The example of Indonesia, one of Australia’s closest neighbours, where individuals by 
law have no adequate access to an international remedy system in cases of human rights 
violations, demonstrates fairly clearly that the ability to have recourse to some sort of 
compliance mechanism at an international level is a crucial need. With the ratification of 
treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2005, 
it is hoped that Indonesia will continue down this path and also accept the complaints 
mechanism, thereby subjecting itself to further scrutiny.
4 
 
2.  Theoretical Overview and the Purpose of International Judicial Review 
 
One of the principles of the Rule of Law states that everybody, including the government, 
is bound by the law and subject to legal supervision exercised by the court
5. For this 
reason, the legality and validity of government acts and indeed legislation must be 
subjected to some type of review.  
 
Apart from any other incidental proceedings, the judicial review of government acts for 
the breach of human rights can only be carried out upon application (i.e. a lawsuit) 
                                                 
4 Ratified September 2005. As at 30 June 2006, Indonesia had not acceded to the additional protocol that 
would permit individuals to send a complaint of a violation of the ICCPR to the UN Human Rights 
Committee.  
5 P. van Dijk, 1980. Judicial Review of Governmental Action and the Requirement of an Interest to Sue. 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, The Hague, p. 1  
 
5
brought by individuals who believe that their rights have been violated, or by an 
organisation acting on their behalf (e.g. an NGO).  
 
  Two types of judicial review are recognised in mainstream law literature: formal or 
procedural review, and content-based or substantive judicial review. In formal judicial 
review, the validity of a government act is reviewed based on the procedure taken as it is 
stipulated in the law.  
 
An Indonesian parliamentary act or Undang-Undang (UU), for example, is considered 
inconsistent with the nation’s 1945 Constitution if it is enacted only by either the 
Parliament or the President. Article 20(1) of the Constitution requires that all acts must be 
approved by the Parliament and enacted by the President. So, by examining the enactment 
procedures, it can be determined whether or not the law is valid. 
 
Unlike the formal or procedural review, the purpose of the contents-based or substantive 
judicial review is to determine whether or not a law, in terms of its substance or content, 
is consistent with the constitution or other higher regulations. If all necessary procedures 
taken in producing the law have been duly followed, but it is found that its content is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution, then the law must be declared illegal 
and revoked. 
 
The emphasis of this study is on substantive judicial review, though one which covers 
legislation as well as State activities in general. Procedural judicial review will not be 
dealt with since it is less important in relation to the discussion of breaches of  
 
6
international treaties such as human rights provisions. Additionally, a clear distinction has 
to be made between national and international judicial review. 
 
Under the Indonesian legal system, judicial review primarily concerns itself with 
examining the government's administrative decisions. Broadly speaking, this means any 
governmental project or action (e.g. building a railroad, establishing a new department or 
service, etc.) that is carried out by government agencies or bodies. There is no 
consideration at this level of judicial review in light of Indonesia’s international or treaty-
based human rights provisions.  
 
National control of administrative actions occurs in the first instance through a range of 
systems that operate and derive their authority solely from within the confines of 
government bodies. This control is normally exercised by the higher-ranking government 
officials; and functions as supervision towards the lower-ranking officials.  
 
In the discussion of international judicial review of government acts and legislation for 
breaches of human rights, on the other hand, the emphasis is on the non-implementation 
and non-application of the international provisions for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms within the national law and law courts. Provisions like those set 
forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), if a State is a 
party to it, will be used to test the conformity of government acts and the practices of 
national judicial bodies in the area of the protection of human rights. In general, and in 
relation to the international review procedure, the widely recognised International Bill of 
Rights will be used as benchmark for testing the validity of a State government’s act or 
legislation.  
 
7
 
Admittedly, judicial review does not sit comfortably with the classical conception of 
international law; which does not permit individual claims to be brought to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) under the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
6 
Still, a number of procedures have now been developed in which the activities and 
legislation of a State can be reviewed if they are in breach of its international obligations. 
These procedures, such as those contained under the auspices of the European Court of 
Human Rights, have the features of a national judicial review. There are also review 
procedures that have a quasi-judicial character. These can be found in cases handled by 
the International Arbitration Tribunal, which not only deals with the omissions of the 
State, but also the legality of the State’s acts. 
 
The main purpose of making procedures available at the international level is to provide 
individuals with greater access to an international system that protects them against 
breaches of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. Another equally important 
purpose is to put State governments under sufficient “pressure” to cause them to bring 
their internal laws into conformity with international legal norms for the protection of 
human rights. 
 
3.  Questions and Issues 
 
There are several questions and issues that need to be addressed in this study. The first 
and most crucial is the question of how and when individuals whose rights and 
fundamental freedoms have been violated by government acts or legislation can find 
                                                 
6 Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ states “only States may be parties in cases before the Court”.  
 
8
suitable redress at the international level. The most obvious solution involves the First 
Protocol to the ICCPR
7, which has made it possible for individuals to bring their petitions 
to the Human Rights Committee (HRC) – at least for those States that have accepted this 
Protocol. If all the conditions of admissibility of the petition have been met as provided 
for in Article 40(4) of the Covenant, the Committee will then consider the case. While 
this procedure is a pioneer for other similar mechanisms allowing individual 
communications to be heard, it remains still a weak one since the views made by the 
Committee are not legally binding on the State Party. 
 
This study will suggest a more progressive approach to the handling of individual 
communications, a concept which could be referred to as international judicial review. 
The review procedure would involve a decision that would have a legally binding 
character, and as such, could indeed only be made by an international judicial body to 
which such competence was entrusted. 
 
The International Court of Justice is by far the most important international tribunal with 
worldwide jurisdiction. In accordance with Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, only 
States may be parties in cases brought before the Court. This rule, however, cannot be 
maintained without any changes for several reasons: the ever-increasing need of 
individuals for more protection of their interests, the demands of international cooperation 
which are constantly on the move in this era of globalisation at the beginning of a new 
millennium, and also the need for real accountability for crimes against human rights.
8 
                                                 
7 Entered into force 23 March 1976. 
8 Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in her speech at the Rome Conference on 
15 June 1998, for instance, admitted that the international community, through the United Nations, has a 
poor record in preventing and stopping systematic acts of violation of human rights. In  her address she 
also stated that: “In the fifty years since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set out the basic 
standards of human rights there has been almost systematic violation of every one of the 30 articles. The  
 
9
 
This study, therefore, needs to address a number of important issues, namely: 
a)  Do the present international instruments already provide sufficient protection 
against abuses by governments that breach the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of individuals? 
b)  Is it really necessary to make procedures for control of government acts and 
legislation available at the international level? 
c)  What form will such procedures take and how will they work? 
 
4.  Purpose and Method of the Study 
 
This study has two aims: firstly, to reveal the limitations or weaknesses of the present 
international instruments and provisions for the protection of human rights, and secondly, 
to suggest a relatively new and more progressive international judicial review procedure 
for dealing with human rights violation cases involving individuals and States.  
 
In order to achieve these aims the following methods of research have been employed: 
 
•  Case study. This thesis contains an in-depth study of Indonesian cases where the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals have allegedly been violated. 
The cases discussed here involved prominent political figures and academics as well 
as religious and press personalities. These cases exemplify the sort of State conduct 
that violates human rights, partially as a result of the nature of Indonesia’s legislation 
and court system, and the impunity that sometimes characterises it. It can further be 
said that the Indonesian legal system and court practices have been deliberately 
systematised to protect government agencies from being held responsible for their 
breaches of human rights and abuse of power. The fact that such breaches of human 
                                                                                                                                                  
lack of real accountability for such crimes has only encouraged the perpetrators, fueled resentment and 
perpetuated cycles of violence.”  
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rights and abuse of power have never been brought to court for examination of their 
legality and constitutionality has resulted in State impunity. Hence, this study is 
conducted specifically to explore the possibility of legally testing the validity of those 
government activities and legislation which have led to impunity of those responsible 
for the violation of human rights. 
 
•  Field research. Research activity conducted in the location concerned was 
considered very important for this work, enabling the collection of first-hand 
information relating to violation cases and court rulings and procedures. Much of the 
information could only be obtained through paying visits to a number of research 
centres. The crucial data was not available elsewhere. Information on the details of 
human rights violations by high-level Indonesian government authorities, for instance, 
are normally not accessible to the public in Indonesia (although that is starting to 
change), nor are they readily available on library shelves. Several field trips were 
therefore necessary, including visits to the University of Ottawa and the Canadian 
Human Rights Committee in Ottawa, Canada. Several Indonesian law faculties and 
non-governmental organisations working in the area of human rights have also been 
contacted to obtain data to support this study. 
 
•  Document research. This is the most exhaustive means of research used in this 
study. A large number of legal documents such as international treaties, law books, 
court orders and other legal literature have been studied extensively in order to gain 
comprehensive and impartial information. Some personal communications with 
individuals or authorities have also been undertaken, but due to Indonesian privacy  
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laws, the sources of such input cannot be disclosed. Input of this nature, however, is 
still very helpful in making analyses and drawing conclusions. 
 
Since this is a qualitative study there is no statistical data treatment to be found, and all 
analysis and conclusions in this thesis are made using induction - the inference of 
generalised conclusions from particular instances, and deduction - the deriving of 
conclusions by reasoning, namely the type of inference in which the conclusion about 
particulars follows necessarily from general or universal premises.
9 
 
5.  The Arrangement of the Work 
 
In order to present a clear and systematic report, this thesis has been arranged in seven 
chapters, beginning with a general introduction and ending with a conclusion and 
recommendations. At the beginning of every chapter there is a brief note containing 
preliminary remarks, serving as an introduction to the entire contents of the chapter. 
Several appendices are also attached as part of the work. 
 
Chapter 1, a general introduction, serves as background notes or remarks. It contains 
reasons for the topic being chosen (part 1), a theoretical overview of judicial review (part 
2), the questions and issues which are dealt with in this study (part 3), and the purpose 
and method of the study (part 4). Part 5 outlines the order and arrangement of the thesis. 
 
In Chapter 2, the three fundamental issues of this thesis i.e. judicial review, government 
acts and legislation, and finally human rights are addressed comprehensively. Part 1 deals 
                                                 
9 Merriam Webster. 1993. Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary. 10
th ed., Springfield, Massachusetts: 
Merriam Webster Inc., pp. 301 & 594.  
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with the definition, notion and purpose of judicial review. Government acts and 
legislation are dealt with in part 2, and the major concepts of human rights in part 3, while 
part 4 covers human rights violations. The purpose of presenting these subjects at the 
beginning of this work is to serve as a theoretical basis for the analysis that follows in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
The title of Chapter 3 is "Executive-heavy Legislation, Restricted Judicial Review and 
State Impunity: the Case of Indonesia". Accordingly, there are three main parts in this 
chapter: the Indonesian legal system (part 2), Indonesian judicial review (part 3), and a 
short list of records of human rights violations to demonstrate the impunity of the State 
(part 4). In addition to this, part 5 deals with attempts made by individuals or 
organisations to seek redress or remedies in relation to these issues at the national and 
international levels (part 5). This chapter provides basic case material to demonstrate why 
an international judicial review is deemed necessary. 
 
As a sequel to the previous chapter, the content of Chapter 4 explores the potential for 
individual access to an international remedy system. This chapter covers issues such as an 
overview of the United Nations Human Rights System (part 2), functions and powers of 
Charter-based bodies (part 3), as well as communications procedures and an individual’s 
access under international human rights instruments (part 4). This chapter provides a 
detailed explanation of the United Nations bodies and other internationally recognised 
instruments for the protection of human rights, and the access available to individuals 
claiming that their rights have been violated. 
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The next issue that has to be addressed is the need for an international judicial review of 
government acts and legislation for breaches of human rights. This is dealt with in 
Chapter 5. This chapter contains analyses of, and answers to, questions such as: ‘Why is 
international judicial review needed?’ (part 2), ‘What are the powers and competences of 
the International Criminal Court?’ (part 3), ‘What are the international practices which are 
similar to judicial review?’ (part 4), ‘What function would the international judicial 
review serve?’, ‘Who should possess this power?’, and ‘Where should this power be 
based?’ (part 5). This chapter is proposed as a response to the previous chapter in which 
an alternative procedure was offered. 
 
As a logical sequence, Chapter 6 proposes a new international judicial review procedure. 
In this chapter, basic issues relating to court proceedings are addressed, such as who can 
bring a case, (part 2), stages of the procedure (part 3) and the critical appraisals and 
prospects of the procedure (part 4). This chapter closes the study and analysis prior to 
conclusions being drawn and recommendations made. 
 
Chapter 7 contains the conclusions that are derived from the entire study (part 1). On the 
basis of these conclusions, some recommendations are made in relation to the subject 
matter of the study as well as to areas of possible further research (part 2).  Chapter 2 
JUDICIAL REVIEW, GOVERNMENT ACTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Since this study focuses on the judicial control of government acts and legislation for 
breaches of human rights, it is necessary to discuss the three basic elements which make 
up the title of this thesis: judicial review, government acts and legislation, and human 
rights. This last element will be dealt with by investigating the ideals and ideologies 
which underpin contemporary concepts of human rights.  The discussion in this chapter 
will be concluded with a brief explanation of what constitutes a violation of human rights. 
The subject of international judicial review will be examined in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
1.  Judicial Review 
 
Clive B. Lewis defined judicial review as:  
…the process by which the courts exercise a supervisory jurisdiction [or control] 
over the activities of public authorities in the field of public law.
10 
 
This control is exercised primarily through the application for judicial review of 
regulations and policies made by those public authorities. Lewis further emphasizes that 
judicial review jurisdiction only operates in the field of public law; and 
[The] procedure is generally regarded as public law remedy. More accurately, the 
application for judicial review is a specialized procedure by which an applicant 
can seek one or more of the existing prerogative remedies which can now only be 
claimed by way of an application for judicial review and, in appropriate 
circumstances, declarations and injunctions and damages.
11 
 
                                                 
10 Lewis, Clive B. 2000. Judicial Remedies in Public Law. 2
nd ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 7. 
11 Lewis, Id.  
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Supperstone and Goudie assert that “judicial review is the process by which the High 
Court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings and decisions of inferior 
courts, tribunals and other bodies or persons who carry out quasi-judicial functions or 
who are charged with the performance of public acts and duties.”
12 In this connection, it is 
important to distinguish between application for judicial review and appeal, bearing in 
mind the suggestion of Ian McLeod that “appeal is a means of challenging a [court] 
decision, while [judicial] review is a means of challenging the way in which the decision 
was made.”
13 And furthermore, 
One major practical consequence of the distinction is that in the case of an appeal 
the appellate body is not only being asked to say whether the decision was right or 
wrong, but can also generally substitute its own decision. Whereas in the context 
of [judicial] review, the supervisory body is not called upon to say whether it 
agrees with the merits of the decision, and therefore, even if it upholds the 
challenge, it cannot substitute its own decision, compel it to be re-made in a lawful 
fashion, and make an order prohibiting future illegality.
14 
 
In the case Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans, Lord Brightman expresses 
himself in similar vein: 
Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a [court] decision, but a 
review of the manner in which the decision was made. [It] is concerned, not with 
the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the 
power of the court is observed, the court will, in my view, under the guise of 
preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.
15 
 
A United States-oriented definition of judicial review is put forward by Tate and Jackson 
in the book they edited, entitled “Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy”. This 
book states that:  
                                                 
12 Supperstone, Micahel & Goudie, James (Eds.). 1992. Judicial Review. London: Buttersworth, p. 24. 
13 McLeod, Ian T. 1993. Judicial Review. Chichester: Barry Rose, p. 1. 
14 McLeod, Id. 
15 See, Supperstone & Goudie (Eds.). Ibid., at p. 24.  
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… judicial review refers to the ability of a court to determine the acceptability of a 
given law or other official action on grounds of compatibility with constitutional 
forms.”
16 
 
In relation to McLeod’s term “fashion”, the word “forms” refers to procedural matters and 
the substance or matter of the law. From this perspective, judicial review can be 
categorized into two major types, namely procedural and substantial judicial review. In 
the procedural review, the object of examination or review is the "fashion", the way or the 
procedure by which a decision or law was issued. Thus, it concerns itself with whether or 
not all the necessary formalities have been met. That is why this type of review is also 
called formal judicial review. The procedure by which the constitutionality and legality of 
the substance or the subject matter of the decision or law are tested is called substantive or 
material judicial review.
17 
 
Neal C. Tate goes even further when he divides judicial review into five different types: 
a. Constitutional and Administrative Review 
b. Direct and Indirect Review 
c. A Priori / A Posteriori and Abstract / Concrete Review 
d. All Courts and Constitutional Court Review 
e. Coerciveness of Review.
18 
 
In the book mentioned above, co-editor Neal  C. Tate provides comprehensive 
explanations for these types of review, which can be summarised as follows: 
 
                                                 
16Jackson, Donald W. & Tate, C, Neal (Eds.). 1992. Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy. 
Westport: Greenwood Press, p, 4. 
17Sri Soemantri. 1982. Hak Menguji Material di Indonesia (Substantive Judicial Review in Indonesia).  
Bandung: Penerbit Alumni, p. 6. 
18Jackson & Tate (Eds.). Ibid., at pp. 4-8.  
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a)  Constitutional review occurs when the courts are assigned to examine and to 
declare whether state laws, legislation and actions of government (including 
legislative and judicial agencies) are constitutional or unconstitutional. 
Administrative review occurs when the courts are assigned to examine and to 
declare whether the actions of government agencies (other than the courts) are 
legally appropriate or not. 
b)  Direct review is basically the same as constitutional review, while indirect review 
occurs where, in the process of interpretation of laws, a court considers whether or 
not the issuing body or legislature actually has the legislative power it claims. 
c)  A priori / a posteriori review is an examination procedure exercised by the courts 
before (a priori) or after (a posteriori) laws or actions take effect. The former is 
identical to abstract, the latter to concrete. 
d)  Coerciveness of review was introduced by William Kitchin in 1990. This has to do 
with the effectiveness of the procedure. At one extreme, the ability of courts to 
declare official laws void on grounds of unconstitutionality is very limited (like in 
Indonesia); at the other extreme, the power of courts is unlimited (coercive). It is 
therefore important to determine in which instance the power of courts exercising 
judicial review may be coercive and those in which it may be advisory
19. 
 
For the purpose of the discussion in this thesis, however, Brewer-Carias’ formulation 
asserting that judicial review is “[the] power of court to decide upon the constitutionality 
of legislative acts; in other words, the judicial control of the constitutionality of [all] 
legislation”
20, is considered the more accurate one. And in order to sharpen the focus of 
                                                 
19 Jackson and Tate, Ibid., p. 8 
20 Brewer-Carias, Allan R. 1989. Judicial Review in Comparative Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
    Press, pp. 4-8.  
 
18
this discussion as it unfolds, neither procedural judicial review nor the divisions 
mentioned above will be considered further in this study. 
 
It should be noted that not all decisions or laws that are disliked by citizens or groups of 
citizens, are reviewable. Three main factors are used to decide whether aggrieved persons 
can challenge decisions: firstly, whether or not the particular body or agency that made 
the decision is the appropriate body to be subject to a review procedure, secondly, 
assuming that the body is appropriate and subject to review, whether or not it is possible 
to review the particular decision or law that is subject to complaint, and thirdly, whether 
or not the person who is submitting application for review has locus standi to do so. 
Moreover, the procedural relevance for the applicant of answers to the above questions 
must also be considered. Must the applicant proceed in a particular way depending on 
whether or not review is available? What will the consequences be for the applicant’s case 
if, in challenging the decision in question, he or she uses a procedure deemed to be 
inappropriate by the court? Due to limited space and in order to maintain a focussed 
discussion, these issues will not be dealt with in this thesis.
21 
 
To sum up, judicial review is the procedure whereby the court is able, in certain cases, 
with or without application, to review the legality (and constitutionality) of legislation or 
decisions affecting the public made by a wide variety of bodies, ranging from government 
                                                 
21 For details on this subject matter, see, among others, Report of the Administrative Review Council 
Australia to the Attorney-General No. 0026 (1986), published by the Australian Government Publication 
Centre, Canberra and several other reports in the years 1991, 1995, 1999 published by the AGPS and 
Administrative Review Council; also see Grahame Aldous & John Alder (1993). Application for Judicial 
Review: Law and Practice of the Crown Office. 2
nd ed., London: Buttersworth; Sue Arrowsmith (1988). 
Government Procurement and Judicial Review. Toronto: Carswell; Stanley A. de Smith, Harry Woolf, 
A.P. LeSeur & Jeffrey Jowell (Eds.) (1995). Judicial Review of Administrative Action. 5
th. Ed., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell; and C.T. Emery & B. Smythe (1986). Judicial Review: legal limits of official power. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell.  
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or state institutions, ministers and officials exercising prerogative or statutory powers, and 
other powerful self-regulating bodies. 
 
1.1.  The Notion of Judicial Review 
 
From an historical viewpoint, the notion of judicial review emerged as a companion of the 
idea of the Rechstaat (Rule of Law), which dates back to the late nineteenth century in 
Europe.
22 Since then, this concept has been developed and reached its evolutionary apex 
shortly after World War II. From then on, despite differences in interpretation, the 
concept seemed to be suitable for every country in the world. 
 
A closer examination of history helps to trace the notion of judicial review back to its 
origin. It was the Magna Carta, decreed by King John of England in June, 1215, which 
was regarded as the birth of the Rule of Law.
23 The Great Charter, as it is popularly 
referred to, guaranteed that citizens would be protected against arbitrary decisions and 
sentences - these were, up to that time, made at the Crown’s discretion and considered 
part of its prerogative. With this Charter, the King recognised the authority of the law 
over his own power to govern (although retaining some of his prerogatives), and placed 
himself on the same footing as his subjects before the law. The Magna Carta thus 
established the principles of supremacy of the law and equality before the law: two main 
“pillars of the Rule of Law”, as Dicey termed it.
24Later on in history, the principle of the 
Rule of Law became an effective means of controlling the performance of governments, 
                                                 
22 See, for instance, Gneist R. 1958. Der Rechsstaat und die Verwaltungsgerichte in Deutschalnd. 2
nd ed., 
Darmstadt: reprint and Informationen zur politischen Bildung, der Rechsstaat. Bonn: published by 
Bundeszentralle fuer politischen Bildung (1991), particularly at pp. 3-6 and 13-15. 
23 Dassault, Rene & Borgeat, Louis. 1990. Administrative Law: A Treatise. Vol. 4, 2
nd ed., Toronto: Cars-
well Student Edition, pp. 25-26. 
24 A.V. Dicey’s “Introduction to the Study of the Law of Constitution”, edited by E.C.S. Wade, 10
th ed., as 
 quoted by Dassault and Borgeat, Id.  
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whose power was thus limited by the duty to guarantee the rights and freedoms of 
individuals and, at the same time, regulated by the functions and duties of the 
government. 
 
In the eighteenth century, the French commentator Montesquieu introduced the doctrine 
of separation of powers (Trias Politica), which requires that the three main State functions 
(legislative, executive and judicial) should each be exercised by different agencies. 
Although the strict separation of powers has never actually occurred, the basic principles 
of this doctrine emphasize that every exercise of power must happen through the proper 
channels and must be in accordance with the law.  
 
Basically, the legislative bodies make the laws, the executive agencies implement and 
perform the duty and competence prescribed by those laws, and the judicial agencies 
(courts) supervise or monitor the implementation of those laws and, where necessary, 
force the other agencies to abide by the laws if there is a violation or inconsistency. 
 
Notwithstanding the values it upholds, the concept of the Rule of Law will remain a 
buried relic unless, as van Dijk asserts: 
 
…procedures are made available by which it is possible to control the observance 
by the government of the legal rules it has itself laid down.  Such control of 
governmental action not only serves to protect the individual against the 
government; it serves the public interest in the maintenance of the legal order. 
Moreover, this control is in the interest of the government itself. The awareness 
that the government too is bound by the law and is subject to supervision under 
certain guarantees, in combination with the fact that for most legal communities 
this supervision will show that the government generally acts legally, strengthens 
confidence in the governmental apparatus and thus enhances the efficiency of the 
administration.
25 
                                                 
25 van Dijk, P. 1980. Judicial Review of Governmental Action and the Requirements of an Interest to Sue.  
    The Hague: Sijhthoff & Noordhoff, p. 2.  
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One of the above-mentioned procedures is unarguably the judicial review. 
 
In accordance with van Dijk’s assertion, the notion of Rule of Law is part of, or rather, 
derived from the principle that no one may exercise power unless that power has been 
granted to them by law. This premise can also be used in formulating the notion of 
judicial review of government acts; that is, no government can exercise power unless that 
power has been granted by law. Furthermore, the legality of that exercise of power must 
constantly be subject to a review procedure prescribed by the law. 
 
1.2.  The Purpose of Judicial Review 
 
In relation to their function as law enforcers, and in the context of English public law, 
Lewis summarises that the courts will review an exercise of power by the government and  
other public bodies in order to ensure that they:  
a)  have not made an error of law; 
b)  have considered all relevant factors, and not taken into account any 
irrelevant factors; 
c)  have acted for a purpose expressly or implicitly authorised by statute; 
d)  have not acted in a way that is so unreasonable that no reasonable public 
body would act in that way; 
e)  have observed statutory procedural requirements and the common law 
principles of natural justice or procedural fairness.
26 
 
Although these review criteria were only meant to be applicable in judicial practices 
based on the common law, they are, in fact, also suitable for most, if not all, national court 
systems and practices. The words “common law”, for example, can be replaced with 
                                                 
26 Lewis, Clive B. Ibid, at p. 1.  
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“constitutional law” in the European-continental system to make the term more general, 
or “our Constitution” to make it more specific to a particular country.
27 
 
While the aim of judicial review may vary somewhat in emphasis from country to 
country, nevertheless, the general purpose of all judicial proceedings in the courts is to 
ensure that the law is enforced and upheld as the law itself requires. Judicial review is no 
different; with the only exception being, as the definition confines, the purpose of judicial 
review is to test, to question, or to challenge the lawfulness of acts, decisions or laws of 
the government and other public bodies. 
 
In Japan, for example, the principal purpose of judicial review is the protection of 
individual rights,
28 whereas in the United States and Canada, which represent the 
American-style of judicial review, the main purpose is to “measure legislation against the 
requirements of a written constitution.”
29 In the United Kingdom and other countries 
whose legal systems have common law foundations, the purpose of judicial review is 
primarily, although not only, to “exercise a supervisory jurisdiction over public bodies to 
ensure that they observe the substantive principles of public law.”
30 
 
2.  Government Acts and Legislation 
 
Prior to examining the nature of government activities or legislation that can be subjected 
to judicial review, it is first necessary to define the term “government”. It is generally, if 
                                                 
27 Such a deduction is meant to provide law students studying different constitutional systems with a simple 
approach, as has been the case in Indonesian law schools. See, Padmo Wahyono, Kuliah Perdana 
Pengantar Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia (Inaugural Lecture on the Indonesian Constitutional Law), 
University of Indonesia in 1979. 
28 Jackson & Tate, Ibid., at p. 29. 
29 Ibid., at p. 30. 
30 Lewis, Ibid., at p. 3.  
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not universally, recognised that a State is an abstract entity which finds its real, concrete 
expression in the government
31. In other words, it is through the actions of government 
that one can comprehend and even “taste” whether the State is a monstrous power or a 
good caring parent. As an abstract conception, the State cannot be “sensed”. The 
government makes it real. “State” is thus a generic term whereas “government” is a 
specific term. 
 
In every democratically governed country, the classical conception is to have the power of 
the State apportioned among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the 
government. In theory, these three branches should work harmoniously together and 
avoid encroaching on one another's domain, but in practice, this is not always the case.  
 
This thesis is not aimed at making an in-depth analysis of the function of these three 
branches. Rather, the focus is centred on the “government” as a whole, of which the three 
branches constitute a “tripod” of State apparatus. In spite of variations in the 
understanding of government branches, the legislative-executive-judicial model of state or 
“government” for our purposes remains the basic conception of government in this 
world.
32 
 
With that perspective in mind, it can be concluded that when one talks about government 
acts (and legislation), one must inevitably talk about the acts of the three branches of 
government: legislative, executive and judicial. In conclusion, the term “government act” 
                                                 
31 More on the theory and conceptions of state, see, among others, Harold Plaskitt & Percy Jordan .1991. 
Government of Britain and the Commonwealth. London: University Tutorial Press Ltd., pp. 1-22; David 
Held (Ed.). 1983. State and Societies. New York: New York University Press; Alex N. Dragnich & John 
C. Wahlke (Eds.). 1996. Government and Politics, an Introduction to Political Science. New York: 
Random House; also Dassault & Borgeat, Ibid., pp. 5-35. 
32 More details on the forms of government, see, among others, Dragnich & Wahlke (Eds.), Ibid., especially 
at pp. 25-212.  
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in its broadest sense comprises any act of one or more persons or agencies discharging a 
State function, irrespective of whether they are government employees, officials or private 
persons.
33 
 
As will be discussed at a later point in relation to Indonesia, the approach in that country 
is much more restricted. Courts in Indonesia can only examine the legality and 
constitutionality of administrative acts or decisions (this is limited to a very narrow 
definition of “government”) and the lawfulness of state legislation (a judicial control of 
legislative power).   
 
3.  Major Concepts of Human Rights 
 
The term “major concepts” in relation to human rights means the more widely discussed 
concepts in the literature examined in this study, but does not in any way imply that the 
“major concepts” are more genuine or more valuable than the “minor” ones.
34 It is not 
appropriate – nor indeed feasible – to discuss all human rights concepts in this study. 
Generally speaking, it has been argued by some that there are four major systems
35 of 
human rights in the world: Asian
36, European, American and African. All four will be 
                                                 
33 Compare, P. van Dijk, Judicial Review of Governmental Action and the Requirement of an Interest to 
Sue, Ibid., at p. 4. He sees the “governmental action” as executive acts only, while in this study an 
executive action is seen, in narrow sense, as part of a government act which includes also legislative and 
judicial actions, especially in relation to discussing international judicial review. Thus, the term used here 
by van Dijk is “administrative action”. 
34 Some authors suggest that there are several new emerging human rights concepts or systems in several 
regions such as in Arabian region (Cairo Declaration on Human Rights, 1990) and Asian Region 
(Bangkok Declaration, 1993). For these, see, among others, Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston. 2000. 
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals. Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 
at p. 780. 
35 Most authors use the term “concept”, but some others “system”. Steiner & Alston, Ibid., for instance, at 
pp. 779-786 uses the term “system”. In this work both terms are regarded as the same and used 
interchangeably.  
36 According to Steiner & Alston, one of the new emerging concepts is the Asian system; albeit still in the 
form of a proposal compared to that of the European, Inter-American and African systems. See, Steiner & 
Alston, Id., in particular at p. 780.  
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dealt with in the following sections and the discussion will be concluded with an 
examination of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which in this respect can be 
regarded as a fundamental doctrine. 
 
3.1.  Asian Concept of Human Rights 
 
The modern concept of human rights is relatively new to Asia. It has been introduced and 
developed over less than four decades,
37 but the Asian concept of human rights has yet to 
be fully formulated. James Tang observed that a region-wide system of human rights 
protection does not exist in the Asian region
38. Steiner and Alston note that “although 
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter makes provision for regional arrangements in 
relation to peace and security, it is silent as to human rights cooperation at that level.”
39 
More recently, regional concepts and systems of human rights have begun to emerge as a 
reaction to the active encouragement of the United Nations through a resolution adopted 
by General Assembly
 40. 
 
Dating back to the ancient world, mainly in East Asian region, one strong influence upon 
the concept of human rights is seen by some commentators as closely related to 
                                                 
37 Batra, T.S. 1979. Human Rights, A Critique. New Delhi: B.V. Gupta, p. 41. 
38 Tang, James T.H. (Ed.). 1995. Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific. London, 
New York: Pimter, p. 3. The Asian Charter of Human Rights is not considered as the ‘official’ concept of 
human rights; it is mainly the position or view taken by a large number of human rights NGOs, 
community organisations, concerned persons and groups. As a matter of fact, there are several documents 
relating to basic principles of human rights adopted within several Asian countries, e.g. Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration on Human Rights, Larrakia Declaration, Bangalore Declaration, Declaration of ASEAN 
Accord. All these documents can be accessed in a collection compiled by F. de Varennes in Asia-Pacific 
Human Rights Documents and Resources, Vol. 1, published by Martinus Nijhoff, 1998. 
39 Steiner & Alston, Ibid. 
40 An appeal was made by the United Nations through General Assembly Resolution 32/127 to States in 
areas where regional arrangements in the field of human rights do not yet exist “to consider agreements 
with a view to the establishment within their respective regions of suitable machinery for the promotion of 
human rights.”  
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Confucianism.  W. Theodore de Barry makes the following comments about the core 
values of Confucianism: 
 
From this [public and private tension] it may seem again that the Confucian ideal 
was a balance of public and private, not an assertion of one over the other. In fact, 
from the Confucian point of view the state’s responsibility for the public interest 
was to encourage legitimate private initiative. How to define what was legitimate 
remained an issue, and the state, historically, was not slow to assert its own 
authority in this respect (any more than it is today), but Confucians were just as 
ready to challenge any such claim on the part of the state bureaucracy (guan), 
asserting instead that the public interest (gong) consists in serving the legitimate 
desires and material needs of the people. A balance of public and private (gongsi 
yiti), not the person or individual subordinated to the collectivity or state, 
remained the Confucian ideal.
41 
 
A human right in Confucianism is therefore none other than a balance of public interest 
on one side and individual desire for freedom on the other. A true human right can only 
be appreciated in the light of the continuing tension that results from efforts to achieve a 
balance between the two.  
 
Using another style of speech, but with essentially the same meaning, Michael Freeman 
observes that “there was no explicit concept of human rights in East Asian culture before 
the reception of Western political ideas at the end of the nineteenth century”, and asserts 
that: 
Confucianism laid the foundations of ethics in certain social relations and the 
mutual obligations that were inherent in them.
42 
 
With regard to the infiltration of Western ideas into Asian values, Freeman further 
suggests that: 
                                                 
41 de Barry, Theodore W. 1998. Asian Values and Human Rights. Cambridge; Harvard University Press, p. 
29; cf., James C. Hsiung (Ed.). 1985. Human Rights in East Asia, a Cultural Perspective. New York: 
Paragon House Publisher, pp. 1-30. 
42 Freeman, Michael. 1995. “Human Rights: Asia and the West” in James Tang (Ed.), Human Rights and 
the International Relations in the Asia Pacific. Ibid., at p. 15.  
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…the embrace of Western ideas and of rights into Asian values was mainly caused 
by the dissatisfaction of the indigenous with the old order and the fact that 
Western ideas of rights and democracy have helped Asian protesters to articulate 
their goals and principles.
43 
 
Yet, as time has passed and changes have occurred, such an embrace has not been without 
objections. Objections to the application of Western ideas of human rights are based on 
the argument that such ideas and values are alien to Asian traditions. These objections 
gained considerable currency in the East when governments of Asian countries were so 
“unfairly” stamped as human rights violators by the West, while at the same time Western 
countries practiced imperialism and colonialism. 
 
The Asian response to this criticism was straightforward. The Asians argued that despite 
its social and technological achievements, there was no justification for the West to 
preach morality to Asia, let alone push Asia into implementing ‘westernized’ human 
rights. The difference here lies within the basic concept of human rights held by East and 
West respectively: the West sees them as the equal civil and political rights of every 
individual, whereas Asia views them more in the context of economic and social 
development for the nation as a collective entity.  
 
This polarisation of perception also leads to the other common Asian argument against 
criticism from the West:
44 that stability, and therefore authoritarianism and respect for 
traditional cultural values, are necessary to facilitate development, including that of 
economic and social rights.  
 
                                                 
43 Freeman, Id. 
44 Freeman, Ibid., at p. 16.  
 
28
For example, summarizing the debate with respect to Western and Asian human rights 
perspectives, Yash Gai asserts: 
… it is generally assumed that there is one Asian view or concept of human rights, 
and that it is opposed to the tradition of individual human rights that first 
developed in the West. … The gist of this position is that human rights as 
propounded in the West are based on individualism and therefore have no 
relevance to Asia in societies which are based on the primacy of the community.
45 
 
Onuma Yasuaki, commenting on the “universal” versus “relative” perceptions of human 
rights, argues that such controversy goes beyond the realm of human rights and behind it 
one can see fundamental problems, namely: 
1)  contradictions between the globalisation of economic and information 
activities and the national state system; 
2)  contradictions between the emergence of non-Western powers in Asia and 
the persistence of Westcentric power structures of information and culture 
in international society, and 
3)  contradictions between a sincere quest for a more humane and less violent 
world and a deep resentment against the colonial past and present 
inequality among nations and international society.
46 
 
However, there is clear evidence that there is no link between economic growth and the 
negation of human rights. Some authoritarian governments may have succeeded in their 
economic development, but many such regimes have failed to achieve stability or 
economic growth.  
 
In 1993 a common understanding of human rights was reached when Asian governments 
came together in Thailand’s capital, Bangkok, for the preparation of the United Nations 
sponsored World Conference on Human Rights, to be held in Vienna. The Asian 
                                                 
45 Gai, Yash. 2000. “Human Rights and the Governance: The Asia Debate”, in Asia-Pacific Journal on 
Human Rights and the Law, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2000. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 16-17. For 
additional readings, see also John Girling (Ed.). 1991. Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region. 
Canberra: Dept. of International Relations, Research schools of Pacific Studies, Australian National 
University. 
46 Yasuaki, Onuma. 2000. “In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: “Universal” vs. “Relative”, in 
Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, Ibid., p. 53.  
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governments that were present in Bangkok adopted a declaration at the conference in 
Vienna. The document, then known as the Bangkok Declaration, recognises the 
universality of human rights with a special note that those rights have to be interpreted in 
the context of religious, historical, cultural and regional particularities. 
 
Amidst accusations that such qualifications could be used by Asian governments as a 
cover for human rights violations
47, thus betraying the universal validity of human 
rights
48, one thing at least was established; namely, the Asian concept of human rights. 
 
The argument that human rights are “none of Asia’s business” is therefore no longer 
valid, since the adopted common position expressed in that Declaration partly, if not 
largely, reflects the universally recognised principles of human rights. This, to some 
degree, opens the avenue for the establishment of an international mechanism for 
promotion and protection of human rights in national government policies, in partial 
conformity with the United Nations’ encouragement and appeal to all States. As one 
human rights activist says, “Human rights do not belong to the West, they are ours too”
49.  
 
3.2.  European Concept of Human Rights 
 
                                                 
47 Many Indonesian NGOs for human rights protection disagree with this and express their criticisms toward 
this concept and perception, including the Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian 
Legal Aid Foundation) as can be seen in its annual report on the human rights situation in Indonesia 
“Catatan Keadaan Hak Asasi manusi di Indonesia 1994”, 1
st ed. published in Jakarta by YLBHI, 1995; 
also, in a similar vein, T. Mulya Lubis, one of Indonesia’s leading human rights advocates in his “Human 
Rights Standard Setting in Asia: Problems and Prospects”, in CSIS-Indonesian Quarterly, 1
st Quarter, 
1993 and in his “In Search of Human Rights: Legal-Political Dilemmas of Indonesia’s New Order”, 
published by PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 1993. 
48 Susumu Awanohara, Machael Vatikiotis & Shada Islam. 1993. “Vienna showdown”, in Far Eastern 
Economic Review, June 17, 1993, p. 17. 
49 Quoted from the opening note made by Dr. F. de Varennes in the Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights 
and the Law, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2000.  
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The European concept of human rights has been well documented in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was signed on 4 
November 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953.  As of 1 June 1993, ten 
protocols were agreed upon as supplementary documents to the original text. The 
Convention is considered the most advanced and developed framework and structure for 
the international protection of human rights in the world. In relation to the promotion of 
respect for international human rights standards, the Convention is of particular 
importance for several reasons: 
•  It was the first comprehensive treaty in the world in this field 
•  It established the first international complaints procedure and the first 
international court for the determination of human rights matters 
•  It remains the most judicially developed of all human rights systems 
•  It has generated a more extensive jurisprudence than any other part of the 
international system.
50 
 
Yet, despite the reputation that the Convention has gained for covering the full spectrum 
of human rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and its protocols only deal with certain rights. Alpha Connelly observes: 
 
… the Preamble to the Convention explicitly states that the signatory governments 
are enforcing only certain rights proclaimed by the United Nations General 
Assembly in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The rights 
guaranteed by the Convention are mainly civil and political rights: rights such as 
the right to life, to freedom from torture and from inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment, to personal liberty, to fair trial, to respect for private and 
family life, to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly 
and freedom of association. The right to vote, a right essential to representative 
democracy, is guaranteed not in the original text but in [article 3 of the First 
Protocol]. Economic and social rights, such as the right to work and the right to 
social welfare, are the subject of separate treaty, the 1961 European Social Charter 
[which entered into force on January 26, 1965].
51 
 
                                                 
50 Steiner & Alston, Ibid., at p. 786. 
51Connelly, Alpha. 1994. “Ireland and the European Convention on Human Rights: An Overview”, in Liz 
Heffernan, Human Rights: A European Perspective, Dublin: The Round Hall Press, p. 35.  
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Human rights in the European perspective are considered as “the rights of the individual 
and the freedom of the citizen.”
52 In 1981 Wiarda, who was the president of the European 
Human Rights Court, wrote an essay on the Ringeisen case in which the Court tried to 
give its own interpretation of the expression “determination of civil rights and 
obligations” in Article 6 (1). He argued that:  
… the Court must have given a much broader scope than what was intended when 
the provision was drafted. Indeed, in reality, the terms “civil rights and 
obligations” is an equivalent of “private or individual rights and obligations”.
53 
 
One might of course argue that there was no necessity for the Court to give an abstract 
definition of “civil rights and obligations”, but, in fact, the notion of the guarantee of 
individual rights has been a prevailing feature of the concept of human rights in Europe. 
 
3.3. Inter-American Concept of Human Rights 
 
The Inter-American Human Rights System is a gradual development from fundamental 
principles for a peaceful coexistence among the American states. The principles include 
regional solidarity, collective security, non-intervention, democracy and human rights. 
These primary and collectively accepted norms were given legal status at the ninth Inter-
American Conference held in Bogota in May 1948, when the American states adopted a 
Charter establishing the Organization on American States (OAS). At the same time, the 
                                                 
52van Dijk, P. 1987. Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension. Koeln: Carl Heymans Verlag KG, 
p. 133. He commented on the wording of the article which leads to that conclusion, especially when one 
considers the text in French, which is more clearly, “contestations sur ses droits et obligations de 
caractere civil”. 
53 Id., at p. 134.  
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Bogota Conference also adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man.
54 
 
Thus, the Americans already had a commitment to human rights in the form of a 
declaration seven months before the United Nations had adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and two and a half years before the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was adopted. 
 
Nevertheless, the establishment of a regional treaty whereby the principles set forth in the 
Declaration would have a legally binding power only came much later.
55 That treaty is the 
American Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted in 1969 and entered into 
force in 1978. Prior to the adoption of the Convention, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights was established in 1959. The Commission became an organ of the OAS 
only after the amendment of the Charter by the Protocol of Buenos Aires 1967. The 
principal function of this Commission is “to promote the observance and protection of 
human rights, and to serve as a consultative organ of the OAS in this matter.”
56 
 
On the basis of the rights which are protected and the freedoms which are guaranteed in 
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Convention on 
Human Rights, one might hastily conclude that the Inter-American concept of human 
                                                 
54 About the debate on the legally binding quality of the Declaration’s provisions relating to human rights, 
see W. van Thomas and A. Thomas. 1963. The Organisation of American States. Dallas: Southern 
Methodist University Press, p. 223. 
55 The reason for this is that in the face of massive and widespread human rights violations in many coup 
d’etat attempts in Latin American countries, the progress towards an established human rights system in 
the region proceeded slowly. J.S. Davidson observes the phenomenon in his books Inter-American Human 
Rights System, published by Dartmouth, 1997, particularly at pp. 1-99 and 259-260, and, more generally 
in Human Rights, published by Open University Press, 1993. 
56 Chapter XVI, Article 111 of the Charter. This broad mandate was further amplified by the Commission 
Statute and Rules of Procedure according to which, as the work progressed, the Commission became an 
organ of the American Convention on Human Rights.  
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rights has an individualistic focus, just like the European one. Article 1 of the Convention, 
for example, requires the States “to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the 
free and full exercise” of the rights and freedoms recognised therein.  
 
The American Convention on Human Rights contains twenty-six rights and freedoms, 
twenty-one of which are included in the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. They are: the right to life, the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial, 
the right to free election, the right to an effective remedy if one’s rights are violated, the 
right to recognition as a person before the law, the right to compensation for miscarriage 
of justice, the right to a name, the right of the child, the right to a nationality, the right to 
equality before the law, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, freedom from 
slavery and servitude, freedom from retroactivity of the criminal law, freedom of 
conscience and religion, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of assembly, 
freedom of association, freedom to marry and found a family, and freedom of movement. 
Meanwhile, there are five rights and freedoms included in the Convention which are not 
part of the United Nations Covenant: the right to property, freedom from exile, 
prohibition of the collective expulsion of aliens, the right of reply, the right of asylum.
57 
 
However, taking this view is not entirely true, especially in conjunction with the provision 
contained in Article XXXVIII of the Declaration, which provides that “the rights of man 
are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the 
general welfare and advancement of democracy.” 
 
                                                 
57 For further comparison of the rights protected in the Inter-American system, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and in the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see N.R. Sharma. 1999. Human 
Rights in the World, Jaipur: Pointer Publishers, especially at pp. 35-117.  
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In conclusion, the American concept of human rights can be pictured as a freeway of 
rights where civic duties function as road signs that remind individuals of the speed limits 
while exercising their rights. 
 
3.4   African Concept of Human Rights 
 
The African system is the newest, least developed and effective, the most distinctive and 
also the most controversial human rights concept of all.
58 This is not surprising when one 
considers the problems faced by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 
which is the sole active organisation in the whole African human rights system. The 
African Commission is a relatively inexperienced organ (fifteen years old), with few 
powers, and for the most part it has been hesitant in exercising or creatively interpreting 
its existing powers, or developing further powers. Moreover, the basic structure and tasks 
undertaken by the Commission have not shown innovation in terms of inter-governmental 
human rights institutions. 
 
Regardless, the region’s sincerity in striving for a common perception of human rights 
was at least proven genuine when the heads of States and governments of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) met in 1981 and eventually adopted the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights. This Charter entered into force in 1986. The 
Charter that established the OAU itself was adopted in 1963. Today, all African States are 
member of the OAU and, as for the African Charter, 53 States are now parties to it. 
Human rights in the African perspective are by and large a communal matter. Contrary to 
the European perspective, which distinguishes individuals, the African view on human 
                                                 
58 Steiner & Alston, International Human Rights in Context, Ibid., at p. 920.  
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rights emphasizes communality. Lone Lindholt articulates this African perspective as 
follows: 
…the focus is the group and on obligations rather than on the rights of the 
individual, contained in the statement ‘in African culture it is the community 
(consisting of unitary, or extended, families) that has priority’. Indeed, we may not 
even find many examples of forms of traditional governments fulfilling the 
requirements of European democratic ideals, which again rest on the equality, 
autonomy and ability of representation of each member of the community.
59 
 
 
Yet this does mean that in traditional Africa there has never been a universally recognised 
conception of rights. Some human rights recognised by most “civilised” societies have 
long been part of the African culture, such as: the right to membership, freedom of 
thought, speech, belief and association, and the right to enjoy property. In contrast to 
European human rights, which stemmed from a Grundnorm or constitutional basis, these 
rights and freedoms were originally derived from natural law and the dignity of man. In 
Lindholt’s own terms, the legitimacy of these rights comes from: 
 
… a set of social values ingrained as a set of basic principles espoused by at least 
a substantial majority of a given society. ….Africa maintained a set of rights and 
duties for its peoples which were substantially in tune with the concept of “natural 
law” and the “dignity of man”.
60 
 
3.5  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
It can be argued that the most important question relating to the universality of human 
rights is the following: whether they are universal or whether they ought to be universal. 
The answer to this question is far more than a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. It involves some 
relevant issues such as moral and cultural values, tradition, religion, state and legal 
                                                 
59 Lindholt, Lone. 1997. Questioning the Universality of Human Rights, The African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights. Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, p. 18. More details on the cultural perspective of the 
African human rights conception, see Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im & Francis M. Deng (Eds.). 1990. 
Human Rights in Africa, Cross-Cultural Perspectives. Washington: The Brookings Institution. 
60 Id., at p. 19.  
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systems as well as social, political, economic, and even historical backgrounds. 
Addressing this issue, Lindholt argues: 
The importance of distinguishing between the two lies within the fact that we 
cannot legitimately deduce from “is” to “ought”, since this represents a confusion 
of two distinct scientific methodologies. This means that just because there seems 
to be some degree of universal consensus as to basic human needs formulated as 
rights and freedoms, we cannot extend this to serve as the only legitimation for 
claiming that human rights, as they develop and express themselves at different 
times or under different circumstances, must therefore conform to a narrowly 
defined universal code of human rights. As to the contrary situation, deducing 
from the normative to the empirical also carries some dubious consequences. An 
illustration hereof would be to reject certain types or distinctions of rights because 
they do not conform to a normative definition of a universal human rights 
conception.
61 
 
Nevertheless, even though we cannot come to an agreement as to whether human rights 
are universal or not, due to the complexities and the variety of perceptions pertaining to 
this matter, one thing is certain: the basic principles set forth in the Universal Declaration 
of Human rights should indeed be deemed as acceptable to every human being and 
society. Affirming anything else would be irrational, and a disaster for the human 
individual in particular and society in general. 
 
Let us examine briefly several principles upheld in the Declaration: 
•  all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights (Art. 1) 
•  everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person (Art. 3) 
•  no one shall be held in slavery and servitude; slavery and slave trade shall be    
prohibited in all their forms (Art. 4) 
•  no one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment (Art. 5) 
•  all are equal before the law (Art. 7) 
•  no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Art. 9) 
•  everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence (Art. 13) 
•  everyone has the right to property (Art. 17) 
•  everyone has the right to freedom of thought, belief and religion (Art. 18) 
•  everyone has the right to social welfare (Arts. 22, 23, 24) 
•  everyone has the right to education (Art. 26), etc…  
 
                                                 
61 Lindholt, Questioning the Universality of Human Rights, Ibid., at p. 23.  
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It is generally acknowledged that human beings everywhere aspire to the realisation of 
diverse values and interests to ensure their individual and collective well-being. It is also 
a common observation that these aspirations are often harshly frustrated by social as well 
as natural forces; resulting in exploitation, oppression, persecution and other forms of 
deprivation. That is why it is the duty of all peoples to prevent all this frustration from 
occurring by observing these “universally” accepted principles, upholding them in the 
family, the society, the state, and in the international arena.  
 
It may be asked, how can this goal be reached if there is no “common understanding” or 
“gentlemen's agreement” among the peoples? It is therefore the purpose of this 
Declaration to lay a foundation and to provide a common understanding for all members 
of the human family in their striving for freedom, justice and peace in the world. The 
opening statement of the Declaration distinctly and appropriately acknowledges that: 
 
…[the] recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world.
62 
 
Universal peace and the respect of human rights are urgent issues. Man can peacefully 
enjoy life if the human rights of every individual are recognized and, what is more, 
respected. Progress is only possible if peace prevails. 
 
4.  Human Rights Violations 
 
Every person wishes to live in peace and harmony with their neighbours. This idea 
extends from home to society, state, and the whole world. Such noble endeavour must be 
                                                 
62 First sentence of the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
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protected. Any violation in a particular instance may be a threat for all human rights. 
Hence, it is the responsibility of the individual, family, society and the world to protect 
and preserve harmony by ensuring that human rights are not violated. In order to 
guarantee this, a State must make the effort to produce legislation that necessarily 
contains legal assurances for the preservation of human rights. A violation of such a right 
will only lead to a hostile society. 
 
When does a violation of human rights take place? Any action against the enjoyment of 
human rights becomes a breach of human rights, regardless of the origin of this action, be 
it from an individual, a family, a society, a state or government, or the international 
community and its organisations. 
 
From what Lalit Parmar has catalogued about situations in which human rights may be 
considered violated, any of the following actions or conditions are considered violations 
of human rights: 
•  Fear of exercising human rights; the fear to defend one's own human rights 
and those of others; 
•  Obstruction to human rights; any acts that prevent someone from enjoying 
his/her human rights; 
•  Breach of human rights; denying someone’s rights to benefit from his/her 
rights; 
•  Molestation of those who attempt to exercise their human rights; any 
molesting or annoying acts that intimidate people so that they are deprived of 
enjoying their rights; 
•  Attack on human rights; some people do not wish to allow other people to 
enjoy their rights. Any clear, direct or indirect, attack to the rights of others.
63 
                                                 
63 Parmar, Lalit. 1998. Human Rights. 1
st ed. New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pty. Ltd, pp. 76-80.  
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5.  Summary 
 
The term Rule of Law (Rechtstaat) shares the fate of other political and legal definitions. 
This term is widely used in the political and legal discourse, although it is understood in 
various ways.  It is, however, fortunate that many debates will cease when the existence 
of the Rule of Law is in danger; namely, when there is a threat or potential hindrance, be 
it coming from socio-political, economic, legal or any other forces. 
 
One of the most serious threats to the consistent observance of the Rule of Law comes 
from State governments, which are supposed to be its defenders. In the specific situation 
of Indoneisa, the most common form of threat is the excessive use of power. Using the 
powers vested in them, governments maintain the status quo and deny the rights of their 
citizens. Legislation, decisions, decrees and other acts of government are often abusive or 
simply unlawful, and yet unassailable. The government considers itself above and beyond 
the law. 
 
In a Rechtsstaat, the government is also bound by the law, and all its acts are ideally 
subject to review for their lawfulness and conformity with human rights standards. Such 
review procedures are necessary in the interests of both the individual citizen and the 
government itself. Realising that everyone is acting according to the law creates a climate 
of confidence, and so progress is possible in the struggle for social welfare. 
 
Judicial review is a court procedure whereby the legality and constitutionality of 
government acts is challenged, and if they are found unlawful, the court has the  
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competence to repeal the act or decision and, where possible, impose another that is 
lawful and in accordance with the law. 
 
In the national context of Indonesia, a government act is by and large an administrative or 
executive action. In international law, however, actions of the judiciary also fall under the 
heading of government act, since a State is internationally responsible for any action of its 
courts that violates international law.  
 
In order to assess whether a government act breaches human rights, a common 
understanding as to what human rights really are has to be achieved. It may be argued that 
the basic principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be the 
international standards suitable for every civilised society, since there is no disagreement 
with those fundamental values of human dignity and rights. 
 
Any act that breaches, denies, attacks or ignores human rights is seen as a violation of 
human rights. Recognition and respect of these rights are the preconditions for peace and 
the social, economic and political welfare among all members of the human family. Any 
interference with the exercise and enjoyment of these rights would be a disaster for all 
human beings.  
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Chapter 3 
EXECUTIVE-HEAVY LEGISLATION, RESTRICTED JUDICIAL REVIEW  
AND STATE IMPUNITY: The Case of Indonesia 
 
1.  Preliminary Remarks 
 
Why use Indonesia as a case study? Four main characteristics typify Indonesian law: 
chameleon-like fluidity, discriminative law enforcement, overlapping legislation and 
denial of justice. Under such conditions, many government acts and abuses of human 
rights cannot be prosecuted in domestic courts. The State government and its agencies can 
therefore avoid any liability for their abuses and breaches of human rights linked to their 
actions or even legislation. This makes them, for all intents and purposes, almost 
invulnerable unless this impunity is challenged through international mechanisms. 
 
Indonesian law has sometimes been compared to a leaking umbrella. When it rains, the 
leaking is so bad that it cannot provide the desired protection for the people. Others liken 
Indonesian law to a spider’s web, which can only catch little insects, but will be torn apart 
by bigger insects. 
 
Indonesia’s confusing legal system and legislation are a legacy of the Dutch colonial era, 
which was deliberately meant to disorient the colonised people so that they might more 
easily remain under the control of the colonial authorities at that time. Many of these 
colonial laws and institutions are still in force; in accordance with a provision mentioned 
in by the Supreme Clause II of the Constitutional Transitional Regulation.  
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Additionally, since every public or administrative agency is vested with rule-making 
power, there is such a plethora of regulations working at cross purposes that it is hard to 
be certain which one really applies. When this is combined with a multitude of different 
types of courts dealing with different types of cases, you end up with even more 
confusion for the people who wish for justice to prevail. Therefore, Indonesia serves as a 
rather unique, yet quite relevant, context in which to consider the desirability of some 
form of outside judicial review. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold. First, to provide an example of how a 
State and its agencies (i.e. the government) can commit blatant and gross human rights 
violations in a system where no sufficient legal remedies are provided. This happens 
partly because of the inability of the legal system to provide the desired protection, a 
situation which may have been deliberately devised through State legislation.  It also 
happens because of a government system which has assigned to the executive branch of 
government far more power than it has to the other branches of government (i.e. 
legislative and judiciary).  
 
Hence, the judiciary and the parliament lack the necessary power to exercise some 
restraint over the executive. The second purpose of this chapter is to provide a reasonably 
detailed description of the existing Indonesian judicial review system which, until the first 
Annual Session of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR)
64, is unable to review the 
legality and constitutionality of certain legislation
65 on which government policies are 
based. Once again, this has been deliberately designed this way, using State legislation, 
institutions and measures. Moreover, abuse of power by the State remains unassailable, 
                                                 
64 People’s Consultative Assembly, Indonesia’s highest state organ. 
65 Parliamentary acts/statutes or Undand-undang (UU), MPR Decrees or Ketetapan MPR (Tap MPR)  
    and higher legislation (constitution).  
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since the laws and regulations on which such policies are based are “legal” and 
“constitutional”. Through those laws, which cannot be reviewed due to the country’s 
constitutional system, the government has been able to violate many basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of its citizens. In legal terms, therefore, Indonesia may serve as 
a good example of the unreliability of a State in providing its citizens with adequate 
protection against abuse of power and violation of human rights when only the 
constitution and legislation are relied on. Because many of the provisions of the 
Constitution are so vague and open to multiple interpretations, it has been the basis for the 
government’s ability to pass legislation that disregards the interests and rights of the 
people. 
 
After its first Annual Session ever, the MPR passed a decree (or Tap MPR No. III / MPR / 
2000) concerning judicial review of higher regulations such as Acts or statutes. This is 
certainly a new development in the Indonesian judicial system, but whether this will 
address the issue remains to be seen. This question will be covered in more detail in the 
section on the Indonesian judicial review system below. 
 
The Republic of Indonesia is still struggling at this stage to establish genuine Rule of Law 
and a democratic government by which, subsequently, human rights will be respected and 
the law consistently observed. One of the related issues which is currently being debated 
intensely is the availability of judicial review for parliamentary acts and other higher-
ranking regulations. The debate is receiving a great deal of attention, since the issue is 
very important for the whole constellation of the Indonesian legal system. The importance 
of this debate lies in the fact that judicial review is one of the “pillars of the rule of law” 
and a significant part of a democratic legal system.   
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Many unjust and abusive laws and regulations – both in regard to good governance as 
well as to the legal guarantee and protection of human rights – were enacted during the 32 
year period of Soeharto’s regime
66: they need to be reviewed in terms of their legality and 
constitutionality.  
 
Additionally, the unwillingness of the Indonesian government to ratify some important 
international legal instruments for the promotion and protection of human rights, and its 
reluctance to implement the instruments that have already been ratified, made the country 
an untrustworthy member of the international community in the area of human rights 
standards implementation. However, the discussion in this chapter is not limited to the 
issues mentioned above. The following related issues will also be addressed: 
•  the 1945 Constitution and the hierarchy of laws upon which the Indonesian 
legal system was founded; 
•  the constitutional guarantee of human rights; 
•  the Indonesian judicial review system; 
•  records of human rights violations; and  
•  attempts made by individuals in seeking remedy. 
 
 
 
2.  Indonesian Legal System 
 
The Indonesian legal system embraces elements of both the European and common law 
systems, although it has to be acknowledged that the European legal system is the 
dominant influence, which is the outcome of a 350-year history of Dutch colonisation. 
The Indonesian legal system, if it may be described in a short phrase at all, is “confusing 
                                                 
66 More popularly known as New Order Era, which emerged after the abortive coup attempt by the 
Indonesian Communist Party or G30S/PKI, led by general Soeharto, who then became the second   
President.  
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and complicated”.
67 Sutan Takdir Alisyahbana, a highly acclaimed writer and a prominent 
figure in the domain of literature and culture, once described the Indonesian legal system 
as “something of a hodge-podge”.
68 This kind of expression is, in the writer’s opinion, 
largely true as far as the consistency or certainty of the law is concerned, and particularly 
in relation to the application of regulations and provisions in the courts, and to law 
enforcement.  Sutan Takdir Alisyahbana portrayed the situation that occurred during 
Dutch colonialism as one where the law depended on politics (i.e. the law served the 
political interests of the authorities), and where different laws and regulations were 
applied to different classes or types of residents.
69 
 
To some extent this colonial heritage is still operative, although it is mainly restricted now 
to the trial of certain legal disputes in family law; such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
etc. Before the enactment of the Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Acara Pidana (KUHAP) - 
that is the criminal procedure law book - Indonesian judges used to apply different 
procedural laws in settling criminal cases involving parties from different areas of 
residency. But it is no longer so today.  
 
                                                 
67 In Indonesian language: amburadul, which means messy. Many legal experts, academics, politicians, 
journalists and even laymen use this expression to describe, in a popular way, the condition of the 
Indonesian legal system. An interview with Prof. Sahetapy in TVRI News program “Persepsi” aired by 
SBS Australia on March 22, 2000; articles in Suara Pembaruan February 26, 1998 at 
http://www.suarapembaruan.com (access date: 26/02/1998) and in Kompas, February 27, 1998 at 
http://www.kompas.com (access date: 29/02/1998). Some, among others Dr. Buyung Nasution, use the 
word chaos. 
68 Alisayhbana, S.T. 1981. Indonesia, Social and Cultural Revolution. Translated by Benedict R. Anderson, 
4
th impression, Selangor: Oxford University Press, p. 70. 
69 Articles 131 and 163 Indishe Staatregeling (I.S.), that was the constitution for Indonesia under Dutch 
colonial rule. It stipulated that for different classes of residents, a different law is applied. The Indonesian 
populace was divided into three classes: Europeans (incl. Japanese), far Easterners (Arab, India and 
Chinese) and pribumi  (indigenous) who were the native Indonesians. See, among others, L.J. van 
Appeldoorn. 1982. Pengantar Ilmu Hukum (Inleiding tot de studie van het Nederlandse recht). Translated 
by Oetarid Sadino. Jakarta: Pradnya Paramita, p. 23; and Hendardi in Suara Pembaruan September 5, 
1998, http://www.suarapembarauan.com, access date: 5/09/1998.  
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By contrast, the court is still using several different procedural laws to settle civil cases 
brought to the court. For the residents of Java and Bali, for instance, Herziene Inlandse 
Regeling (HIR) is applied as the civil process law, whereas Regeling van Buitengewijzen 
(RBG) is used to settle legal disputes outside Java and Bali. In cases where Muslims are 
involved, the Islamic law (Syari’ah) is applied.
70 
 
Besides, there are various other factors that create uncertainty and contribute to 
“confusion” and “complication” in law enforcement, such as the credibility and integrity 
of the judges, surat sakti (over-ruling letter), mafia peradilan (court mafia) and extra-
judicial settlements. These will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
This confusion in the legislation, which generates legal uncertainty, has a huge impact in 
the area of law enforcement and the administration of justice: law cannot be properly 
enforced and justice cannot truly prevail. As indicated earlier, Indonesian law is 
sometimes likened to a leaking umbrella or a spider’s web: a leaking umbrella cannot 
adequately protect someone from getting wet when it is raining, and a spider’s web can 
only trap little insects but will be broken by big insects. 
 
After the Proclamation of Independence, however, a legal system that reflected the unity 
of the Indonesian people was gradually developed. In this system, the identity, interests 
and aspirations of the nation were clearly articulated. One of its achievements, which was 
regarded as monumental, was the enactment of the KUHAP; that is, the criminal 
                                                 
70 There are four different kinds of court to which different kinds of cases are brought: General Court deals 
     with general civil and criminal cases, Military Court deals with offences committed by or involving  
     military personnel, Administrative Court hears petitions questioning administrative decisions and 
     Religious Court hears cases involving Moslems in disputes of  marriage, inheritance, divorce and the 
     like.  
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procedural legislation. In general, however, Indonesian law still typically exhibits the 
following characteristics: 
•  a low degree of legal certainty; 
•  confusing overlaps between different legislation; 
•  discriminative law enforcement; 
•  denial of justice (justice delayed, justice denied). 
 
2.1  The 1945 Constitution and the Hierarchy of Laws 
 
Like many modern nations, the entire Indonesian legal system is built upon its 
Constitution. The Indonesian Constitution is called the Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, and 
is more commonly known by its acronym, UUD ’45.
71 
 
The UUD ’45 consists of the preamble (Pembukaan), the body of the Constitution 
(Batang Tubuh), containing 37 Articles, 16 Sections, 4 transitional provisions, 2 
additional provisions, and the elucidation or annotation of the Constitution (Penjelasan 
Resmi UUD ’45, the explanatory notes relating to each of the articles). The preamble, the 
body of the Constitution and the elucidation are regarded as one inseparable whole. Thus, 
if one speaks of the Indonesian Constitution, one speaks of these three components 
simultaneously.  
 
The UUD ’45 was first
72 enforced by the Preparatory Committee of Indonesia’s 
Independence (PPKI) on August 18
th 1945, one day after the Proclamation of 
                                                 
71 The Indonesian version of the 1945 Constitution (UUD 45) used in this work is taken from Bahan 
Penataran P4-Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 published by BP-7 Pusat Jakarta, 1994, while the English 
version is taken from http://www.uniwuerzburg.de/law/id_indx.html, access date: 9/09/2000. The latter is 
attached as an appendix. 
72 Indonesian history records that the 1945 Constitution has been revoked once in 1949 and was replaced by 
the Constitution of the United States of Indonesia (Konstitusi RIS) in 1949/50 and Provisional 
Constitution (UUDS) from 1950-59, and with the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959 the 1945 
Constitution was re-enforced.  
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Independence. In the entire Indonesian constitutional system, the UUD ’45 is considered 
only as one part of the nation’s Constitution, which is called the written basic law. The 
other part, the unwritten basic law, is found inter alia in the so-called state convention, 
which comprises “regulations that develop and are preserved in the conduct of state 
affairs”
73, provided this does not contradict the provisions of the UUD ’45. 
 
Being the country’s basic law, the UUD ’45 functions as the source of all laws and 
regulations that concern all aspects of the nation’s life, ranging from government and 
citizens and their relations to each other, to State organs or institutions and their relation 
to individuals’ lives. This means that all legislation and regulations regarding both 
governmental and individual actions must be based on the UUD ’45, which includes in 
the broadest sense all government activities including those of the administrative, 
legislative and judicial branches. 
 
As mentioned before, UUD ’45 consists of three inseparable parts: Pembukaan 
(preamble), Batang Tubuh (body) and Penjelasan Resmi (annotation). Within the system 
of UUD ’45, Pembukaan, the first component of the Constitution, is the highest authority 
in the country’s legal system, and is the primary source of law. As such, it is not 
amendable. That is because the Pembukaan contains the nation’s ideals, aspirations and 
goals as well as its main guidelines for entering into relations with other countries.
74 So, 
amending or altering the Pembukaan is equivalent to changing or even anulling the 
                                                 
73Penjelasan Resmi or Annotation or Explanatory Note of 1945 Constitution general section figure I. 
Indonesian constitutional law experts such as Solly Lubis and Padmo Wahjono agreed that at least two 
requirements must be met in order to be recognized as a state convention: continuous state 
practice/conduct and opinio juris necessitas. One example is the annual Presidential Address to the Nation 
on January 6. Compare with Harmaily Ibrahim & Moh. Kusnardi. 1984. Pengantar Hukum Tata Negara 
Indonesia. Jakarta: University of Indonesia Press, p. 39. 
74 According to the Preamble, Indonesia’s foreign policy shall be free and active; free from foreign pressure 
or dictation and actively striving for and promoting international peace and prosperity based on social 
justice.  
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country’s foundation. This is understandable since the Pembukaan contains four basic 
thoughts
75 that articulate the Nation’s ideals, principles of life, and moral values, 
including its legal aspirations.
76  
 
These are followed by the principles that the Constitution must “make it the duty of the 
State and all its institutions to foster high human ethical norms and to live up to noble 
[universal] moral aspirations”.
77 In addition, the Pembukaan also contains the reasons that 
inspired the Indonesian people to proclaim their independence from colonialism, and 
furthermore, to proclaim moral and social codes not only for the State apparatus but also 
for individuals in the conduct of their daily lives. 
 
The basic thoughts, ideas and moral values of the Pembukaan find their concrete 
application in the articles of the Batang Tubuh, the second component of the Constitution. 
The Batang Tubuh UUD ’45 is made up of 37 articles distributed amongst 16 chapters, as 
follows: 
•  Chapter I (Art. 1 (1) & (2)) regulates the form of the State and sovereignty 
•  Chapter II (Arts. 2 and 3) deals with the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) 
or the People’s Consultative Assembly – the nation’s constitutional body and 
supreme state institution  
•  Chapter III (Arts. 4-15) regulates the executive power 
•  Chapter IV (Art. 16) regulates the Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (DPA) or the 
Supreme Advisory Council 
•  Chapter V (Art. 17) concerns the State Ministers 
•  Chapter VI (Art. 18) is about Regional Government 
                                                 
75 Explanatory note of 1945 Constitution, general section figure II. Those basic thoughts are: the State 
protects all the Indonesian people and the entire territory of Indonesia on the basis of humanity, the State 
shall strive for social justice for all the people of Indonesia, the State shall be based on the sovereignty of 
the people, on democracy and deliberations of representatives, the State shall be based on the belief in one 
and only God and on just and civilized humanity. 
76 The term used is Rechtsideen “which encompassed the basic law of the State, both the written and the  
     unwritten.” 
77 An Indonesian perspective sees these as the universal principles of humanity crystallised in Pancasila 
(Five Principles), which is the State ideology and the nation’s way of life: belief in one and only God, 
     humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy and representation of the people, and social justice.  
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•  Chapter VII (Art. 19-22) deals with the House of Representatives or Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) 
•  Chapter VIII (Art. 23) is about the State Finance 
•  Chapter IX (Arts. 24 and 25) concerns the Judicial Power 
•  Chapter X (Arts. 26-28) is about Citizens 
•  Chapter XI (Art. 29) deals with Religion 
•  Chapter XII (Art. 30) deals with National Defence 
•  Chapter XIII (Arts. 31 and 32) is about Education 
•  Chapter XIV (Arts. 33 and 34) is about Social Welfare 
•  Chapter XV (Arts. 35 and 36) concerns the National Flag and Language 
•  Chapter XVI (Art. 37) deals with Amendments of the Constitution 
 
Besides those 37 articles, the Batang Tubuh also contains four transitional and two 
additional provisions, but these provisions deal mainly with the specific conditions at 
the time Indonesia proclaimed its independence; e.g. the period of transition, and the 
power transfer, from colonial authority to the Indonesian people through the founding 
fathers. However, Clause II of the transitional provisions is of fundamental 
importance for the Indonesian legal system. It stipulates that “all existing state 
institutions continue to function and all [colonial] regulations remain valid” until new 
ones are established, provided they do not contradict the UUD ’45.  
 
The third component of the UUD ’45 is the Penjelasan Resmi, that is, the annotations 
or elucidation of the Constitution. The Penjelasan Resmi is viewed as the official 
explanation of the Constitution and is meant to be the one and only valid 
“interpretation” of the articles contained in the Batang Tubuh. Despite its purpose of 
giving detailed explanations about every article, the Penjelasan Resmi only provides 
brief, general, and often ambiguous notes, particularly for articles that relate to human 
rights.   
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Ever since the 1945 Constitution was established, its interpretation has always been 
dominated and monopolised by the regime (State authority).
78 This is once again due 
to the character of the Constitution provisions, which are vague and multi-
interpretative, enabling various interpretations as to what a certain article means. In 
making an interpretation, the government has always been the most authoritative. 
 
It should be noted, however, that although the Batang Tubuh and Penjelasan Resmi 
are inseparable components of the Constitution, they differ from Pembukaan in the 
sense that they are amendable.
79 So far, the 1945 Constitution has been amended 
twice, and these two amendments occurred within the space of less than a year. The 
first amendment was decreed in plenary session of the MPR
80 on October 19, 1999. In 
the first amendment, which was regulated in the decree of MPR or Tap
81 MPR No. 
III/MPR/1999, nine articles were amended, namely articles 5(1), 7, 9, 13(2), 14, 15, 
17(2) and (3), 20 and 21.  
 
In its Annual Session for the year 2000, which was concluded on August 18, the MPR 
endorsed another nine Tap MPR which took effect on the same day. One of those Tap 
MPR constitutes the second amendment of certain articles of the Constitution. The 
decree mentioned is the Tap MPR No. IX/MPR/2000 which contains alterations and 
                                                 
78 See, Gadjah Mada University-based Prof. Muchsan’s comment in Kompas, November 10 and 12, 1998 
and August 30, 2000, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 10 & 12/11/1998 and 31/08/2000 res-
pectively. See also, infra, note 17. 
79This is because of the unique position of the body of the constitution (Batang Tubuh), which is not 
   considered as Grundnorm, as it is the case with the Preamble, which contains four basic thoughts. See, 
infra,   
    note 11. 
80 Stands for Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, that is the highest state organ.  
81 It is the abbreviation of Ketetapan decreed by the MPR, ranking second to the Constitution.  
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additions giving rise to the present form of Articles 18, 18A, 18B, 19, 20 (5), 20A, 
22A, 22B, 25E, 26 (2) and (3), 27 (3), 28 A-I, 30, and 36A-C of the Constitution.
82  
 
In addition to its special position as the prime source of laws, UUD ’45 also functions 
as a benchmark against which lesser forms of legislation are assessed. Therefore, it is 
essential to observe the hierarchy of the Indonesian laws and regulations in the 
context of law making because in order to be declared valid, and therefore legally 
binding, a law or regulation has to show conformity with the Constitution. 
 
The Indonesian legislation system, or as it is officially called, the hierarchy of laws 
and the order of the source of law and legislation, is regulated in Tap MPR No. 
XX/MPR/1966. This decree has been upheld by Tap MPR No. III/MPR/2000. It 
stipulates that the Pancasila (the State’s five principles) is still the ideal source of law 
and the source of all sources of law followed by: 
•  UUD ’45, or the 1945 Constitution. 
•  Decrees issued by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the People’s 
Consultative Assembly, which is the highest state institution, and also the 
highest legislative and constitutional body. Such decrees are known as 
Ketetapan (Tap MPR). 
•  Laws or Acts - Undang-undang (UU) - endorsed by parliament and signed by 
president (Statute). Alongside these are the Government Regulations in lieu of 
Acts , called Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti UU or Perpu. 
•  Government Regulations implementing the Act/statute or Peraturan 
Pemerintah (PP) issued by the President. 
•  Presidential Decrees or Keputusan Presiden (Keppres), issued by the President 
for the purpose of implementing the PP. 
•  Presidential Instructions or Instruksi Presiden (Inpres), also issued by the 
President for the purpose of either implementing the Keppres or imposing 
special measure under special circumstances. 
•  Ministerial Regulations or Peraturan Menteri (Permen), issued by a minister 
or the head of a government department; they are meant to be operational 
and/or technical directions for the handling of specific programs or issues 
under the particular department concerned. 
                                                 
82 Kompas, August 21, 2000, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 21/08/2000.  
 
53
•  Ministerial Decrees or Keputusan Menteri (Kepmen), very similar to a 
Permen, usually further detailed in a Ministerial Instruction or Instruksi 
Menteri (Inmen). 
 
Basically, and generally speaking, the function of lower regulations is to implement 
higher regulations. Only for special reasons which require prompt decision-making, 
such as the organisation of an emergency aid program for the victims of a natural 
disaster, can a regulation (e.g. Inpres) be issued without its depending on other pre-
existing regulations. Thus an act or UU, for example, takes effect as the 
implementation of a Tap MPR, because the Tap itself requires it, or else as the 
necessary reinforcement of a certain provision contained in a Tap MPR. Other 
regulations follow the same principle. 
 
This hierarchy can be further extended down to even lower-ranking regulations that 
are considered as implementing the higher order requirements. Those lower-ranking 
regulations are, among others, the Provincial Regulations adopted by the Provincial 
House of Representatives (DPRD) called Peraturan Daerah or Perda, the Governor's 
Decree, called Keputusan Gubernur, and the Governor’s Instruction, or Instruksi 
Gubernur, issued by the Governor as the Head of a provincial government, etc. 
 
It must be noted though, that the 1945 Constitution says nothing about the hierarchy 
mentioned above. This ranking is based only on the MPRS Decree No. 
XX/MPRS/1966. The 1945 Constitution only recognises three types or legislation: the 
constitution itself, statutes (Undang-undang), and regulations in lieu of statutes 
(Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti UU (Perpu)). As to the MPR Decree, it can only be 
deductively implied from the provision in Aricle 3, which reads: 
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The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat [MPR] shall determine [in the form of a 
decree] the constitution and the guidelines for State policies. 
 
2.2   The Recognition of Human Rights in the 1945 Constitution  
 
There are only four articles contained in the 1945 Constitution that concern or regulate 
the rights of citizens. For each of these articles there is no annotation whatsoever that 
explains or interprets what the article means. The only explanatory note contained in 
the Penjelasan Resmi for these articles is “self explanatory”.
83 
 
Article 27(1) states the equality of all before the law. It reads: 
 
(1) All citizens have equal status before the law and in government and shall abide 
by the law and the government without any exception. 
 
Article 27(2) affirms the right to live and work. It reads: 
 
(2) Every citizen has the right to work and to live in human dignity. 
 
Article 28 regulates the freedom of association and of expression, and it reads: 
 
Freedom of association, assembly, and of verbal and written expression, and the 
like, shall be prescribed by the law. 
 
Freedom of religion is regulated in Article 29(2). It reads: 
 
The State guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her 
own religion or belief. 
 
Article 31(1), which refers to education, reads: 
 
Every citizen has the right to education. 
 
In the Tap MPR No. IX/MPR/2000, the second amendment to the Constitution
84, many 
new provisions that regulate human rights have been added. Those seem to have been 
designed to cover all possible aspects of basic human rights. Also, for the first time ever, 
                                                 
83 Penjelasan Resmi, or explanatory note, of the 1945 Constitution, Chapter X. 
84 MPR Decree or Tap MPR No. III/MPR/1999, which is the first amendment, does not contain additional 
references on human rights. References on human rights are still the same as in the original text of the 
1945 Constitution.  
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the term Hak Asasi Manusia (human rights) appears and is used in the context of the 
Constitution. The second amendment introduces a separate chapter under this title, 
namely Chapter A consisting of 10 articles (28 A-J). While it includes generally accepted 
concepts such as the right to life, the right to be free from discrimination, the right to be 
treated equally before the law, the right to freedom of thought and the right to fair 
employment, etc., the chapter also contains controversial points. Among them is the right 
to build a family and procreate in the context of a lawful marriage
85. 
 
3.  The Indonesian Judicial Review System 
 
Prior to discussing the Indonesian judicial review system, it is necessary to briefly address 
the State institutions, their rank and function, for this underpins the review system and its 
mechanism. According to the 1945 Constitution, the highest institution of the nation, and 
the one that enshrines the sovereignty of the people, is the Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat (MPR). This consultative body is made up of members of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat (DPR) or House of Representatives, which is the Parliament of the country; as 
well as of representatives of the provinces and of various functional or occupational 
groups. The MPR is also the State’s constitutional body vested with the power to establish 
or amend the Constitution (Article 37). Subordinate to the MPR are five high-level state 
institutions, as follows: 
 
•  The Presidency: The President is the top administrator, head of the State and 
government, holder of the executive power and, in part alongside the DPR, 
legislative power; assisted by a Vice President and a number of state ministers. 
                                                 
85 Currently there is no official English version for Articles 28A – 28 J. A free translated version can be 
found in the appendix.  
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•  The House of Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, which is the State 
parliament, and comprises 500 elected members
86. Along with the President, it 
holds legislative power. 
•  The Supreme Court or Mahkamah Agung (MA) is the body in which the State’s 
judicial power is vested. As the highest judicial institution, the MA is, according 
to Article 24 and Penjelasan Resmi, the only holder of judicial power, and should 
be free from any influence or interference, even from the government itself.  This 
principle also applies to the status of the judges. 
•  The supreme advisory body or Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (DPA), which is the 
highest advisory body of the State. It gives both solicited and unsolicited advice to 
the President as the head of government. 
•  The audit supervisory body or Badan Pengawas Keuangan (Bepeka) is the State’s 
supreme auditing body. It supervises the management of state finances. 
 
All of these institutions are entitled by law to make regulations which are legally binding, 
not only internally but also to other institutions, and even to the public. As a matter of 
fact, all State institutions, and not only the higher ones, are vested with legislative or 
regulation-making powers. That is why it is so confusing for a citizen or for the public to 
abide by the rules, since one regulation issued by a certain institution can contradict 
another which is issued by a different institution, even though both regulations concern 
the same subject matter. This state of affairs makes the issue of judicial review an 
extremely difficult one.  
 
                                                 
86Before the 1998 term of office, 100 members of the DPR were not elected (appointed). They were the 
representatives of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and Police. After 1998, the first democratic 
election ever, all members are elected representing political parties.  
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The key institutions of the MPR, the President, the DPR and the Supreme Court will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
 
3.1.  Judicial Review in the 1945 Constitution 
 
If one tries to assess what the legal basis for Indonesian judicial review might be in terms 
of constitutional provisions, one becomes engaged in solving a riddle. The fact that the 
1945 Constitution does not specify any type of judicial review forces one to accept two 
opposing conclusions: that judicial review is acknowledged and so exists; or that judicial 
review is not recognised, and so does not exist.
87  
 
Indonesian history shows that, although only for a very short period from 1949 to 1950, 
the Constitution of the Federated State of Indonesia (Konstitusi RIS) did contain a 
provision for judicial review.
88 However, this was not the case with either the 1945 
Constitution or with the Provisional Constitution of 1950. 
 
On the whole, and from a legal point of view, there is some guarantee of a judicial review 
procedure, even though it is only applicable for subordinating laws and regulations.
89 This 
is not the consequence of the provisions contained in Articles 24 and 25 of the 
Constitution, as believed by many. These articles only provide that the Supreme Court 
may take any necessary measure to ensure a full and appropriate exercise of its judicial 
power, free from any intervention; including from the government. Both articles are 
actually silent as to the power of judicial review of the Court. There is no mention at all 
that the Court has the power of judicial review. Rather this is more of an “invention”, an 
                                                 
87 Sri Soemantri, Hak Menguji Materiil di Indonesia. Ibid., at p. 47. 
88 For more detail, see, Sri Soemantri. Ibid., pp. 14-22. 
89 Supra, note 82.  
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ad hoc response to “popular demand”, with a little influence from Anglo-Saxon legal 
thinking.
90 
 
However, speaking of a constitutional guarantee, there has never been even so much as a 
single clause or paragraph in the Constitution that regulates judicial review, even after 
two amendments. Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution concerning judicial power simply 
indicates that: 
 
(1) the judicial power shall be executed by one Supreme Court and other judicial 
bodies and shall be regulated by law. 
 
(2) the composition and competency of the courts shall be regulated by law. 
 
The explanatory note to this article reads: 
Judicial power is an independent power, which means free from [any, including] the 
influence of the government. In this connection the [independence of the] status of 
judges must be guaranteed by law.
91 
 
UU No. 14/1970 on the Basic Principles of Judiciary can be mentioned as one very 
significant example of a subordinating law which implements this provision in 
conjunction with judicial review. Article 26 reads: 
 
(1) The Supreme Court is competent to declare all regulations ranking lower than 
law/statute to be null and void, by reason of contravention with a higher-ranking 
regulation. 
 
  (2) The annulment of the said regulation may be declared in connection with an 
examination in a cassation procedure. The repeal of the regulation which is declared 
null and void shall be executed by the authority concerned”.
92 
 
                                                 
90 Compare with article on the subject written by Prof. Moh. Mahfud MD in Republika Online, September 
16, 1997, http://www.republika.co.id, access date: 17/09/1997. 
91 Lotulung, P.E. “Judicial Review in Indonesia” in Yong Zhang (Ed.). 1997. Comparative Studies on the  
Judicial Review System in East and South-east Asia. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 168; cf. 
chapter IX Penjelasan Resmi (explanatory note) of 1945 Constitution. 
92 Lotulung, P.E. Ibid., at p. 176.  
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Thus, according to this provision, the limited type of judicial review available in 
Indonesia refers to a procedure of examination of regulations whereby the said regulations 
are tested as to whether or not their substance is consistent with the regulation on which 
they are based. This process is called substantive judicial review. 
 
A similar provision can also be found in Article 31 of UU No. 14/1985 concerning the 
Supreme Court. This regulation is considered only as an implementation and 
reinforcement of the regulation subsumed in Article 26 of UU No. 14/1970. More 
specifically, that article contains provisions concerning the judicial review of regulations 
issued by the administration.  
 
3.2.  Reviewable Regulations 
 
According to the aforementioned laws, the Indonesian judicial review system functions 
exclusively in the areas of examining administrative acts or actions which belong to the 
domain of general regulation. In fact, the entire judicial system does not have any 
provision for reviewing parliamentary legislation, either statutory or theoretical.
93 This 
also means that it does not allow any state institution, including the Supreme Court, to do 
so. Hence, based on the hierarchy and order of the sources of law subsumed in Tap MPRS 
No. XX/MPRS/66 and Tap MPR No. III/MPR/2000, the Indonesian Supreme Court, 
despite being the sole state institution vested with judicial power, can only review PP, 
Keppres, Inpres, Kepmen, and the like. The official reason
94 for this is that the position or 
level of the Supreme Court, according to the Constitution, is that of a high-level State 
                                                 
93 Lotulung, P.E. Id., also Sri Soemantri, supra, note 21 
94 This refers to officially accepted legal argumentation that state institutions that are at the same level 
cannot supervise or control each other. Supervision and control must be exercised by a higher-level state 
institution. On the level or rank of the state institution, see previous discussion on the 1945 Constitution 
and the Hierarchy of Laws.  
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institution, along with the Presidency and DPR: a legislator which produces the UU. It is 
thus considered to be irrational for the Supreme Court, from a legal and logical viewpoint, 
to review or test legislation endorsed by other State institutions that are on its own level. 
It is considered even more irrational, of course, for the Supreme Court to scrutinise the 
legislation (in this case, Tap MPR) decreed by the MPR as the State’s highest institution. 
 
Article 5, particularly paragraph (1), of the 1945 Constitution stipulates: 
 
The President shall hold the power to make statutes in agreement with the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). 
 
According to this provision, although an approval from the DPR is necessary, the 
President is also, alongside the DPR, the holder of legislative power, which means that 
the institution of the Presidency functions as a law-making body. In addition, the 
constitutionality and legality of the legislation (i.e. parliament act, or the UU) produced 
by these two institutions cannot be examined by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the 
Constitution grants the President even more power in law-making than it does to the DPR.   
 
Article 21 (2) provides that: 
 
Should a bill not obtain the sanction of lis ethe President, notwithstanding the 
approval of the DPR, then the bill shall not be resubmitted during the same session of 
the Dewan. 
 
With this provision, the President is given a stronger position than the DPR. As can be 
read in Article 5 above, “the President holds the power to make statutes”; the DPR does 
not. The DPR, according to this provision, only gives its “agreement” or “approval” to a 
bill submitted by the President. The history of constitutional law of the Republic of 
Indonesia may prove that the DPR, as the holder of legislative power, has been under the  
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strong influence of the executive (i.e. the President).
95 Prof. Koesnadi Hardjasoemantri of 
Gadjah Mada University stated: 
 
…the 1945 Constitution does not give any room for democracy since there is too 
much power given to the government (executive), and only little to the representative 
bodies such as DPR.
96 
 
This can be verified by the fact that until now, the DPR has never used its “right of 
initiative” to submit a bill despite a constitutional guarantee in Article 21(1). The 
government has always been the one taking the initiative in submitting a bill. 
Furthermore, the approval of the DPR has always been obtained, which in turn has led to 
ratification of the bill by the President’s signature. This renders any attempt at controlling 
the government, either by the DPR or the Supreme Court, extremely difficult. This 
remains the case, even though in 1991 an administrative court
97 was introduced, by which 
government policies and decisions can be legally tested and questioned.  
 
Perpu stands for Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang or Government 
Regulation in lieu of Law. Perpu is issued by the President “in the event of a compelling 
emergency”.
98 The Supreme Court does not have the competence to review this 
legislation, either. To prevent the President from misusing his power by issuing Perpu for 
reasons other than those permitted, the Constitution prescribes that such regulations “shall 
have the consent of the DPR during its subsequent session”.
99 And if “the approval of the 
DPR is not obtained”, those Perpu must be repealed and declared null and void.
100 So, 
                                                 
95 The term used is “executive-dominated state” or “executive-heavy state”. More details on this, see 
Bedner, A. “Administrative Court in an Executive-dominated State: the Case of Indonesia”, in Yong 
Zhang (Ed.), Ibid., at pp. 183-210. 
96 Kompas, October 8, 1999, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 10/10/1999; also, Prof. Harun Alrasid in 
Suara Pembaruan, May 10, 2000, http://www.suarapembaruan.com, access date: 3/06/2000. 
97 Bedner, A. Ibid., at p. 183. 
98 Art. 22 (1) 1945 Constitution 
99 Art. 22 (2) 1945 Constitution. In practice, usually within a period of six months. 
100 Art. 22 (3) 1945 Constitution  
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according to Article 26 of UU No. 14/1970, the Supreme Court is competent to declare 
(to review) only regulations lower than statute (PP downwards) by reason of 
contravention with the higher-ranking regulations (UU or Perpu upwards). 
 
In addressing this issue, three leading Indonesian legal experts, Dr. Adnan Buyung 
Nasution (member of the MPR), Prof. Bagir Manan (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) 
and Prof. Sri Soemantri (University of Padjadjaran), suggested that Tap MPR, Perpu and 
Keppres be erased from the legislative system (hierarchy of laws).
101 Furthermore, they 
also demand that Tap MPRS No. XX/MPRS/1966 on the source of legal order and the 
hierarchy of laws be revoked and another Tap be issued in its place. They made those 
recommendations during the course of a session with the second ad-hoc committee (PAH 
II) of the MPR, for the preparation of the first MPR Annual Session 2000. 
 
Nasution, who was actively involved in the drafting, recalls that Tap MPRS No. 
XX/MPRS/1966 was a “mistake.”
102 This Tap was only decreed out of the grave necessity 
in 1966 to tackle the crisis situation that followed the failed coup attempt known as 
G30S/PKI
103. Nasution said that the Tap was no longer relevant and should have been 
revoked long ago. He then finally suggested that MPR in its Annual Session should 
declare the Tap invalid and issue a new Tap in which the Ketetapan (Tap) MPR would no 
longer be part of the level of legislation which currently ranked immediately below the 
Constitution.  
 
                                                 
101 See previous discussion in this chapter on the Indonesian Legal System. 
102 Suara Pembaruan, March 8, 2000, http://www.suarapembaruan.com, access date: 8/03/2000. 
103 The September 30 Movement, a coup attempt of the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) that  
      enabled General Soeharto to come to power as President.  
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This suggestion was supported by Sri Soemantri, who commented further that even at 
MPR level, a Tap should be reviewed, and not only at the level of lower regulations. In 
particular, he urged the MPR to issue a Tap that would no longer recognise Keppres as 
part of the legislation. He drew attention to the fact that many, and even most of the 
Keppres issued by former President Soeharto were in contravention with, and superseded, 
higher regulations such as the UU. He stated that many Keppres that were not actually 
part of the Constitution were issued by Soeharto for the purpose of giving him and his 
cronies financial and political advantages.
104 
 
Prof. Bagir Manan, commenting on the existence of a Perpu, stated that this kind of 
regulation should also be erased from the Indonesian legislation system.  He argued that 
Perpu as a legal instrument could be misused in favour of the government, although only 
temporarily (according to Article 22 of the Constitution). Besides, he recommended that if 
a Perpu did not obtain the required approval from the DPR, it would be declared null and 
void, and there would be no law that could be applied to the matters regulated in the 
former Perpu.
105 
 
Is there any way in which the Tap MPR in particular can be reviewed if it is not 
considered to be in conformity with the Constitution?
106 As regards the Constitution, there 
                                                 
104 Suara Pembaruan, Id., also F.H. Winata in Kompas, October 26, 1998, http://www.kompas.com, access 
date: 30/10/1998. To mention only one example is Presidential Decree or Keppres No. 46/1996 on 
National Car (Mobnas) which contradicts the import tax provisions set forth in Law No. 10/1995 on 
Custom. 
105See, Suara Pembaruan, Id.. For example, Government Regulation in lieu of Law (Perpu) No, 1/1999 on 
the Establishment of National Human Rights Court, which was recently disapproved by the DPR, and wsa 
thus declared invalid. This has caused a big problem for the Indonesian law enforcement authority in 
prosecuting the suspected perpetrators of human rights abuses in East Timor, because no other laws or 
regulations deal with the issue. 
106 In addition to MPRS Decree no. XX/MPRS/1966, MPRS Decree No. XXV/MPRS/1966 on the 
Dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the Banning of the Teaching, Disseminating 
and Developing of Marxism/Leninism is also contradicting the provision of Art. 28 of 1945 Constitution 
on the guarantee of freedom of speech and expression.  
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is a possibility of reviewing it according to Article 37. This provision prescribes that in 
order to amend
107 the Constitution, “not less than two thirds of the total number of the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall be in attendance” and that no less than two thirds 
of the members in attendance shall approve. And to date, there have been two 
amendments decreed by the MPR (see above). 
 
Unfortunately, the MPR in its Decree Tap MPR III/MPR/2000, which was issued at the 
end of its Annual Session in 2000, did not respond to those recommendations. Instead of 
erasing all “unnecessary legislation”, the MPR, in addition to assuming the prerogative to 
review acts and statutes, only scrapped the Inpres, Kepmen and Permen from the 
prescribed types of legislation.
108 As for the Tap MPR, there is a consensus that it can and 
will be reviewed annually when the Annual Session is held. 
 
3.3.  Exercising Institution and the Procedure 
 
Neither UU No. 14/1970 nor Law No.14/1985 regulates any judicial review procedure. 
As can be seen, Article 26 of UU No. 14/1970, which is considered the main point of 
reference for judicial review, does not give even the slightest clue as to how a petition for 
judicial review should be brought forward, or how it should be processed. This gives rise 
to many legal arguments as to whether or not a lawsuit or petition asking for judicial 
review may be brought to the Supreme Court; and if so, how it should be done. Or, in a 
case where the petition mainly concerns the civil rights of an individual, whether this falls 
under the jurisdiction of a general civil court, which would mean that the case would be 
                                                 
107 Prior to amendment process the MPR need to review the actuality and the relevance of the Constitution  
       to the current situation and development. 
108  Suara Pembaruan, June 13, 2000, http://www.suarapembaruan.com, access date: 29/09/2000. These 
types of legislation no longer belong to hierarchy of Indonesian law.  
 
65
processed according to civil procedural law started from Distrct Court and, if appealed, up 
to the Supreme Court; or whether a judicial review complaint should be processed 
directly by the Supreme Court. 
 
In 1992, the first ever significant case requesting judicial review came before the Supreme 
Court.
109 The petition was brought by the representatives of PRIORITAS magazine, 
asking the Supreme Court to review the Ministry of Information Regulation or Permen 
No.1/PER/Menpen/1984/SIUP concerning the requirements to be met for the issue of a 
license for a publishing business. On the strength of this Permen, the Indonesian Minister 
for Information had placed a ban on the further publication of this magazine. The legal 
argument was that this regulation was in contradiction with the superior law on which it 
hierarchically depended (UU No. 11/1966 on Basic Rules on the Press). The lawsuit was 
filed directly with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that this lawsuit was 
inadmissible (niet onvanklijk verklaard or NO), because up to the time when this petition 
was filed, there was still no regulation as to how and where a petition for judicial review 
should be brought.
110 
 
Apparently, the PRIORITAS case has “taught” the Supreme Court a lesson, because less 
than a year later, a regulation concerning the procedure for bringing a petition for judicial 
review was issued: the Peraturan Mahkamah Agung, or the Supreme Court’s Regulation 
No.1/1993. This regulation stipulates that a judicial review can only be conducted if there 
is a petition or lawsuit brought by individuals or any other party concerned. This 
regulation furthermore states that people or residents should file a lawsuit asking for 
judicial review directly with the Supreme Court, or else indirectly through the District 
                                                 
109 Lotulung, P.E. Ibid., at p. 177. 
110 Lotulung, P.E. Id.  
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Courts of the region where the resident concerned lives, or where the party being sued is 
located. 
 
Since the first petition brought by the representatives of PRIORITAS, and the 
enforcement of this Supreme Court regulation, there has only been a relatively modest 
number of cases seeking judicial review which have been dealt with by the Supreme 
Court. Some of the more important ones have been: 
 
YEAR Number  of  Cases/   Case  Concerning 
   Decision 
 
1993  3: - No. 02/P/TN/1993  Review of Regulation of the Minister of  
Home Affairs No 15/1975 on land use. 
        - No. 01/G/TN/1993  Review of Regulation of the Minister of 
Manpower No.342/Men/78 on labor. 
- No. 02/G/TN/1993  Review  of  Regulation of the Minister of 
Manpower No. Kep-438/Men/1992. 
 
       1995  3: - No. 01/G/TN/1995  Review of Regulation of the Minister of 
Information No. 01/PER/Menpen/1984/ 
SIUP. 
        - No. 02/G/TN/1995  Review of Regulation of the Minister of  
      Information  No.  01/PER/Menpen/ 
      1984/SIUP. 
- No. 03/G/TN/1995  Review of Attorney-General Regulation No. 
Kep-129/JA/12/1976.
111 
 
With the implementation of Supreme Court Regulation No. 1/1993, twenty-three years 
after the enactment of Law No. 14/1970, the procedure for judicial review has become 
available to a much greater extent. Although the number of cases brought to the Supreme 
Court may be considered relatively small compared to the existing regulations that really 
need to be reviewed
112, the decisions mentioned above have had a significant impact on 
                                                 
111 Lotulung, P.E. Ibid., at p. 178. 
112 Djiwandono, Soedjati J., in The Jakarta Post’s Editorial and Opinion, May 11, 2000, http:// 
www.thejakartapost.com, access date: 12/05/2000, stated that “all past legislation passed by Soeharto’s 
New Order regime must be thoroughly reviewed… and replaced.”  
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the development of the Indonesian judicial system in general, and in particular on the 
judicial review system.  
 
Even more promising still, it is reported that the Supreme Court is about to issue a new 
regulation to replace Regulation No. 1/1993. This new regulation is likely to stipulate that 
judicial review can be conducted even in the absence of a lawsuit or petition; meaning the 
Court can automatically review legislation that is allegedly in contradiction with other 
laws without waiting for an official petition be brought forward. “The purpose of this", 
stated a Supreme Court Justice, Prof. P.E. Lotulung, “is to enable the Supreme Court to be 
more pro-active in responding to popular legal aspirations in line with the demands of 
Reformasi”
113. At that time Lotulung was briefing journalists on the subject of the 
Supreme Court law reform plan, and was in the company of the Secretary General of the 
institution.
114 
 
Nevertheless, Indonesia is still not free from controversy over judicial review. Polemics 
rage over whether or not there should be a judicial review which could scrutinize 
parliamentary Acts, and not only limited to lower regulations (administrative acts). 
Besides, there is also a lively debate over which institution should be granted the power to 
carry out this higher judicial review since, to date, the Supreme Court has only been 
granted the competence to review regulations below the level of parliamentary Acts. 
 
                                                 
113  Reformasi (reformation) is a popular, and predominantly student-led initiative and movement that 
successfully toppled the military-backed and dictatorial Soeharto from his Presidency of over 32 years. 
One of the reformation agendas (Agenda Reformasi) is to reform the legal system enabling greater 
access to justice, protection of human rights and supremacy of law. So far, however, this remains just an 
idea. 
114 Kompas, January 29, 1999, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 3/02/1999.  
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At present, however, the main concern is whether the Supreme Court will be able to carry 
out its task at all, considering the huge number of regulations issued by government 
bodies and other administrative agencies. One must bear in mind that in Indonesia, all 
government agencies, including officials, are vested with rule-making powers, and that 
many of the regulations issued are likely to overlap and interfere with one another.   
 
Those are not the only reasons for concern. For a considerable period of time during the 
New Order Era (1996-1998), the power and authority of the Supreme Court was further 
eroded.  Using UU No. 14/1970 (particularly Article 11) and UU No. 14/1985, the 
government has been so deeply involved in judicial affairs that the organisation, 
management and finance of the Supreme Court have been put under the control of the 
government’s Justice Department.  
 
This kind of interference also found its way into the process of recruitment to the 
judiciary. According to legislation regulating specific court branches
115, all judges 
(including Supreme Court justices) are government officials on the one hand; while on the 
other, they are agents of the judiciary at the same time . This means that the position of 
the judges is no longer independent as the Constitution (Articles 24 and 25) originally 
prescribed. During the New Order, the judges were even compelled to become members 
of the umbrella organisation for all government civil servants, called Korpri (Corps of 
Indonesian Civil Servants), an organisation directly supervised by the President.  
 
                                                 
115 Laws or UU No. 2/1986 on General Court, No. 5/1986 on Administrative Court, No. 7/1989 on 
Religious Court. About court types or branches, see, supra, note 77.  
 
69
Based on UU No. 8/1974 concerning Civil Servants, it is stipulated in Article 3 that all 
Indonesian civil servants shall be “obedient and loyal to the government”
116. So, how can 
a judge be a good agent of the judiciary, who can only be bound by the law alone, while 
he or she at the same time has to bow to the government’s will? No wonder Sarwata
117, 
the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, said in an interview “the symbol of the 
executive still sticks to the implementation of the judiciary.”
118 
 
Another form of government intervention is the establishment of government-controlled 
(and particularly military-controlled) agencies that were given power to perform extra-
judicial settlements such as Polkam (Restoration of Security and Public Order Command) 
and  Bakorstanas (Agency for the Coordination of Support for the Development of 
National Stability). Although these agencies dealt mostly (although not only) with 
politically related legal cases, they represented further reduction of the power and 
authority of the Supreme Court. Both agencies, along with their branches and other 
similar institutions, have recently been abolished by presidential decree.
119 
 
Another quite common practice carried out by government agencies (in many cases even 
by the military) in settling a legal dispute is that of using the services of a so-called debt 
collector. A debt collector is a person who is assigned to solve mainly loan or debt related 
cases by using power and strength to intimidate debtors into paying the money that is 
owing, plus unlawful (self estimated) interest. 
 
                                                 
116 Officially termed as “mono loyalitas” or mono loyalty. 
117 The then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who was himself a government official (4
th deputy of State 
Apparatus Minister) and an army general when appointed by the President. 
118 Suara Pembaruan, August 4, 1998, http://www.suarapembaruan.com, access date: 15/08/1999. 
119 See The Jakarta Post, March 22, 2000, http://www.thejakartapost.com, access date: 24/03/2000.  
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Moreover, many justice-seekers doubt the credibility and integrity of the Supreme Court 
justices in handling cases brought before them. The Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), 
a non-governmental organisation formed to monitor corrupt practices in Indonesia, 
published the results of their research concluding that among forty-one currently active 
Supreme Court justices, only five can be considered as clean, credible and possessing 
integrity.
120 The bribing of Supreme Court justices is no secret in Indonesia. 
 
Furthermore, in conjunction with the guarantee of legal certainty, some practices common 
to the Supreme Court create an even greater doubt among the public as to the capability of 
the Supreme Court to bring justice to the people and to ensure the adequate legal 
protection of the basic rights and freedoms of every individual.  
 
The aforementioned practices refer to the issuing of surat sakti”
121 (overruling letter) by 
the Chief Justice. There are two kinds of surat sakti: the first kind, which is considered 
legal, is used by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to prevent his subordinate judges 
from conducting unfair trial procedures; the second kind, which is considered illegal, has 
nothing to do with legal process or fair trial. The latter is in this respect a greater source of 
problems, despite the official argument of the Supreme Court that defends this policy as 
                                                 
120 See  “Pay-offs prominent in court system”, article in The Jakarta Post, March 22, 2000, Ibid.,  access 
date: 24/03/2000, also another article in Suara Pembaruan, Ibid., March 10, 2000, access date: 
11/03/2000 
121 Originally this was meant to be a legal opinion of the Supreme Court. But lately in practice it has been 
used as court measure to protect (unjust) government policy. In Chief of Tribe Ohee v Irian Jaya local 
government, for instance, the issuance of surat sakti No. KMA/126/IV/1995 has hindered the 
compensation payment instituted in the Supreme Court decision No. 381/Pdt./1989, which had to be 
paid by the local government for unlawful occupation of a communal land traditionally belonging to the 
tribe. Similar surat sakti were also issued in the cases PT Anoa Perkasa v Bappindo (a state-owned bank) 
and People of Kedungombo v. Public Service Minister. The latter has human rights violation elements. 
For more details, see, Suara Pembaruan, Ibid., June 17, July 8 and August 3, 1999, access date: 
4/08/1998 and recently in Varia Peradilan (bulletin published by the Supreme Court) No. 171, 1999 
edition.  
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“part of the legal supervision of subordinating courts and judges.”
122 This second kind of 
surat sakti is used to annul legally binding decisions handed down by judges of the 
Supreme Court itself.
123 Contrary to that statement, Prof. Muladi, former Justice Minister, 
admitted that the issuing of surat sakti interferes with the independence of the 
judiciary.
124 
 
Another “common” practice involving judges is the so-called mafia peradilan or ‘court 
mafia’. This practice makes the credibility of the Supreme Court as the last fortress of 
justice even more doubtful.  “Court mafia” is a collusion or conspiracy involving bribery 
and the forgery of court rulings.
125 Court mafia may occur between the judge or judges of 
a proceeding case on the one hand; and the prosecutors, lawyers and perhaps one of the 
parties concerned on the other, to fabricate a verdict or court ruling in exchange for a 
certain amount of money, which benefits all those involved in a legal dispute.  
 
In order to eliminate this practice, the Indonesian Forum for Law Enforcement (Forpeshi) 
suggests that a system of trial by jury be imposed in the Indonesian courts.
126 Under the 
jury system, a judge will only function as the facilitator of a court proceeding and not as a 
decision maker. It is believed that this system could prevent “court mafia” from becoming 
even more ubiquitous. 
 
                                                 
122 Pranowo, the Secretary General of the Supreme Court, in an interview with Suara Pembaruan, Ibid., 
August 3, 1998. 
123 Two very well known surat sakti were issued in relation to the cases of Kedung Ombo in Yogayakarta 
and Tribe Chief Ohee of Papua. Both cases were lawsuits for compensation against government. 
124 Suara Pembaruan, July 8, 1998, Ibid., access date: 4/08/1998. 
125 None other than Chief Justice Sarwata himself, along with two other justices (H.P. Panggabean and P.E. 
Lotulung), were at the time of writing implicated in the bribery and forgery of decision case and under 
police investigation. 
126 Kompas, November 3, 1999, http://www.kompas.com. access date: 4/11/1999.  
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It had been hoped that the enactment of UU No. 35/1999, which is an amendment of UU 
No. 14/1970, would mean the immediate end of government intervention in the judiciary. 
In actual fact, the law itself stipulates that a further five years has to elapse before this can 
happen. UU No. 35/1999 was enacted as an implementation of the provisions on the 
separation of the executive from the judicial powers contained in Tap No. X/MPR/1998.  
Five years have passed, but no sign is to be seen that this will happen soon. That has to be 
considered carefully though, since the wording of that law regarding the status of the 
judges who are now state officials and no longer government officials, requires further 
elaboration. According to the law, this process shall be carried out by a government 
regulation or a Peraturan Pemerintah (PP), but the said PP is as yet unavailable. 
 
3.4.   Judicial Review in the Administrative Court  
 
A petition asking for the annulment of any administrative decision that causes damage or 
loss to individuals can be submitted to the Administrative Court (PTUN) provided that the 
said decision meets the categories of an administrative decision as stipulated in Article 
1(3) of UU No. 5/1986 on Administrative Court. However, not all kinds of administrative 
decisions fall within these categories, as mentioned in Article 2, which can be considered 
as the exception to Article 1(3). 
 
Apart from its supplementary character to the existing “powerless” judicial review 
system, the Administrative Court presents considerable weaknesses, which have been 
briefly summarised as follows by the former deputy Chief Justice Prof. P.E. Lotulung: 
 
•  The complexity of the preliminary procedure due to the fact that an 
administrative examination of the lawsuit is to be executed by the secretariat  
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of the court first, before the substantial examination is conducted through 
dismissal procedure by the chief of the court, which is to be followed by a pre-
trial procedure by the panel of judges before the lawsuit is to be heard before 
the public by the panel of judges (Articles. 62 and 63). 
•  Free introduction of evidence is permissible according to Articles 100 and 107, 
although in a more limited sense. 
•  The possibility of issuing a stay of execution for an administrative decision by 
the administrative judge can be executed in two ways (art. 67 para. 2). 
•  The authority of an administrative judge to annul an administrative decision, to 
order the payment of compensation, and to require rehabilitation (in manpower 
or labor disputes) is, according to Articles 120 and 121, very limited. 
•  Relatively low compensation may be awarded by an administrative judge. The 
minimum is Rp. 250.000 (approx. A$50) while the maximum is Rp. 5.000.000 
(approx. A$1,000). 
•  The system of execution depends largely on the hierarchical authority of the 
administrative official towards his subordinates. This hierarchy culminates in 
the president as the highest executive authority.
127 
 
3.5.    Latest Developments 
 
The latest development concerning the judicial review system in Indonesia is the adoption 
of the Decree or Tap MPR No. III/MPR/2000, which deals with the source of the legal 
and chronological order of legislation and/or regulations. As mentioned above, for the 
first time in the history of the Indonesian legal system, a decree enables the legality and 
constitutionality of acts or statutes to be reviewed and examined. Furthermore, the Decree 
states that not only the legality of acts, but also of Tap MPR and the Constitution itself 
can now be tested (Article 5 (1)). To review the constitution means to modernise the 
content or provisions of it, which can only be conducted by the MPR. As expected, this 
development is seen by many as a further opening of the door to justice and freedom. 
 
However, this regulation contains an anomaly, namely that the competence to review has 
not been granted to the Supreme Court as the holder of the nation’s judicial power, but to 
the MPR instead.  Before and after the Tap MPR was adopted, legal experts, scholars and 
                                                 
127 Lotulung, P.E., Ibid., at p. 171.  
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politicians were strongly of the opinion that the competence of judicial review should 
remain with the Supreme Court.
128 “This is to prevent legal affairs from becoming 
political affairs”, stated Prof. Sri Soemantri, a leading constitutional law expert at the Law 
Faculty of Padjadjaran University, Bandung. 
 
However, it is conventionally considered, from the perspective of the Constitution and the 
structure of State institutions, to be “inappropriate” to grant this right to the Supreme 
Court, because its standing as a high-level state institution is exactly the same as that of 
the DPR and the President, who are the law makers. Besides, Supreme Court justices are 
elected by the DPR and appointed by the President.  
 
In order to get out of this “vicious circle”, it was recommended by legal experts and 
observers
129 that a new institution be established which would be able to examine the 
legality of a statute and even of the Constitution. From an Indonesian way of legal 
thinking, a constitution can be declared illegal if it is no longer the manifestation of 
people’s aspiration. And, once again, only the MPR can assess this. The recommended 
institution was Mahkamah Konstitusi (Constitutional Tribunal)
130, which follows the 
model of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 
Indonesia's case though, the said tribunal would function only as an ad-hoc tribunal 
                                                 
128 Sri Soemantri (in Suara Pembaruan, June 16, 2000, http://www.suarapembaruan.com, access date: 
20/06/2000), Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, member of MPR, and Usamah Hisyam, member of the DPR 
(in Kompas, August 22, 2000, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 23/08/2000). 
129 Satya Arinanto of the University of Indonesia and Amin Aryoso, a prominent lawyer, in Kompas, August 
12 and 16, 2000, http://www.kompas.com. access date: 29/09/2000. 
130 For more details on the German Federal Constitutional Tribunal or Bundesverfassungsgericht, see, 
among others, Christine Landfired (Ed.). 1988. Constitutional Review and Legislation: an International 
Comparison. 1
st edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, at pp. 147-168; Allan R. Brewer-
Carias. 1989. Judicial Review in Comparative Law. Ibid., at pp. 203-213 and P van Dijk. 1980. Judicial 
Review of Governmental action and the Requirement of An Interest to Sue: A Comparative Study on the 
Requirement of An Interest to Sue in National and International Law, Ibid., at pp 155-195.  
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entrusted with the power to examine not only parliamentary acts or statutes, but also MPR 
decrees and even the Constitution.
131 
 
Nonetheless, even if the power to review legislation were to be entrusted to it, there 
would still be some doubt as to the capability of the Supreme Court to carry out its task. 
Contrary to popular opinion, a University of Indonesia law professor and current Minister 
of Law, Legislation and Human Rights, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, argues that “it isn’t time 
yet for the Supreme Court to review acts or statutes.”
132 Apart from the reasons 
mentioned above, the examination procedure used within the Supreme Court is now the 
basis for this proposition. Under the current law and regulations, the examination and 
hearing procedure to settle a legal dispute within the Supreme Court (including a petition 
for judicial review) is conducted by a panel of three justices (majelis hakim).  
The question here is whether these three Supreme Court justices can really represent the 
legal stance of the Supreme Court as a whole, which is supposed to reflect the people’s 
aspiration for justice. Ideally speaking though, the Supreme Court should hold the power 
not only to review acts, but also higher regulations (including the Constitution), “provided 
there is a check-and-balance system operating as in the USA.”
133 Since Indonesia does not 
embrace this system, it is therefore appropriate for judicial review of acts and statutes in 
particular to be entrusted to the makers of that legislation itself, namely the DPR and the 
President. 
 
                                                 
131 Sri Soemantri, Suara Pembaruan, Ibid. 
132 Kompas, November 20, 1997, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 21/11/1997. 
133 Details on this are discussed in Edward McWhinney. 1986. Supreme Court and the Judicial Law-
making: Constitutional Tribunal and Constitutional Review. Dordrecht, Boston: Nijhoff, distributed in 
the U.S. and Canada by Kluwer Academic, John Hart Ely. 1980. Democracy and Distrust: a Theory of 
Judicial Review. Cambridge: Harvard University Press and Charles L Black, Jr. 1960. People and the 
Court: Judicial review in A Democracy. Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.  
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However, such idea is hardly reasonable. How can one expect the DPR and the President 
to conduct a fair examination of the regulations which they themselves agreed upon as 
being law? Besides, according to trias politica, a principle partially adopted by the 
Indonesian legal system as stipulated in Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution, the DPR 
and the President are not vested as the holders of the judicial power. Therefore, the most 
appropriate body to which the power of judicial review should be entrusted is the 
Supreme Court. 
 
Despite being hailed as a new breakthrough, Tap No. III/MPR/2000 still does not solve 
some basic legal problems; rather it generates more confusion. This also means that the 
erosion of the power of the Supreme Court continues. A number of questions need to be 
satisfactorily answered, such as: how the will MPR exercise this competence, what the 
review procedure would look like, whether the MPR will hear a legal petition asking for 
judicial review from the people, or instead, whether it will thoroughly research all acts 
and decrees without petition, and subsequently declare unconstitutional legislation null 
and void.  
 
Other relevant issues also need to be addressed, such as whether the whole 700 members 
of the MPR should attend the examination procedure, or whether the MPR may, for this 
purpose, appoint a representative committee of around 90 members. If the former is the 
case, what distinguishes this from the Annual Session of the MPR? And if the latter is the 
case, would this committee collectively represent the whole MPR as an institutional 
instrument of the people’s sovereignty? And still, the result of the review will be in the 
form of a decree or Tap MPR that will disqualify the reviewed regulations. As far as the 
acts are concerned, it is unquestionable; but if this applies to the Constitution or Tap MPR  
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itself, that would be another problem. This is because, according to the hierarchy of laws 
and legislation, a lower regulation cannot disqualify another of the same level or higher.  
Unfortunately, even this basic principle has been ignored for a very long time.
134 
 
Apparently, in Indonesia, the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the Supreme 
Court (Annotation to Articles 24 and 25 and upheld by Tap No. X/MPR/1998) has no real 
meaning at all. As regards the relationship between the President and the Supreme Court, 
the former not only interfered with the latter, but what is more, often ignored it altogether. 
When former President Soeharto handed power over to then Vice President Habibie, there 
was a debate as to the constitutionality of this hand-over. Article 8 of the Constitution 
requires that the President’s oath be taken in front of the plenary session of the MPR. The 
appointment should then be decreed in a Tap MPR. Neither of these conditions was met 
during that hand-over. For such an important legal issue, the President did not consider it 
necessary to consult the Supreme Court, but sought advice instead from a university law 
professor.
135 
 
Neither Tap No. X/MPR/1998 nor UU No. 35/1999 nor Tap No. III/MPR/2000 has 
empowered or ensured the independence of the Supreme Court. This has frustrated and 
delayed the expectations of many that, after the fall of the New Order, there would be a 
really powerful Supreme Court able to guard the Constitution and bring justice for all.   
 
Given the extremely restricted procedures of judicial review, which are placed under 
heavy government influence and control; and given the lack of confidence in the 
                                                 
134 Press release of Ikahi (Indonesian Judges Association) and Hajriyanto Thohari, member of 2
nd Ad-hoc 
Committee of MPR, in Kompas, August 2, 2000, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 4/08/2000. 
135 Prof. Yusril Ihza Mahendra of the University of Indonesia, who was appointed Minister of Law and 
Legislation under Habibie’s administration.  
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capability and integrity of the Supreme Court, together with the presence of court-like, 
government or even military-controlled extra-judicial institutions and procedures, it 
should not come as a surprise to anyone that many human rights violations and other 
injustices committed by the state government through its exercise of existing laws and 
regulations, remain unpunished. And this still goes on. Governmental impunity results in 
a whole chain of unpunished crimes. 
 
As a matter of fact, more than thirty years ago, three Supreme Court rulings 
(yurisprudensi or precedents) were adopted to prohibit the Indonesian courts to try or 
conduct a hearing of lawsuits which involved government policies. In other words, no 
judges are allowed to examine any petition brought by any individual or organisation in 
which government policies are legally questioned. Those rulings are, respectively, the 
Supreme Court ruling of October 14, 1957 No. 118/K/Sip/1955, of May 18, 1960 No. 
157/K/Sip/ 1960, and of March 3, 1971 No. 818/K/Sip/1970. These binding Court rulings 
were based only on the power and competence vested within the Supreme Court as 
provided for in Articles 24 and 25 of the UU No. 14/1970. 
 
In connection with the implementation of international human rights standards aiming at 
developing respect for and promotion of human rights, the independence of the judiciary 
is a priority. Not only that; it is a necessity. The Basic Principles on the Independence of 
Judiciary, adopted by the United Nations in 1985, envisage that: 
 
… all judges [must be vested] with full authority to act, free from pressures and 
threats, adequately paid and [well] equipped to carry out their duties.
136 
 
                                                 
136 United Nations Background Note, Independence of Judiciary: A Human Rights Priority, at http://www. 
un.org/rights/dpi1837.htm, access date: 2/05/1998.  
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4.  A Record of Human Rights Violations 
 
Despite the availability of significant legal documents acknowledging international 
principles and standards of human rights, such as MPR Decree No. XVII/MPR/1998, Law 
No. 39/1999, and most recently MPR Decree No. IX/MPR/2000 on the second 
amendment of the Constitution, human rights violations in Indonesia are not likely to 
come to a rapid end.  
 
Quoting a World Bank study on good governance, Ian Buchanan from Booz-Allen and 
Hamilton ranked Indonesia as the lowest, compared with other Asian countries, in the 
areas of good governance and efficiency of the judiciary and law enforcement systems.
137 
In the area of human rights, during the New Order, Indonesia implemented only 33% of 
its commitments to promote and protect the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of its 
citizens. This is well below the average of 60% in other ASEAN countries
138 . 
 
A poll conducted by Kompas in 1998 shows that around 70% of the Indonesian 
population is of the opinion that the government has not done enough yet to promote and 
protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens. This percentage of 
respondents replied “bad” to the question: “is the government protection of human rights 
good or bad?”
139 In its annual report, published in London in 1998, Amnesty International 
ranked Indonesia amongst the ten countries that violated human rights most blatantly.
140 
 
                                                 
137 Kompas, October 1, 1999, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 4/10/1999. 
138 Kompas, December 1, 1999, Ibid., access date: 2/12/1999. 
139 Kompas, December 10, 1998, Ibid., access date: 10/12/1998. 
140 Suara Pembaruan, June 18, 1998, http://www.suarapembaruan.com, access date: 19/06/1998.  
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While recognising that there is no linear correlation between political democracy and 
equitable economic growth, Prof. Sudarsono, the former Vice-Governor of the Indonesian 
National Defence Institute or Lemhanas, recorded that in 1997, there were 25 million 
human rights infringements in Indonesia “simply because many of the citizens are still 
struggling below the poverty line
141 and that they are in the process of being economically 
and socially empowered in order to better exercise their civil and political role as active 
and responsible citizens.”
142 
 
There is no way to present a full record of the types of violations against specific rights 
that are internationally or universally recognised as fundamental human rights. It is 
nevertheless useful to provide a limited selection of the worst violations, in order to show 
how violations of human rights principles in Indonesia occur every day without adequate 
measures taken to reduce them. Those presented in this chronology are just the “big fish”. 
 
The data presented has been taken both from the Annual Report (Laporan Tahunan) of 
the Indonesian National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM),
143 and the United 
Nations Human Rights Record System,
144 as well as from other sources such as 
newspapers, press conferences and personal communications. 
 
                                                 
141 Article 34 of 1945 Comnstitution obliges the government to look after the poor, as this is their right. 
142 Soedarsono, Juwono. 1997. Human Rights and Foreign Policy. Paper presented at the Conference on the 
Contemporary Indonesia, organised by Carleton University, Ottawa, and the Indonesian Embassy in 
Canada, February 25, 1997, p. 2. 
143 http://ww.komnas.go.id/ indonesia/laporan/index.html 
144 http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord/vol3/ indonesia.htm  
 
81
4.1.   Violations against Freedom of Opinion, Expression and Speech 
 
1994:  
•  Adnan Buyung Nasution was banned from speaking in a conference at the 
University of Indonesia just because of governmental prejudice (despite the 
constitutional guarantee in Article 28). 
•  Books and poems written by leading Indonesian authors, journalists and poets 
were not allowed to be published or distributed in Indonesia. Among these 
were the multiple award winner Pramudya Ananta Toer, the Acehnese 
journalist and author D. Adnan Beuransyah, and Filomena da Silva Derreita, 
an author from East Timor. 
•  The publishing licenses of the magazines TEMPO, Editor and Detik were 
revoked by the government’s Information Minister. 
1995: 
•  A scholar and former member of the House of Representatives (DPR), Dr. Sri 
Bintang Pamungkas, was arbitrarily detained for criticisms he expressed in a 
seminar series organized by German NGOs in support of Indonesia. He then 
was wrongly accused of leading an underground subversive movement to 
topple President Soeharto, and eventually jailed. 
•  The editor and prominent member of the human rights group "Pijar" was 
arrested, tried, and eventually found guilty for having written a defamatory 
article about the President and Vice-President, which expressed hatred of and 
contempt for the government. 
1996:  
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•  Three University students were killed by military and security personnel 
during a rally to protest against local government policy on public transport in 
Ujung Pandang. 
•  On the 27
th July, the government and military initiated a violent attack to stop 
the  mimbar bebas (freedom of speech) activities in the Megawati-led 
Indonesian Democratic Party headquarters, in which at least 5 were killed, 149 
were injured, and 23 disappeared. In this incident not only freedom of speech 
was violated but also freedom of assembly and association, freedom from fear 
and freedom from degrading and inhuman treatment. 
•  The labour rights activist Mukhtar Pakpahan was arrested for his involvement 
in the “Majelis Rakyat Indonesia”, an alliance of around 32 NGOs connected 
with his work as legal representative for workers and their concerns. His right 
to a fair trial was denied because his lawyer was continually intimidated by the 
government and the military. 
1997: 
•  The state police banned a theatrical play, entitled “Marsinah Menggugat” or 
Marsina’s Petition, which was scheduled to be performed in several important 
cities such as Surabaya and Bandung. The play was based on a true story about 
a young female worker and labour rights activist, Marsinah, who died under 
torture after repeated rape, in a police/military precinct. 
1998: 
•  The Information Minister forbade both the electronic and print media to give 
any coverage to students’ protest rallies demanding political, legal and 
economic reform. 
  
 
83
The rights to freedom of opinion, freedom of expression and freedom of speech are 
human rights recognised both in national law (Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution) and in 
international law (Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
 
4.2.   Violations against Freedom of Assembly and Association 
 
•  From 1973 to 1998, the government only acknowledged three political parties 
as contestants in general elections: PPP, Golkar and PDI. The MPR Decree 
and parliamentary acts were used by the government to restrict people to 
membership of one of only these three parties. The establishment of parties 
other than these three was against the law, and so subject to criminal 
prosecution under Subversive Act No. 1/PNPS/1969. 
•  Until 1999, workers were not allowed to join labour associations other than 
those endorsed by the government. As Indonesia is not a Party to the 
International Labour Convention, the norms and standards set out in the 
Convention have not been applied by the Indonesian government. Many 
attempts to build labour unions have been suppressed. It is a legal requirement 
for all social and mass organisations (including political and even religious 
ones) to adhere to the official state ideology, the Pancasila. 
 
The rights to freedom of assembly and association are guaranteed in the 1945 
Constitution (Art. 28) and proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or 
UDHR (Art. 20). 
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4.3.   Violations against Freedom of Religion 
 
•  The Constitution grants religious freedom to the members of five officially 
recognised religions (Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and 
Confucianism) and one traditional belief called Aliran Kepercayaan (Belief 
Movement). However, there are some restrictions on certain types of religious 
activity. For instance, since 1967 (under Law 14/1967) some Confucianist 
religious practices were restricted to houses or temples and were not allowed 
in public places. Just recently, with Presidential Decree No. 6/2000, this ban 
has been lifted. 
•  There is discrimination in the selling or publishing of religious books and 
literature. In general, Islamic religious books and literature can be published 
and sold publicly, while for other religions it is confined only to their own 
followers. 
 
The rights to freedom of religion are constitutionally guaranteed in Article 29 of the 1945 
Constitution. The same principles are set forth in the UDHR (Article 18), which were 
further upheld and elaborated in the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 
 
4.4.   Other Violations against Individuals’ Human Rights 
 
1965:  Mass killings followed the 1965 abortive coup of the Indonesian Communist Party 
(G30S/PKI).  
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1997:  Dita Sari Indah, a pro-democracy activist experienced inhuman and degrading 
treatment during her detention in the Malang Women’s Prison where she was 
denied the right of free movement and access to her family. 
1998: 
•  A number of politicians, human rights and pro-democracy activists (mainly 
students) were abducted. They were kidnapped by the former Indonesian 
Military Special Forces (Kopassus). Among them, twelve activists, mostly 
students, remain missing to the time of writing. 
•  Four Jakarta-based Trisakti University students were killed in a protest rally 
on campus. 
•  Since 1989, many gross violations of individual human rights have occurred in 
the so-called DOM (military operation region) which was established to crack 
down on the forces of the Freedom of Aceh Movement (GAM). Violations 
include summary killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, rape and sexual 
assault on women, abduction and destruction of property. 
•  In the so-called May 1998 tragedy, many members of the Chinese minority 
were victims of mass rape, destruction of property, and inhuman and 
degrading treatment. 
1999: 
•  Mass and systematic killings, abduction, destruction of property, rape and 
sexual assaults occurred after the August 30 referendum in East Timor. 
•  The ongoing violence in Aceh and Irian Jaya (now, Papua Barat or West 
Papua) continues to be characterised by violations of human rights, inhuman 
and degrading treatment, destruction of property, rape and sexual assault, 
abduction, etc.  
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2000:  
•  Four national agrarian activists were kidnapped by well-trained kidnappers but 
were eventually released. No satisfactory measure was taken by the 
government in order to solve this case. 
 
Without doubt, these incidents have violated Article 333 of the Indonesian Criminal Law 
book (KUHP), Article 9 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the principles set forth in the UDHR and the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
 
5. Indonesia’s View of Human Rights 
 
Accepting the wisdom of sayings such as “Apa yang engkau percaya menentukan siapa 
dirimu sebenarnya (what you believe determines what you are)”, or “Bagaiman engkau 
memandang sesuatu hal menentukan siapa dirimu (the way you view things, that’s what 
you are)”, it follows that Indonesia’s view about international human rights standards 
determines the way the Indonesian state deals with these issues.  
 
When he opened the Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993, the former United 
Nations’ Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that human rights are “the 
common language of all humanity.” By this he meant that regardless of religion, race, 
nationality or social status, human rights, using Sir Ronald Wilson’s expression, “matter  
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for everyone.”
145 But for many countries, including Indonesia, the universality of human 
rights is not totally accepted. 
 
In the end, the Conference brought to a conclusion the long debate as to whether human 
rights are Western values being forced on the East, and whether human rights are 
universal or particular. In that conference, the universality of human rights was 
recognised; and at the same time, the particularity of its implementation was also 
acknowledged. By the former it is meant that human rights are to be implemented as they 
are universally formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whereas the 
latter suggests that the implementation of human rights needs to take the circumstances 
specific to a country into consideration; that is to say, its culture, religion, history, etc. 
 
Under this consensus, cultural diversity is seen as a reality and plays an important role in 
the promotion of respect for human rights. Specific cultural elements in certain countries 
have emerged as key parameters in understanding their economic development and their 
style of democracy and human rights.  
 
This seems to acknowledge that there are no absolute human rights. All human rights 
have their own limitations and must be exercised in relation to the rights, conceptions and 
values of others, and of society at large. The Vienna Declaration of former days 
constituted a blend of Western and Eastern conceptions and ideas of human rights. In this 
declaration, human rights were defined as having five essential characteristics: universal, 
indivisible, impartial, non-selective and unchangeable. 
 
                                                 
145 E-Law, Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1996), p. 1, access 
date: 30/07/1997.  
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Indonesia, swinging between the pursuit of economic growth and the promotion of 
international human rights standards, agrees with this conception; and moreover is of the 
opinion that every single right must be accompanied by its corresponding obligation or 
duty. In Indonesia, priority has been given to political stability as a prerequisite to 
sustained economic reconstruction leading to increased social justice.
146 It has been part 
of a citizen’s duty to contribute (read: to sacrifice) something to the achievement of this 
political stability. And it seems that the need for political stability has been the best 
argument to justify the use of repression against trade unions, the media, non-
governmental organisations and individuals. 
 
Still on this issue, Prof. Muladi of the University of Diponegoro in Semarang, and former 
Justice Minister, stated that the universality of human rights could be restricted by 
national interest and security, democratic principles, public order, rights of others and 
morality.
147 Arguably, there should not be any objection to this view. The question is: 
who decides what is in the national interest in terms of security, public order, morality 
and democratic principles? The history of Indonesia provides evidence that these 
decisions have been made by the government in the narrowest sense, namely the 
executive; that is, the President and the presidential oligarchy. 
 
As already explained in the previous section, Indonesia represents an executive-heavy 
state system, which does not give much room for other branches of government (i.e. 
legislative, judiciary) to exercise control and supervision on government policies. Even 
worse, many fundamental state policies and programs (e.g. State Policy Guidelines or 
GBHN) are formulated by the military (largely through the National Defence Institute and 
                                                 
146 Soedarsono, Juwono. 1997. Ibid., at p. 5. 
147 Suara Pembaruan, January 4, 1998, http://www.suarapembaruan.com, access date; 6/01/1998.  
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National Defence and Security Council) on the strength of the principle of dual 
function
148 which has been effectively exploited to shield the powers that be, rather than 
the nation at large. 
 
The former Secretary General of the Indonesian National Defence and Security Council 
(Wanhankamnas), Soekarto, explicitly stated that “human rights are inherent in, and 
inseparable from, human obligations”. He referred to the Pancasila (five principles) as 
instructing all Indonesian citizens not only to ask for their rights, but also to perform their 
duties. In the Guidelines for the comprehension and practical application of the Pancasila 
(P4), the Indonesian nation embraces the balance, harmony and synergy between rights 
and duties,
149 which are like two faces of the same coin. Within the ideology of the 
Pancasila as the nation’s basic principles, duty to the country is valued more highly than 
the demand for or exercise of rights. 
 
Historically speaking, there was indeed a feeling of reluctance or discomfort among the 
founding fathers in introducing human rights provisions into the Constitution. Soekarno, 
who was the inaugural chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee and the first 
Indonesian President, argued that the inclusion of human rights in the Constitution meant 
recognition of les droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen which were derived from Western 
individualism and liberalism.
150 Indonesia was supposed to be against those philosophies, 
and instead sought to build its national spirit upon family-like principles of mutual help 
and the pursuit of social justice. This explains why there are only a few articles 
concerning human rights in the 1945 Constitution.  
                                                 
148 Locally known as “dwi fungsi” ABRI (now TNI), which enables the Indonesian military to function both 
as defence as well as social and political force. 
149 BP-7 Pusat. 1994. Bahan Penataran P4/Undang-undang Dasar 1945. Jakarta: BP-7 Pusat, p. 38 
150 Bp-7 Pusat. Ibid., at p. 39.  
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This reluctance can be traced through the sequence of human rights treaties that have been 
ratified by Indonesia. To this day, after 55 years of independence, Indonesia has become 
party only to four major human rights treaties, with one other acceded to, but not yet 
ratified. The table below shows the human rights treaties so far acceded to or ratified by 
Indonesia. 
 
  T r e a t y  Entry into 
force 
Date of signature 
or accession 
Date of 
ratification 
1. International  Convention 
on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
4/01/1969 25/06/1999  -- 
2.  Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women 
3/09/1981 29/07/1980  13/09/1984 
3.  Convention on the Political 
Rights of Women 
7/07/1954 31/03/1953  16/12/1958 
4.  Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 
2/09/1990 26/01/1990 5/09/1990 
5.  Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.
151 
26/06/1987 23/10/1985 28/10/1998 
 
Certain reservations were expressed by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
regarding the interpretation and application of some provisions contained in the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia declared that it is not bound by the 
provisions contained in Article 29 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Form of 
                                                 
151 de Varennes, Fernand (Ed.). 2000.  Asia-Pacific Human Rights Documents and Resources. Vol. 2. The 
Hague, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 577.  
 
91
Discrimination against Women. It stated that any dispute on this would be settled through 
arbitration or the International Court of Justice with the consent of all parties.
152 
 
Reservations were also expressed by the Indonesian government concerning the 
application of Articles 1, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. The rights of the child and other provisions in these articles were considered 
beyond constitutional guarantee and therefore the Indonesian government declared that it 
would “apply those provisions only in conformity with the 1945 Constitution.”
153 
 
6.  Attempts at Seeking Remedy 
 
Several attempts have been made by individuals, groups of individuals or non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to find justice and to seek legal reparation for the 
violation of their rights through government acts and policies, both at national and 
international levels. Some of the most significant attempts are listed below. 
 
6.1.   National Level 
 
It is obvious that any attempt at appealing against government acts that breach human 
rights in Indonesia will not be successful. As mentioned in the previous section, according 
to Supreme Court jurisprudence, the State government and its agencies may not be 
prosecuted before any national court for human rights abuses because, as State 
institutions, they merely implement state policies which strive for “social justice and 
welfare”.  
                                                 
152 United Nations Human Rights System. Record 1997 on Indonesia, at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord/ 
1997/ vol3/indonesia.htm 
153 de Varennes (Ed.), Ibid.  
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From its very beginning, the Indonesian criminal law system, inherited from the Dutch 
colonial Wetboek van Strafrecht (criminal law book), has prohibited judges (and courts) 
from hearing cases questioning government or State policies, even when the State had 
committed criminal offences inflicting loss or damage to citizens. 
 
The same situation applies in the case of the Indonesian military which, during the New 
Order, was used as a government bodyguard against the people. In the new Military Court 
Act (UU No. 31/1997), principles of legal immunity similar to those in the criminal law 
book, are also recognised. They can be found inter alia in Article 123 (1) concerning the 
competence of the investigating officer (Pepera). In paragraph (h), for example, the 
Pepera (who must be an active military officer) has the competence to “close the case for 
reasons of the interest of law, the public and the military.” 
 
This is exactly what is happening to all human rights violation cases which involve the 
government and the military. To mention only one example, this is what happened to the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, who 
went on to become the first Indonesian female President. 
 
After her consecutive defeats in seeking legal reparation by appealing to the first (district 
court) and appeal courts (high court) nationwide, Mbak Mega as she is familiarly called, 
whose political rights were violated by the state government under Soeharto's regime 
through the endorsement and sponsoring of the Medan Congress
154, had to accept the 
                                                 
154 The Congress was designed by the New Order ruler to depose Megawati from her post as Chairwoman 
of the PDI Party (Indonesia Democratic Party), which also meant her exclusion from candidacy for 
President. Many military officials acting as members of the Party were sent to the Congress and voted in 
favour of deposing Megawati.  
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Supreme Court ruling No. 1986K/Pdt./1998 of 18 August 1998. This decision ruled that 
the lawsuit filed against the state apparatus for illegal intervention in internal party affairs 
and violation of her constitutional rights, could not be heard by the Court on the basis of 
current jurisprudence, certain provisions of which stipulate that “the court is incompetent 
to hear cases questioning government policies”.   
 
Since Indonesia has only very recently become a party to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (but not yet its Optional Protocol permitting individual 
complaints when breaches of the treaty occurred), Megawati, as well as other individuals 
and bodies including NGOs, could not take any further steps to seek access to remedies 
offered by international law. 
 
6.2.   International Level 
 
Of the students and pro-democracy activists who were kidnapped and tortured by the 
military during 1998, twelve are still missing, and nobody knows whether they are alive 
or dead. They were kidnapped because, in the Indonesian government’s opinion, they 
presented a threat to national stability and security. So, as part of the government policy 
of maintaining national stability, they had to be silenced. Such actions clearly violate the 
provisions contained in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Kidnappings have also occurred in several other 
parts of Indonesia such as Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor (when this was still part of 
Indonesia). 
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Since the Indonesian government did not take the necessary measures to solve the case 
(the government even seemed to ignore it), an Indonesian NGO called the Commission 
for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) tried to bring the case before the 
International Commission of the Red Cross.
155 Besides, Kontras intended to report the 
case to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) by sending students 
and human rights activists to put it before a session of the Commission on Human Rights. 
A report of the episode was also made to the Working Groups on Enforced and 
Involuntary Disappearances. 
 
Some individual attempts were also made to attract international attention to the incident. 
For example, once they were released, some of the students went to present their personal 
reports and testimonies in front of the U.S. Congress. 
 
Another NGO was created to represent the victims of the violence perpetrated from 13-15 
May 1998 - violence which was allowed to go unchecked by the State government. In 
these riots, the victims were mostly from the Indonesian Chinese minority.
156 The above-
mentioned NGO, the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI), 
planned to bring a petition to the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which operates within the framework of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. As an 
integral part of this attempt, it was decided that a similar complaint would be submitted to 
the Commission on the Status of Women on behalf of Indonesian Chinese women who 
were the victims of mass rape in this violent episode. 
                                                 
155Munir, chariman of Kontras in Suara Pembaruan, June 23, 1998, http://www.suarapembaruan.com, 
access date: 25/06/1998. 
156Hendardi, director executive of PBHI, in Suara Pembaruan, July 17, 1998, Ibid., access date: 
19/07/1998.  
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Finally, on behalf of the victims and relatives of the Semanggi Tragedy of 1998, where 
police assisted by military personnel brutally fired at peacefully protesting students and 
took five lives, the Association of the Victims of the 1998 Semanggi Tragedy (Paguyuban 
Korban dan Keluarga Tragedi Semanggi) filed a petition to the Geneva-based UNHCHR. 
 
Little, if any, attempt has been made by the Indonesian government to bring the 
kidnappers or the violators before the court. To the time of writing, there has been no 
progress, let alone result, in these attempts; except for the last one, where the Jakarta-
based UNHCHR representative promised to conduct an inquiry into the incident.
157 This 
inquiry has never come to pass, unfortunately. 
 
7. Summary 
 
The establishment of the supremacy of law has proven to be the first, hardest and most 
important task for the new Indonesian government with a claim to democracy.  The 
supremacy of the law has never existed in Indonesia since its independence from Dutch 
colonial power in 1945. In the first fifteen years of Indonesia's independence, there was 
no supremacy of the law. Even the necessary state institutions had not been established 
yet. The cause of national unity, along with the transitional quality of law and 
government, were used as excuses for this situation. 
 
During the New Order, this situation became worse. This was caused by three major 
constitutional problems: a confusing legal system and legislation, a State government 
                                                 
157 Kompas, August 20, 1999, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 21/08/1999; also Kompas, October 24, 
2000, http://www.kompas.com, access date: 30/10/2000.  
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dominated by the executive, and a powerless and dependent judiciary. The first problem 
generated legal uncertainty in most legal transactions. The second put the State 
government above all other State institutions, and so beyond any control mechanism. The 
third did not give enough space for the development of an effective judicial review system 
by which the lawfulness of State and government policies might be examined. 
 
Since the legal system is unreliable, alternative mechanisms offer more hope. One aspect 
of the legal machinery that can prevent the state or government from misusing its power 
is the judicial review procedure, by which the constitutionality and legality of legislation 
are tested. Regrettably, the Indonesian judicial review system is so feeble and limited that 
many laws and regulations issued by the government cannot be scrutinised. Because the 
law may not be questioned, many abusive government acts have remained unpunished. 
 
One way out of this situation would be found if the judges were dedicated and committed 
enough to bring about the justice that the people deserve. Both scholarly and factual 
evidence reveal that this is far from being the case in Indonesia. Not only is there 
government intervention in the judiciary and in court procedures, but the credibility and 
integrity of the judges are seriously questioned and doubted by the people. The 
government's interference is so entrenched that the judges are at the same time 
government officials who are supposed to be loyal to the government. 
 
Frustration and annoyance with the domestic laws and legal system force Indonesia’s 
citizens to turn to the international legal resources provided by the international human 
rights system, such as the International Convention on the Civil and Political Rights, and 
the Optional Protocol. Under this system, groups of people, organisations and even  
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individuals are entitled to bring petitions about alleged rights violations, provided the 
country of which they are nationals is a party to that treaty (or, as in some cases, has 
acceeded to the protocol permitting individuals to have recourse to the complaint 
mechanism). 
 
Unfortunately, the Indonesian government is not a party to the ICCPR’s complaint 
mechanism protocol or related treaties. The government’s reluctance to ratify such 
treaties, and its unwillingness to implement them once ratified, are responsible for this 
state of affairs. Indonesia’s particular outlook on international human rights standards 
plays a significant role in this reluctance. 
 
The burdens of constitutional duty and moral obligation to establish an independent 
judiciary will grow heavier if concrete action is not taken immediately. Obviously, the 
transfer of court administration from the executive to the Supreme Court urgently needs 
to be put on the agenda. The executive’s involvement in judicial governance became the 
channel of the government’s intervention in the judiciary for a long period under the New 
Order. The independence of the judiciary is constitutionally guaranteed by Articles 24 and 
25 of the 1945 Constitution, and upheld by MPR Decree No. X/MPR/1998. So, there 
should not be any reason whatsoever not to implement this basic principle in a 
Rechtsstaat and not Machtsstaat like Indonesia. 
 
Law No. 35/1999 has once again emphasised the independent status of judges. It is now 
up to the judges to decide whether or not they will be consistent in carrying out their duty 
to bring justice to the people. Nevertheless, there is much doubt as to the judges’ integrity 
and credibility in exercising their function.  
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Experience shows that many crimes and human rights violations formerly committed 
under the New Order cannot be investigated under existing laws because they were 
deliberately protected from such investigation. During the New Order, not only the 
judiciary but also the legislative power were so paralysed that there was no rule of law, 
but rather rule of power. People no longer trusted either the court or the law. This 
situation, however, should not prevent judges from providing people with legal security 
and certainty. It is regrettable that judges should not be more dedicated to their duty as the 
champions of justice, but unfortunately this has been the experience for the majority of 
Indonesian people. 
 
Asmara Nababan, the Secretary General of the Indonesian National Commission on 
Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and T. Mulya Lubis, a leading lawyer and human rights 
defender, suggest that Indonesian judges should use the so-called transitional justice.
158 
By this they mean justice that is not only based on legal formalistic arguments (since this 
would mean chaos for Indonesia), but more than that, on moral and social values. In order 
to be able to do this, a judge must not use a merely legal formal approach in trying a case, 
but more importantly, as the then Vice President Megawati phrased it, “use [his] 
conscience.”
159 
 
Until the desired level of this conscientiousness can be reached, which is a very 
subjective, uncertain and immeasurable matter, there are more reliable legal mechanisms 
available through international instruments and organisations. It is highly desirable that 
                                                 
158 Kompas, October 24, 2000, at http://www.kompas.com, access date: 30/10/2000. 
159 Kompas, October 30, 2000, Ibid.,   
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the Indonesian government should now benefit by becoming a party to these instruments, 
even though such initiatives have proved uncomfortable for Indonesia in the past.  
 
Another alternative would be that the international community (possibly the UN) should 
take the initiative to increase pressure on countries like Indonesia by making available a 
national prototype judicial review procedure in the light of which the country’s 
constitution could be examined to see whether or not it was in conformity with 
international human rights standards. This, however, would prove impossible since the 
UN currently has no such mandate. Chapter 4 
INDIVIDUAL ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL REMEDY SYSTEM 
 
 
1.  Preliminary Remarks 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that for citizens living in countries like Indonesia it is 
quasi-impossible to obtain adequate legal reparation for breaches of their human rights if 
they merely rely on national laws. This chapter has a dual purpose. First, it outlines the 
functions and powers of the United Nations bodies in the field of human rights, including 
the availability and ease of individual access to those bodies. Second, and more 
importantly, it analyses the existing international mechanisms or procedures available to 
individuals, including the limitations or weaknesses of these procedures. Although there 
is not the slightest intention to overlook or diminish the strengths and benefits of the 
procedures, the author is of the view that an analysis of their limitations is crucial for the 
purpose of this entire study. 
 
Various communications procedures have been developed within the framework of the 
United Nations in the field of human rights. Of particular importance, and in support of 
the study conducted in the previous chapter, the centre of the analysis will be on the 
procedures concerning individual communications within the Charter and treaty-based 
bodies - that is, the Economic and Social Council with its subsidiary bodies and 
Committees, working in accordance with the Charter, resolutions and treaty provisions. 
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2.  Overview of the United Nations Human Rights System 
 
A number of mechanisms
160 that grant individuals access to means of legal redress at the 
international level have been developed within the framework of the United Nations
161. 
Anyone, be it a single individual or a group of people, may bring human rights problems 
to the attention of the United Nations; thousands of people around the world have done 
this in the past, and continue to do so. What kinds of communications on human rights 
can the United Nations receive? How are they dealt with and what are the procedures for 
handling them? How about the outcomes? These are the issues that will be discussed in 
this chapter. 
 
Within the United Nations human rights system, there are two different types of bodies 
that deal with communications of human rights problems. The first is Charter-based 
bodies or organs, also referred to as Charter bodies. The second is Treaty-based bodies, 
also referred to as treaty-monitoring bodies or simply treaty bodies. Charter bodies 
function in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which applies 
to all Member States. Treaty bodies, on the other hand, function according to the 
provisions contained in the treaties, which apply only to the States that are parties to the 
treaties. Brief descriptions of the functions and powers of the Charter bodies are provided 
later in this chapter. 
 
                                                 
160 Despite their long existence, not until the last decade did those mechanisms become popular to 
individuals in any countries; partly because of the information system within the UN itself, and largely 
because many countries are not yet willing to become parties to those treaties. Australia, for example, 
had just ratified and become party to the Optional Protocol on 25 December 1991 while Indonesia has 
not yet ratified either the ICCPR or its Protocol. 
161 The term United Nations used here refers to the UN itself, as by definition the UN also includes a far 
wider family of other specialised agencies, e.g. ILO, Unesco.  
 
102
The following diagram
162 shows how the Charter-based and Treaty-based bodies work 
within the framework of the United Nations for the promotion and protection of 
international human rights: 
 
 
UNITED NATIONS BODIES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
Charter-Based Bodies     Treaty-Based Bodies 
 
 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
for the ICCPR 
 
 
UN General Assembly  Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) for 
the ICERD 
 
Third 
Committee       Committee Against Torture 
      (CAT)  for  the  CAT-Convention  
  Economic and 
  Social  Council 
Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) for the 
Commission on   Commission on   CEDAW-Convention 
Human Rights  the Status of Women 
 
  Committee on Economic, Social 
Sub-Commission on        and Cultural Rights (CESCR)  
the Prevention of Dis-      for CESCR-Covenant 
crimination and Pro- 
tection of Minorities 
  Committee on the Rights of the 
Child for the CRC-Convention 
 
 
 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
 
 
                                                 
162 Adapted from Sarah Pritchard, Naomi Sharp & Sandrine Rodrigues. 1998. Petitioning the CERD 
Committee, Human Rights Booklet No. 2, Sydney: Australian Human Rights Centre, at p. 9.  
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Individuals seeking redress for alleged abuse of their rights have access to the 
international system under four UN treaties
163: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) with its first Optional Protocol
164, the International Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),
165 the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT)
166, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW)
167 with its Optional Protocol
168.  
 
Under these treaties, any individual can bring a petition, complaint or communication
169 
about alleged human rights violations to the respective Committees which function on the 
basis of the treaty provisions. The treaties are multilateral, and the fact that they are 
treaties makes them legally binding on the States parties. According to the provisions of 
these treaties, any individual who is a subject of the State Party can challenge acts it 
allegedly commits in violation of the rights set forth in the treaties. This may be done by 
filing a petition with the respective Committees. 
 
Each treaty provides for the appropriate Committee to receive and consider, within the 
jurisdiction of the State concerned, any petition, complaint or communication submitted 
by individuals who claim to be victims of violations of any right laid down in the treaty.  
                                                 
163 Actually, there are currently six treaties that provide for Committees to monitor their implementation, the 
other two are: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights (ICESCR) and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). However, these two treaties do not make provisions on 
the procedures dealing with individual complaints. Both will be addressed briefly later in this chapter as 
they are closely related to the others. 
164 General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) (1966). 
165 General Assembly Resolution 2106A (XX) (1965). 
166 General Assembly Resolution 39/46 (1984). 
167 General Assembly Resolution 34/180 (1979). 
168 General Assembly Resolution A/54/4 (1999). 
169 All of the four treaties use the term “communication” and it seems to be an ‘official’ one. However, in 
many writings the terms “petition” and “complaint” are also used, and it is rightly so considering the 
very nature of the communication, which is a petition or complaint.  
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3.  Functions and Powers of Charter-based Bodies 
 
Charter-based bodies do not receive nor consider individual communications. A brief 
description of the work and functions of the Bodies is given below. 
 
3.1. General Assembly and the Third Committee
170 
 
As one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, the General Assembly is its main 
representative body. It contains representatives from all Member States. The General 
Assembly refers most human rights matters to its Third Committee, which deals with 
social, humanitarian and cultural matters.
171 The role of the General Assembly, prescribed 
in Articles 10 and 13 of the United Nations Charter, ranges from standard setting
172, 
implementation and supervision of international standards
173, to providing advisory 
services, and hosting or participating in philosophical debates on human rights
174. 
 
 
In brief, the functions and powers of the General Assembly are the following: 
 
 
•  to consider and make recommendations on cooperation in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, including disarmament and arms regulation; 
•  to discuss any question relating to international peace and security and except 
where a dispute or solution is being discussed by the Security Council, to 
make recommendations on it; 
                                                 
170 More detail on this including the historical analysis of the General Assembly can be read in Antonio 
Cassese and John Quinn’s essays “The General Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-1989” and “The 
General Assembly into 1990s” in Philip Alston (Ed.) 1996. The United Nations and Human Rights. 
Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, pp. 23-106. 
171 Pritchard, Sharp & Rodrigues, Petitioning the CERD, Ibid., at p. 6 
172 Mainly in adoption of resolutions but also in making recommendations, see John Quinn in Philip Alston 
(ed.), Ibid., at p. 65. 
173 In relation to treaty implementation the GA receives reports from the HRC, the CESCR, the CAT and the 
CEDAW, Ibid., at p. 68. 
174 For more details, see, John Quinn, Ibid., at pp. 84 and 89.  
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•  to discuss and, with the same exception as above, make recommendations on 
any question within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and 
functions of any organ of the United Nations; 
•  to initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international 
political cooperation, the development and codification of international law, 
the realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, international 
collaboration in the fields of economics health and socio-cultural affairs; 
•  to make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation 
regardless of origin, which might impair friendly relations among nations; 
•  to receive and consider reports from the Security Council and other United 
Nations organs; 
•  to consider and approve the United Nations budget and to apportion the 
contributions among Members States; 
•  to elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the members of 
the Economic and Social Council and the members of the Trusteeship Council 
that are elected; 
•  to elect jointly with the Security Council the judges of the International Court 
of Justice, and on the recommendations of the Security Council, to appoint the 
Secretary-General.
175 
 
 
3.2. Economic and Social Council 
 
 
The powers and functions of the Economic and Social Council (the ECOSOC) are 
detailed in Chapter X of the Charter. Like the General Assembly, the ECOSOC is a 
principal organ of the UN. As regards human rights in particular, according to the UN 
Charter, the ECOSOC may, amongst other things, “… make recommendations for the 
purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms …” [Article 62 (2)]. In the field of human rights the ECOSOC has also initiated 
studies and prepared draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly.
176 
 
The founders of the United Nations foresaw an important role for the Council and gave it 
considerable powers in the UN Charter, inter alia:  
•  to make or initiate studies and reports and to make recommendations to the 
General Assembly, Member States and Specialised Agencies;  
                                                 
175 Fifty-sixth Session: 2001, General Assembly, at http://www.un.org/ga/56/about.htm,       access date: 
25/09/2001. 
176 Pritchard, Sharp & Rodrigues, Petitioning the CERD, Ibid., at p. 6  
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•  to prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, and to call 
for international conferences, subject to the General Assembly’s approval;  
•  to enter into agreement with any of the specialised agencies and to define the 
terms in which the agency concerned should be brought into relationship with the 
UN;  
•  to co-ordinate the activities of these specialised agencies by consulting with them 
and issuing them with recommendations, along with recommendations to the 
General Assembly and members of the United Nations;  
•  to furnish information to the Security Council and assist it upon request.
177 
 
Pursuant to Article 68 of the UN Charter, ECOSOC has established a number of 
functional commissions
178 including a Commission on Human Rights and a Commission 
on the Status of Women. In practice, the ECOSOC assigns most of its work on questions 
of human rights to these functional commissions.
179 
 
To sum up, the functions and powers of the ECOSOC are the following: 
 
•  to serve as the central forum for the discussion of international economic and 
social issues of a global or inter-disciplinary nature and the formulation of policy 
recommendations on those issues addressed to Member States and to the United 
Nations System; 
•  to make or initiate studies and reports and make recommendations on international 
economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters; 
•  to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; 
•  to call international conferences and prepare draft conventions for submission to 
the General Assembly on matters falling within its competence; 
•  to negotiate agreements with the specialised agencies defining their relationship 
with the United Nations; 
•  to coordinate the activities of the specialised agencies by means of consultations 
with and recommendations to them by means of recommendations to the General 
Assembly and Members of the United Nations; 
•  to perform services, approved by the General Assembly, for Members of the 
United Nations and, on request, for the specialised agencies; 
•  to consult with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) concerned with matters 
with which the Council deals.
180 
                                                 
177 Declan O’Donovan (1996) “The Economic and Social Council” in Philip Alston (ed), Ibid., at p. 107. 
178 As at the time of writing, there are nine functional commissions: Statistical Commission, Commission on 
Population and Development, Commission on Human Rights, Commission on the Status of Women, 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Commission on Crime Prevention Criminal Justice, Commission for 
Social Development, Commission on Science and Technology for Development and Commission on 
Sustainable Development. See Economic and Social Council on http://www.un.org/documents/ 
ecosoc.htm, access date: 9/09/2001. 
179 See supra, note 166. 
180 Economic and Social Council, http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc.htm, access date: 25/09/2001.  
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3.3. Commission on Human Rights 
 
 
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which was created in 1947, meets annually 
for six weeks during February and March and consists of 53 Member States. It is the 
single most important United Nations body dealing with international human rights.
181 
 
The CHR assists ECOSOC in coordinating human rights activities within the United 
Nations system. It undertakes studies, makes recommendations and prepares draft 
international instruments. It undertakes tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly and 
ECOSOC, including the investigation of allegations concerning human rights 
violations.
182 Since the 1960s, with the powers vested in it, the CHR has developed 
procedures in dealing with communications regarding violations of human rights.  
 
Through the appointment of special rapporteurs, special representatives and independent 
experts, and through the establishment of working groups, the CHR has established rules 
and procedures for dealing with human rights situations in particular countries. It also 
deals with specific types of human rights violations which affect a large number of people 
in a large number of countries.
183 There are three types of procedure: country procedures, 
thematic procedures and “1503” procedures.
184 Together, these procedures are known as 
Charter-based human rights procedures.  
 
                                                 
181 The CHR is the main subsidiary body of the ECOSOC in the field of human rights. Mary Robinson, the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, describes the CHR as having been “the central architect of 
the work of the United Nations in the field of human rights” at (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu2/2/chr.htm, access date: 25/09/2001). 
182 Ibid., at p. 7. 
183 See Philip Alston (1996) “The Commission on Human Rights” in Philip Alston (ed.), Ibid., at p. 126 cf. 
Pritchard, Sharp & Rodrigues’ Petitioning the CERD, Ibid. at p. 7. 
184 Summary on the development of the procedures, see Philip Alston in Philip Alston (ed.), Ibid., pp. 126-
210.  
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The country procedures, also referred to as country mechanisms or mandates, are the 
mandates or procedures with which the CHR examines, monitors, and publicly reports on 
human rights situations in specific countries or territories. The thematic procedures are 
procedures by which the CHR examines, monitors, and publicly reports on major 
incidences of human rights violations worldwide.
185 
 
Country and thematic mechanisms, which are extra-conventional, differ from treaty-based 
bodies in that they have no formal complaints procedures. The activities of the country 
and thematic mechanisms are based on communications which have been received from 
various sources (the victims or their relatives, local information or NGOs, etc.) and which 
contain allegations of human rights violations. Such communications may be submitted in 
various forms (e.g. letters, faxes, cables, emails, etc.) and may concern individual cases as 
well as details of situations of widespread or systematic alleged violations of human 
rights. Collectively, these procedures or mechanisms are known as the Special Procedure 
of the CHR.
186 
 
With regard to the submission requirements of communications under these extra-
conventional mechanisms, there is no distinction between the two procedures. The criteria 
required by both mechanisms are: 
 
•  identification of the alleged victims(s); 
•  identification of the perpetrators of the violation(s); 
•  identification of the person(s) or organisation(s) submitting the communications 
(anonymous communications are inadmissible); 
•  detailed description of the circumstances of the incident in which the alleged violation 
occurred.
187 
                                                 
185 See, Commission on Human Rights on http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chr.htm, Ibid. 
186 Also referred to as communications under extra-conventional mechanisms, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/-
menu2/8/ ex_conv .htm, access date: 19/09/2001. 
187 Id.  
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In order to facilitate examination of reported communications, a questionnaire is made 
available to persons wishing to report alleged violations. Reports on communications will 
also be made available after consideration. Examples of reports that have been submitted 
through these mechanisms can be seen in the appendix.
188 
 
The “1503” procedure is vested in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
of Minorities, the main subsidiary body of the CHR. This is a procedure to confidentially 
examine communications which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross violation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
189 It will be addressed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
3.4. Commission on the Status of Women (the CSW) 
 
Like the CHR, the Commission on the Status of Women (the CSW) is one of the 
commissions which function under ECOSOC, pursuant to the provisions contained in 
Article 68 of the United Nations Charter. Its membership, which was originally set at 
fifteen and followed a pattern of geographic distribution, has increased to forty-five since 
the 1990s, reflecting the growing membership of the United Nations.
190 
 
As its name indicates, the CSW concerns itself mainly with the promotion of gender 
equity. While the mandate of the CSW was not originally as broad as that of the CHR, it 
is clear from the early records that the Commission was intended to be the main policy-
                                                 
188 [Report] on Country Mandates is taken from http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/a/cm.htm, and 
Thematic Mandates from http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/tm.htm, access date: 25/09/2001. 
189 Sentence 1 of the ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII). 
190 See, supra, notes 168 and 169.  
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making body of the United Nations on most questions relating to women. The mandate of 
the CSW was defined by ECOSOC in 1947 as follows: 
 
The functions of the Commission shall be to prepare recommendations and reports 
to the Economic and Social Council on promoting women’s rights in political, 
economic, civil, social and educational fields. The Commission shall also make 
recommendations to the Council on urgent problems requiring immediate 
attention in the field of women’s rights with the object of implementing the 
principle that men and women shall have equal rights and to develop proposals to 
give effect to such recommendations.
191 
 
 
This mandate was gradually modified as the CSW over the years received authority to 
undertake standard-setting exercises, to review communications and make general 
recommendations on them, and to review the implementation of the documents emanating 
from the United Nations Decade for Women.
192 Following the recommendations made by 
the CSW at its special session in 1987, the Council formalised the expansion of the 
commission’s terms of reference since the 1980s to include “the functions of promoting 
the objectives of equality, development and peace, monitoring the implementation of 
measures for the advancement of women, and reviewing and appraising progress made at 
the national, subregional, regional, sectoral and global levels”.
193 
 
In short, the functions and powers of the CSW are as follows: 
 
•  to prepare recommendations and reports to ECOSOC on promoting women’s 
rights in the political, economic, civil, social and educational fields; 
•  to make recommendations to ECOSOC on urgent problems requiring immediate 
attention in the field of women’s rights; 
•  to promote implementation of the principle that men and women shall have equal 
rights.
194 
 
 
                                                 
191 Supra,note 168. 
192 ESC Resolution 48 (IV) (1947). 
193 Laura Reanda. 1996. “The Commission on the Status of Women” in Philip Alston (ed.), Ibid., at p. 272 
in relation to, supra, note 168. 
194 ESC Resolution 1987/22.  
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3.5. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
 
 
As the main subsidiary body of the CHR working under the authority of ECOSOC, the 
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (the 
Sub-Commission) was established in 1947. The Sub-Commission is an expert body 
subordinate to the CHR and ECOSOC. The main purpose of its creation, and therefore its 
main function, is to provide the CHR with analysis and advice. More recently, however, it 
has also become a link between official inter-governmental institutions and the general 
public as represented by the NGOs. As a consequence, it has consistently shown more 
independence than its parent bodies.
195 The mandate given in 1947 by the CHR to the 
Sub-Commission was set out as follows: 
 
(a)  in the first instance, to examine what provisions should be adopted in defining the 
principles to be applied in the field of the prevention of discrimination on grounds 
of race, sex, language or religion, and in the field of the protection of minorities, 
and to make recommendations to the Commission on urgent problems in these 
fields. 
(b) to perform any other functions which may be entrusted to it by ECOSOC or the 
CHR.
196 
 
In 1949 the CHR amended section (a) of the mandate to read: 
 
(a) to undertake studies particularly in the light of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind relating to 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and protection of racial, national, 
religious and linguistic minorities.
197 
 
 
The mandate was subsequently expanded three times: in 1968, 1978 and 1986. The 
revisions and expansions of the mandate were made mainly at the request of the CHR and 
ECOSOC in order to address specific and urgent problems requiring immediate 
                                                 
195 Commission on the Status of Women, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/,  
access date: 25/09/2001. 
196 Report of the Commission on Human Rights in 1947 (First Session), E/259 (1947), para. 19. See also, 
Asbjorn Eide, Ibid., footnote 186, at p. 211. 
197 Report of the Commission on Human Rights in 1949 (Fifth Session), E/1371 (1949), para. 13, section A. 
Also, Asjborn Eide, Ibid., at  note 186.  
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attention.
198 Those revisions and expansions of the mandate were by and large partial and 
incidental and did not change the basic function of the Sub-Commission. 
 
In brief, the functions and powers of the renamed Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights
199 are: 
 
•  to undertake studies, particularly in the light of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and to make recommendations to the CHR concerning the 
prevention of discrimination of any kind relating to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the protection of racial, national, religious and linguistic minorities; 
•  to perform any other functions which may be entrusted to it by ECOSOC.
200 
 
 
3.6. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
 
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, formerly known as the 
Centre for Human Rights, is part of the United Nations Secretariat. The Office plays an 
important part in implementing the human rights programmes developed by policy organs 
and in servicing Charter-based and Treaty-based human rights bodies.
201 One of its main 
functions is to provide and disseminate information and documents relating to 
international human rights, and to channel communications to the appropriate bodies. The 
Office is based in Geneva and has a branch in the United Nations headquarters in New 
York. 
                                                 
198 Details on the changes to the mandate can be read in the ESC Resolution 1334 (XLIV) (1968), ESC 
Decision 1978/21 and ESC Resolution 1986/35. 
199 Since 1999, the ECOSOC has changed the name of the sub-Commission into Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 
200  Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu2/2/sc.htm, access date; 25/09/2001. 
201 Pritchard, Sharp & Rodrigues, Petitioning the CERD, Ibid. at p. 10.  
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4.  Communications Procedures and Individual Access through International 
Human Rights Instruments 
 
Firstly, the discussion is about the communications procedures of the Charter bodies, in 
particular those that fall under the area of competence of the Economic and Social 
Council. Secondly, this discussion also concerns the procedures for dealing with 
individual complaints before the treaty bodies (that is, the Committees). While the former 
will only be touched on briefly, the latter will be addressed in more detail.  
 
It should be noted that the procedures that are brought before the Charter bodies do not 
concern individual complaints or petitions as such; rather, these procedures concern 
human rights situations that affect a large number of people in countries over a 
protracted period of time.
202 Individuals or, in most cases, groups of people who claim to 
be the victims of alleged human rights abuses
203 may, however, participate in the 
examination procedures as witnesses with a consultative status.
204 Thus individuals do, to 
some extent, have locus standi under this treaty procedure. 
 
As for individual complaint mechanisms under specific human rights treaties, there are 
currently four United Nations committees appointed to receive and consider individual 
communications concerning human rights: The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee Against 
                                                 
202 See, United Nations Fact Sheet No. 7 on Communications Procedures, at (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu6/2/fs7.htm, access date: 19/09/2001). 
203 The role of the NGOs is of fundamental significance. More on this, see Declan O’Donovan in Philip 
Alston (ed.), Ibid., pp. 110 ff. To date there are 1600 NGOs having consultative status with the 
ECOSOC, see http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc.htm, Ibid. 
204 When gathering information on human rights situation they may, where necessary, invite individuals or 
groups of peoples who are victims of alleged human rights abuses to testify before the Charter-bodies. 
For instance, sentence (a) of the CHR’s Decision 1997/105 (E/CN.4/Dec/1997/105). Compare, 
provisions in the revised 1503 Procedure (E/Res/2000/3).  
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Torture (CAT) and the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). 
 
4.1. Charter-based Communications Procedures 
 
Communications procedures within the framework of Charter bodies dealing with human 
rights problems, also referred to as Charter-based human rights procedures, occur mainly 
in the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), its Commission on 
Human Rights (CHR) and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities. 
 
4.1.1.  Communications Procedure under ECOSOC Resolutions 
 
The procedures for dealing with communications concerning human rights are provided 
for in two ECOSOC resolutions: ESC Resolution 75(V) (1947) and ESC Resolution 116 
(VI) A (1948).
205 
 
According to these resolutions, the United Nations Secretary-General will prepare a list of 
communications. This list will be submitted to ECOSOC for referral to the Commission 
on Human Rights, which will in turn examine it using the authority vested in it by 
ECOSOC. 
 
The first resolution of ECOSOC concerning procedures for dealing with communications 
seems almost bureaucratic; a matter of simply deciding what to do with embarrassing 
                                                 
205 United Nations ECOSOC 5
th Session (July-August 1947) and 6
th Session (February-March 1948). See 
also, Satish Chandra. 1985. Individual’s Petition in International Law. New Delhi: Deep & Deep 
Publications, footnote 25, at p. 39.  
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pieces of paper. Under this procedure, it is possible for the CHR to conclude that there 
should be no action taken on these documents. In addition, it could decide to keep their 
contents strictly confidential; so confidential that even the Secretary-General would be 
required to compile a list of communications without revealing their authors' identities.
206 
Later on, in accordance with Resolution 116 (VI) A, the identity of the authors could be 
revealed provided that they had no objection to disclosure. 
 
In another resolution adopted in 1959, it was decided that this confidential list of 
complaints to the United Nations concerning human rights violations should be 
distributed to the CHR and to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities. Under this resolution, it was reaffirmed that the CHR had 
“no power to take any action in regard to any complaints concerning human rights.”
207 
 
Despite this reaffirmation of the competence of the Commission, the resolution (unlike 
the previous ones) went on to specify that the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
should record confidential statistics of human rights communications by individual 
petitioners.
208 However, rather than providing for the follow up of individual petitions, 
ECOSOC simply rewrote the rule of Resolution 75 (V) that no action would be taken on 
their communications. Further, in the resolution it was required that the governments of 
States which were referred to in the communications should receive copies and that their 
replies should also be sent to the CHR. 
 
The CHR had to wait another twenty years before it was given the power to take any 
action on complaints about human rights infractions. In 1967, ECOSOC adopted a 
                                                 
206 Declan O’Donovan in Philip Alston, Ibid., at p. 117. 
207 ESC Resolution 728 F (XXVIII) (1959), UN Fact Sheet No. 7. 
208 This amendment came into being after a recommendation brought to the ECOSOC by the CHR in its 5
th 
Session in May-June 1949 (UN Doc. E/1371).  
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resolution (Resolution 1235)
209 which entrusted the Commission on Human Rights with 
the power to “make a thorough study of situations which reveal a consistent pattern of 
violations of human rights, as exemplified by the policy of apartheid.” The reasons for 
this new attitude within ECOSOC were, briefly, the changing composition of the United 
Nations, the process of de-colonisation and the development of a human rights conscience 
among Western States.
210  
 
It should be noted, however, that Resolution 1235 did not fully empower the CHR with 
the competence to take action on any kind of human rights violations. It clearly specified 
that action may only be taken in situations which reveal a consistent pattern of violations 
of human rights “as exemplified by the policy of apartheid”, and even then, the action 
taken should not exceed the power vested in it by the resolution, namely “to make a 
thorough study.” 
 
Pursuant to this resolution, the CHR proposed to ECOSOC that an Ad Hoc Working 
Group be established to consider human rights violations in southern Africa. The 
ECOSOC accepted the proposal. The Working Group was to be sent to a particular 
country (South Africa) to gather all relevant information relating to human rights abuses. 
The establishment of this Working Group was the first “serious” action taken by the 
United Nations in fulfilling its task to “promote respect for, and observance of, 
international human rights standards.” In its work, the Working Group compiled 
information from both government representatives or agencies, and individuals or groups 
of people. 
 
                                                 
209 ESC Resolution 1235 (XLII) (1967) of 6 June 1967. 
210 Historical summary on this in Declan O’Donovan, Ibid., pp. 118-121.  
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Although these developments did not by any means address every human rights issue or 
problem in need of attention and action, and although the driving force behind them was 
often ideological and political, they had a significant impact on the efforts of the United 
Nations to promote respect for, and observance of, international human rights standards. 
 
As a result of these developments, the United Nations has now become more actively 
concerned with the implementation of international human rights principles than was the 
case up to the early 1960s. This was an important step forward. Another step followed in 
1970, when ECOSOC adopted Resolution 1503,
211 which provides for a “procedure for 
dealing with communications relating to violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.” This procedure was referred to as the “1503" procedure, after the number of 
the resolution. 
 
4.1.2.  The “1503” Procedure 
 
Every month, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities (hereinafter referred to as the Sub-Commission) receives from the Secretary-
General of the United Nations a list of communications with short descriptions of each 
case and any replies sent in by Governments. The same document is also supplied to the 
Commission on Human Rights. 
 
To follow up the list of communications, a Working Group consisting of five members 
meets for two weeks each year, just before the Sub-Commission’s annual session. The 
Working Group, also called Working Group on Situations, considers all the 
                                                 
211ESC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) (1970) of 27 May 1970.  
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communications that have been received, including Governments' replies, and selects for 
the attention of the Sub-Commission cases where there seems to be reliable evidence of 
“a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms”
212, 
namely situations that affect a large number of people over a protracted period of time. 
 
A majority vote by members of the Working Group’s members is required for the 
selection to be considered by the Sub-Commission. If a majority vote is not achieved, no 
action in relation to the submissions is taken by the Sub-Commission. All 
communications successfully brought to the attention of the Sub-Commission are duly 
examined, whether or not they are eventually passed on to the CHR. 
 
Subsequently, the CHR will determine whether a thorough study of a particular situation 
is needed, together with a report and recommendations to ECOSOC. If considered 
necessary, an ad hoc committee may also be appointed to make an investigation on a 
particular communication, but this requires the consent of the State in which the 
violations have allegedly occurred. 
 
Procedural rules have been developed by the Sub-Commission to decide what 
communications may be accepted for further examination.
213 Firstly, these rules stipulate 
that the aim of the communications must be in conformity with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other applicable 
human rights treaties or conventions. The procedure also specifies that there must be 
reasonable grounds to believe that there is a consistent pattern of violations of human 
                                                 
212 Sentence 1 of Resolution 1503 reads: “…which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
attested violations of human fundamental freedoms.” 
213 Sub-Commission Resolution I (XXIV) of 13 August 1971.  
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rights and fundamental freedoms. In addition to this, any replies by the Governments 
concerned must also be taken into account. 
 
Furthermore, the procedure rules that communications may be admitted when they come 
from people, either individuals or groups, who claim to be the victims of human rights 
violations. The communications may also come from any person or group of people who 
have direct and reliable knowledge of such violations. Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) that want to submit communications must meet the condition that they are acting 
in good faith in accordance with recognised principles of human rights and that they have 
direct and reliable knowledge of the violations. Anonymous communications will not be 
accepted.  
 
The contents of the communications must state the purpose of the petition, the factual 
evidence and the rights that have been violated. As a general rule, a communication will 
not be accepted if it contains abusive language or insulting remarks about the State 
against which the complaint is directed. Also, no communication will be considered if it 
shows political motivation or objectives. 
 
Under this procedure, a communication may only be submitted after all domestic 
remedies have been exhausted. However, if it can be demonstrated that domestic remedies 
are either ineffective or, if undertaken, may extend over an unreasonable length of time, 
then an exception to this rule may be made. 
 
Finally, the rules of procedure require that a communication will not be accepted if it has 
already been dealt with under other existing procedures within the United Nations system.  
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All actions taken on communications made under the “1503” procedure remain 
confidential until the Commission reports them to ECOSOC. Up to this point, the 
meetings of all the human rights bodies involved are held in private and the 
confidentiality of their records and of the documents that they handle is preserved.
214 
 
Just recently, with its Resolution 2000/3 of 16 June 2000
215, ECOSOC has reformed the 
communications procedure. According to this resolution, the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights will designate a Working Group from among 
its members on an annual basis
216. This Working Group on Communications is to be 
geographically representative of the five regional groups with an appropriate rotation, and 
will meet annually following the Sub-Commission’s session in order to examine any 
communications or complaints received from individuals or groups alleging human rights 
violations along with any responses from the Governments concerned.  
 
Thus, under the “1503” procedure there are now two Working Groups: a Working Group 
on Situations and a Working Group on Communications. Unfounded communications 
will be screened out by the secretariat of the Working Groups and will not be submitted to 
the Working Group nor to the Government concerned. If the communications received are 
identified by the Working Group on Communications as showing reasonable evidence of 
                                                 
214 Since 1978, however, the Chairman of the CHR has announced in public session the names of countries 
which have been under examination. The ECOSOC sometimes decides, on its own initiative or after a 
study of a particular situation has ended or on the recommendations of the CHR, to lift the 
confidentiality. This has been the case with Equatorial Guinea in 1979, Argentina and Uruguay in 1985 
and the Philippines in 1986. The ECOSOC has also revealed the country that was under examination in 
the case of special representatives’ report on the human rights situation in Haiti in 1987. 
215 Adopted in its resumed organizational session for the year 2000, on the CHR’s recommendations, which 
were adopted in the Commission’s decision 2000/109 of 26 April 2000. See The Revised 1503 
Procedure at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/1503.htm, access date: 19/09/2001. 
216 Since 1999 it is titled the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. See, 
supra, note 189.  
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a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the 
matter will be referred for examination to the Working Group on Situations. 
 
The Working Group on Situations comprises five members. It will meet at least one 
month prior to the CHR’s session to examine the particular situations submitted to it, and 
will decide whether or not a particular communication may be brought before the CHR. 
The procedure is still called the “1503” procedure.
217 
 
The criteria or conditions for a communication to be accepted for examination
218 are as 
follows: 
 
•  no communication will be admitted if it runs counter to the principles of the 
United Nations Charter, or it shows political motivation; 
•  a communication will only be admitted if consideration shows there are 
reasonable grounds to believe, also taking into account any replies by the 
Government concerned, that there is a consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
•  communications may come from individuals
219 or groups who claim to be victims 
of human rights violations or who have direct and reliable knowledge of the 
violations. Anonymous communications are inadmissible as are those based only 
on reports in the mass media; 
•  each communication must describe the facts, the purpose of the petition and the 
rights that have been violated
220; 
•  domestic remedies must have been exhausted prior to submission of 
communications, unless it can be shown convincingly that the solutions at the 
national level would be ineffective or that they would extend over an unreasonable 
length of time. 
 
                                                 
217 Sentence 8 of the Resolution 2000/3. 
218 The Revised 1503 Procedure, Ibid. 
219 Different from, and not to be mistaken for, individual communications before treaty bodies. Under the 
“1503” procedure, individual communications are considered as part of the “human rights situations 
affecting large number of people in all countries over a protracted period of time”. See supra, note 191. 
220 As a rule, communications containing abusive language or insulting remarks about the State against 
which the petition is directed will not be admitted for consideration.  
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4.1.3.  Critical Appraisal and Limitations of the Procedures 
 
 
So far, the role of ECOSOC itself has received only limited scrutiny. Whatever interest 
was once shown has diminished steadily over the years. No recent published study has 
focussed on the powers and functions of ECOSOC. O’Donovan concluded that this is due 
to two major failures of the Council: first, the failure of the Council to deal substantively 
with human rights issues; and second, its failure to relate human rights issues to the wider 
economic and social field.
221 
 
O'Donovan argues that: 
Conceptually, the debate on an integrated approach to human rights and on their 
importance in assessing development problems has passed the Council by. 
Operationally, the Council has made little effort to co-ordinate the work of the 
Commission on Human Rights with other bodies and agencies…The other part of the 
problem is that, because of the range of the economic and social programmes of the 
United Nations, the Council has difficulty in even monitoring what its various 
subsidiary bodies and associated bodies and agencies are doing.
222 
 
Many studies have been conducted on the work and effectiveness of the Commission on 
Human Rights as the main subsidiary body of ECOSOC. This is understandable because 
the Commission, along with its two main Sub-Commissions, is arguably the most 
important human rights body in the United Nations, even after the introduction of treaty-
based bodies. The role of the Commission was analysed historically and critically in a 
study by Philip Alston. 
 
In his analysis, Alston observes that, from the beginning, the Commission was reluctant to 
assume too much power, as shown by its deletion of the provision of the Universal 
                                                 
221 Declan O’Donovan, “The Economic and Social Council” in Philip Alston, Ibid., at p. 122. 
222 Philip Alston “The Commission on Human Rights” in Philip Alston’s The United Nations and Human 
Rights, Ibid., p. 139.  
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Declaration of Human Rights entitling it to handle petitions. This provision was included 
in the first draft declaration compiled by the United Nations Secretariat in 1947, which 
was adopted by the General Assembly in 1948.
223 One year later, the appropriateness of 
this measure was raised again by the Secretariat. In its report, the Secretariat warned, inter 
alia, that deletion of the provision enabling the Commission to handle petitions would be 
'bound to lower the prestige and the authority not only of the Commission but also of the 
United Nations as a whole.’
224 
 
Several prominent academics took uncompromising stances against the attitude of the 
Commission. One of the most outspoken was British international law expert Hersch 
Lauterpacht. He condemned the position of the Commission as ‘constituting an 
extraordinary degree of abdication of the United Nations proper function.’ He suggested 
that the United Nations and its organs, particularly the Commission, were duty bound to 
receive petitions concerning violations of human rights, to examine them, and, on the 
basis of such examinations, to take all requisite action short of intervention. Otherwise, he 
went on to warn, the United Nations would be found wanting in perhaps the most crucial 
aspect of its purpose.
225 
 
As previously noted, several procedures based on various ECOSOC resolutions have been 
developed to accommodate such views, such as the procedures under Resolutions 75 (V) 
and 11 (VI) noted above. Alston observes, nonetheless, that there is no question that these 
highly restrictive and unproductive procedures failed to do justice to the concerns and 
hopes of the tens of thousands of people who petitioned the United Nations annually. In 
the words of the official responsible for all of the Secretariat’s assistance to the 
                                                 
223 UN Doc. E/CN.4/165 (1949). 
224 Quoted from Philip Alston, Ibid., at p. 140. 
225 Ibid., at p. 141  
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Commission at the time, the system became “the world’s most elaborate waste-paper 
basket.”
226 
 
Later on, ECOSOC adopted Resolutions 1235 and 1503, which authorised the 
Commission to take action on communications, and was generally aimed at making the 
Commission more ‘powerful’. Nevertheless, both procedures generated considerable 
controversy and raised high hopes while actually accomplishing relatively little during 
their first decade in operation.
227 
 
Despite a lack of public action by the Commission, especially in relation to situations in 
Kampuchea (Pol Pot), Central Africa (Bokassa), these procedures gained some respect 
during the next decade (1970s). Yet, as a survey conducted by the London daily 
newspaper, The Times concluded, “the Commission worked in almost total secrecy and 
had deliberately constructed a bureaucratic and procedural maze, as a result of which 
delay has been institutionalised and the aim has not been to protect the victims but the 
oppressors.”
228 
 
The “1503” procedure, for instance, can be better characterised as a ‘petition information 
system’ than as a ‘petition redress procedure’, since it offers no solace or redress to 
individual victims. Its objective is to use complaints as a means of helping the 
Commission to identify situations that involve a consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
attested violations of human rights. In this context, an individual victim is but a piece of 
                                                 
226 Quoted from Philip Alston, Ibid., at p. 144. 
227 Ibid., at p. 145. 
228 Id.  
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evidence whose case might, if accompanied by a sufficient number of related cases, spur 
the United Nations into action of some kind.
229 
 
4.2. Treaty-based Communications Procedures 
 
Treaty-based communications procedures are procedures for dealing with human rights 
complaints which have been brought before the treaty-based bodies. These bodies will 
then consider and decide what action should be taken on the communications. There are 
two types of communications: inter-state communications and individual 
communications. 
 
Treaty-based bodies, also referred to as treaty bodies, are established to defend the 
provisions laid down in the treaty, and to monitor and supervise their implementation. 
This means that the rules and procedures of the treaty apply only to those States which are 
parties to the treaty and not to all UN member States. The treaty bodies concerned are the 
Human Rights Committee (the HRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (the CERD), the Committee Against Torture (the CAT) and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (the CEDAW). 
 
4.2.1.  Procedure brought before The Human Rights Committee (the HRC) 
 
The Human Rights Committee (the HRC) works in accordance with the provisions set out 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its first Optional 
                                                 
229 Ibid. 
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Protocol.
230 The ICCPR and its first Optional Protocol were adopted by the General 
Assembly in its resolutions in 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976.
231 
 
The ICCPR, along with its first Optional Protocol, is regarded as the most important 
international instrument for the protection of human rights.
232 This is for two reasons. 
Firstly, it not only sets down most, if not all, of the basic civil and political rights 
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (part I, articles 6 to 27), but 
more importantly it puts those rights into a legally binding form. It should be noted 
however that the States that are Parties to the Covenant are not automatically Parties to 
the Optional Protocol. An act of ratification or declaration from a State is required before 
it becomes a Party to the Protocol. Secondly, it was the Optional Protocol which, for the 
first time, opened the door for individuals to access remedies at the international level. By 
31 December 1995, 87 States had become parties to the Optional Protocol.
233 
 
Pursuant to the Covenant, the Human Rights Committee (the HRC) was created in 
September 1976 in accordance with the provisions contained in part IV (Articles 28 to 45) 
of the ICCPR to monitor the implementation of the Covenant. This part of the ICCPR sets 
out the establishment, composition, status, function and procedure of the Committee. Its 
two main functions are to consider reports from, and complaints against, States parties. 
The former is obligatory while the latter is optional.
234 
 
                                                 
230 The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aims at the Abolition of the Death Penalty. 
231 See supra, note 152. 
232 Torkel Opsahl in Philip Alston (Ed.), Ibid., at p. 367. 
233 Sarah Pritchard & Naomi Sharp, Communicating with the Human Rights Committee, Ibid., at p. 8. 
234 Obligatory according to Article 40 of the ICCPR; optional because it depends on the communications 
received. The wording of the Optional Protocol reads “…individuals …may submit a written 
communication …for consideration.”  
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Technically speaking, the HRC is not an organ of the United Nations because it is not 
accountable to the General Assembly. However, the HRC uses the services of the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and submits its annual 
reports to the General Assembly. The HRC has four main functions: to receive and 
consider periodic reports from the States parties, to make general comments, to examine 
inter-state communications, and to consider individual communications. 
 
In accordance with the implications of the ICCPR, the HRC functions as a quasi court of 
law for the parties in cases of alleged violations of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
235 
Thus, under this procedure, individuals are granted a locus standi, the right to be heard in 
court or other proceeding. Communications or complaints against States parties exist in 
two forms: inter-state communications
236 and individual communications. 
 
The competence of the Committee to receive and consider individual communications is 
provided for in the first Optional Protocol to the Covenant (hereinafter referred to as the 
Protocol). The Protocol, which entered into force on the same date as the Covenant, sets 
out the conditions of admissibility of individual communications as well as their 
examination procedures. The second Protocol deals with the elimination or abolition of 
the death penalty within the States parties. 
 
Article 1 of the Protocol stipulates that States parties must recognise the competence or 
ability of the HRC to receive and consider communications from individuals alleging that 
                                                 
235 Article 45 of the ICCPR: The Committee operates like a court in the manner it considers evidence and 
arguments and subsequently makes ‘decision’ on the communications. Moreover, in practice the 
functions of the Committee combine judicial, administrative, supervisory and conciliatory elements. 
236 The procedure for handling inter-state communications is provided for in Article 41 of the ICCPR. States 
Parties can submit communications to the HRC alleging that another State party has not fulfilled its 
obligations under the treaty. At the time of writing, no communication had ever been submitted under this 
procedure.  
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the State party violates the provisions of the ICCPR. Thus, the HRC cannot receive nor 
consider petitions or communications which originate from citizens of States that are not 
parties to the Protocol. 
 
Articles 2, 3 and 5 list the admissibility requirements that need to be met for 
communications. Articles 4, 5 and 6 concern the procedures that the Committee should 
follow in handling communications.  
 
4.2.1.1. The Procedure 
 
Let us first examine the criteria, or conditions of admissibility, for communications set 
down in the Protocol. They are: 
 
a)  Compatibility with the Covenant: communications must assert that there has been 
a violation of at least one of the human rights or fundamental freedoms referred to 
in the Covenant, and that this violation occured after the Protocol entered into 
force for the State party concerned; no communication will be declared admissible 
if it comes from or refers to a country that is not a party to the Covenant (no 
“drittwirkung” effect). 
b)  Written submissions: communications must be submitted in written form. The 
format of this document has been developed by the Committee (see appendix)
237; 
c)  Individuals submitting communications must be the victims of human rights 
violations: a third party (e.g. NGO) may only submit a communication if 
authorised by an individual victim. Any individual, citizen as well as non-citizen, 
must be subject to the State party's jurisdiction. A non-citizen, however, may not 
complain about his/her right to participate in politics.
238 
d)  No abuse of rights of submission: an abuse of rights of submission occurs when 
the communications submitted to the Committee are based neither on facts, nor on 
the law; 
e)  Anonymous communications are inadmissible; 
                                                 
237 There is no fixed or official format or model communication. See Michael O’Flaherty. 1996. Human 
Rights and the UN, Practice Before the Treaty Bodies. London: Sweet & Maxwell, at. p. 48. The model 
presented in the appendix here is adapted from the UN Fact Sheet No. 7 and Sarah Pritchard & Naomi 
Sharp, Communicating with the HRC, Ibid. 
238 Compare Article 25 of the ICCPR.  
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f)  Communications must not be under examination by another international 
procedure.
239 
g)  Exhaustion of domestic remedies: prior to submitting communications to the 
Committee, all domestic systems available must have been used.
240 
 
Pursuant to Article 39 of the ICCPR, the Committee is permitted to develop its own rules 
of procedure in examining communications. So far, the HRC has established Rules of 
Procedure
241 (rules 78-94) for considering communications from individuals. 
Consideration of communications before the Committee is held in closed meetings. Rules 
95-98 state that all steps of the procedure under the Protocol are confidential until the 
point where the Committee either adopts its views,
242 or else closes the case. Listed below 
are the various stages in handling or processing a communication: 
 
Phase 1- Receipt and transmission of communications 
 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (formerly Centre for Human 
Rights) receives the communication and, if necessary, requests some clarifications from 
the author, before transmitting it to the Committee. Through its Communications Unit, the 
Office channels all communications to the appropriate body. The Office does not perform 
a discretionary or screening role in relation to communications. 
 
Phase 2- Determination of the admissibility of communications 
 
                                                 
239 Article 5(2) (a) of the Optional Protocol. However, the Committee may consider the communications 
after the previous international procedure has been exhausted or discontinued. 
240 In general, communications under this procedure are only possible as a mechanism of last resort. The 
Committee has however held in accordance with Articles 2 and 5(2) (b) of the ICCPR that the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies is required only to the extent that these remedies are effective, 
available and would not extend over an unreasonable length of time. 
241 UN Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev. 3. 
242 That is the Committee’s decision on the merit of the communication, normally reported in its annual 
report to the General Assembly.  
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Upon receipt, the CHR shall set a time to conduct closed meetings in order to examine the 
admissibility of the communications. The conditions of admissibility of communications 
as set out in the Protocol must be met by the author in order for a communication to be 
declared valid. The procedure on how to determine the admissibility of communications 
is not specified in the Protocol. In exercising its functions, the Committee has developed 
rules of procedures under which a Working Group on Communications has been 
established (rule 89) to assist the Committee in this matter. The Working Group makes 
recommendations to the committee on the admissibility of communications.  
 
In order to assist the Working Group, Special Rapporteurs, who are members of the HRC, 
may be appointed if necessary. The HRC may rule that a communication is admissible if 
the Working Group unanimously so decides (rule 87 of the Rules of Procedure). A 
communication can be declared wholly or partly admissible. The criteria for rejection, 
however, can only be stated by the HRC. Communications are only permissible after the 
entry into force of the Protocol for the State party concerned.
243 
 
Phase 3- Determination of the merits of communications 
 
Once a communication has been declared wholly or partly admissible, the Committee will 
ask the State party concerned to respond; that is to say to throw light on the problem by 
explaining what measures have been taken to try and resolve it. If further information is 
needed, the Committee may request it from the author or from the State party concerned 
(rule 93). After receiving all the necessary information, the HRC may refer the 
communication to the Working Group or Special Rapporteur and ask for 
                                                 
243 This means that events or human rights incidents that occurred before a particular State became party to 
the Optional Protocol will not be accepted for consideration even if a State has since become party to the 
ICCPR.  
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recommendations. The Committee then formulates its views, that is to say its final 
opinion on the merits of the communication, and transmits it to the author and to the State 
party concerned (rule 94). The views are generally adopted on a simple majority basis. 
However, before voting, the Committee always tries to make its decision passed by 
consensus among all its members.  
 
In its views, the Committee formulates which obligations have to be fulfilled by the State 
party involved.  Sometimes, in the wording of these obligations, the Committee is very 
specific about certain matters such as how much compensation should be paid or which 
part of the legislation should be amended. Generally, the obligations contained in the 
views can be summarized as follows: 
 
•  take immediate steps to ensure strict compliance with the ICCPR; 
•  provide immediate, effective and appropriate reparation to victims; 
•  alter legislation; 
•  immediately release victims who are imprisoned or reverse death sentences not 
already executed; 
•  allow victims to leave the country; 
•  ensure that the victims do receive, and will continue to receive, any necessary medical 
care; 
•  investigate what has happened to victims and bring to justice those who are 
responsible; 
•  give the victim a fair or fresh trial; 
•  return property to the victim; 
•  take steps to ensure that similar violations will not happen again in the future.
244 
 
                                                 
244 Pritchard & Sharp, Communicating with the Human Rights Committee, Ibid., pp. 22-23.  
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4.2.1.2.Critical Appraisal and Limitations of the Procedure 
 
It must be noted that the HRC is not a court in the judicial sense and does not hand down 
judgements. The views it expresses on the merits of individual communications do not 
have legal force and are not binding on the State party involved. This is the most 
significant limitation of this procedure. The State party concerned is not obliged to take 
any of the steps or measures contained in the views, and the Committee has no means of 
enforcing them. Actually, despite recognition and vindication of the Committee’s efforts 
in dealing with communications, these have been futile in many cases.
245  
 
It should be acknowledged, however, that some countries
246 have responded positively to 
the Committee’s final views. To date however, it can be asserted that in general, State 
compliance with the views of the Human Rights Committee has not been encouraging. 
Given the present limitations on the exercise of its mandate, one could hardly expect any 
more from the procedure.  
 
Another basic weakness of the procedure is the absence of a direct and effective fact-
finding mechanism.
247 Other limitations of the Optional Protocol procedure are: 
 
                                                 
245 Among others, a case concerning human rights violations in Uruguay where the Committee’s views 
simply fell onto deaf ears. See, Torkel Opshal in Philip Alston’s (Ed.), The United Nations and Human 
Rights, Ibid. pp. 434-443. 
246 For example, Australia, in undertaking the measure contained in the Committee’s views requiring change 
of legislation, has, through the intervention of the Federal Government, enacted Human Rights (Sexual 
Conduct) Act 1994 to override the offending provision of Tasmanian Criminal Code. See, Pritchard & 
Sharp, Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
247 See, Torkel Opsahl in Philip Alston (Ed.), Ibid., at p. 437.  
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a)  Limited right to complain. The Protocol does not recognise the right of individuals 
to complain about violations which are unrelated to their civil and political rights 
as set down in the Covenant. 
b)  Lack of State compliance. At present, one could argue that there was a 
disappointing level of State party compliance with the views or decisions of the 
HRC. In order to ensure compliance with its views, the Committee largely relies 
on publicity. Until now this publicity has attracted but little notice. Another 
problem can arise as a consequence of the federal system of government: while the 
national government is responsible in international law for the violation of treaties 
such as the ICCPR, it may be that the violation involves a state or provincial 
government such as in the Nicholas Toonen v Tasmanian State Government 
case.
248 The Australian Federal Government had to intervene by applying the 
Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act of 1994, as the Tasmanian Government 
failed to respond to the HRC's request that the part of its Criminal Code 
prohibiting certain forms of consensual sexual activity be amended. 
c)  Ambiguity in the interpretation of "exhaustion of domestic legal avenues". The 
Committee’s interpretation says that this means all “effective and available” legal 
remedies, so that there are situations in which the domestic remedies are so 
inaccessible or ineffective that these need not be resorted to before a victim can 
proceed with a communication. Uncertainty remains, however, as to whether this 
concept of “domestic remedies” includes administrative procedures such as an 
Ombudsman settlement, which may not result in a legal redress. There is also the 
fact that making use of all effective and available domestic remedies can be 
                                                 
248 Pritchard & Sharp, supra, note 237.  
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prohibitively expensive. It would seem that individuals must make use use of all 
legal remedies, whether or not they have the financial means to do so. 
d)  A long wait. When it was first established, the Committee only dealt with a few 
communications, but nowadays, there is a large backlog of cases that are awaiting 
examination.
249 At present, a decision of admissibility can take up to a year; in 
some cases even longer. Complete examination of a communication can take up to 
four years or more. Individuals will no doubt endure even more suffering before a 
final decision can be made. In the appendix, the statistics on the cases that have 
recently been handled by the Committee will show this new development.
250 
 
4.2.2.  Procedure efore the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination  
(the CERD) 
 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 December 1965 and took 
effect on 4 January 1969. Like the ICCPR, the ICERD is a legally binding document on 
all States that have become parties to it. All of the States parties are simultaneously bound 
by the ICERD provisions dealing with individual communications. The ICERD is the 
main international legal instrument that promotes the equality of all races and requires the 
observance of human rights without any racial distinction.  
 
Part I (Articles 1 to 7) of the ICERD contains substantive provisions concerning the 
definition of "racial discrimination", and a State’s obligations to combat racial 
                                                 
249 UN Fact Sheet No. 7, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs7.htm, Ibid. The entire process of dealing 
with an individual complaint is normally completed within two to three years. Between 1977-1988 the 
Committee had received 333 communications involving 28 States. As at 23 August 2001 there were 197 
living cases, the statistics of which can be seen in the appendix. 
241Taken from a statistical survey of individual complaints dealt with by the Human Rights Committee 
provided by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu2/8/stat2.htm, access date: 16/04/2002.  
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discrimination. Its object is to ensure the domestic implementation of protection and 
compensation for the victims of racial discrimination, and to promote respect for human 
rights and tolerance through education and cultural activities. Part II (Articles 8 to 16) 
proposes measures for the implementation of the Convention and Part III (Articles 17-25) 
deals with the necessary procedures for the signature and ratification of the ICERD. 
Pursuant to Article 8, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the 
CERD) was established to monitor and supervise the implementation of the Convention.  
 
Technically speaking, the CERD is not an organ of the United Nations because it was 
created under a multilateral treaty. As such, the CERD is not accountable to the General 
Assembly. Links with the United Nations exist mainly through funding. The CERD’s 
secretariat is funded by the regular budget of the United Nations. It also submits annual 
reports to the General Assembly and maintains dialogue with the Third Committee. 
 
The three main activities of the CERD are: the reporting procedure, the early warning and 
urgent procedure, and the consideration of communication procedure.
251 Article 14 is of 
particular interest. It opens the possibility for an individual or, unlike the procedure under 
the Optional Protocol, for a group of persons to bring a communication against their State 
before the CERD. As is the case under the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, this 
procedure can only be invoked if the State concerned is a party to the Convention and has 
declared that it recognises the competence of the CERD to receive and consider such 
complaints.  
 
                                                 
251 More detail on the two previous procedures including statistical survey, see, Michael O’Flaherty, Human 
Rights and the UN, Ibid., pp. 89-104.  
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The CERD Committee was created on 10 July 1969, a little more than six months after 
the entry into force of the Convention. One of the main functions of the Committee is to 
receive and consider communications, which occur in two forms: inter-state 
communications,
252 and individual communications. For the former, unlike the procedure 
under the ICCPR, the mechanism is automatically applied to all States parties, while for 
the latter, prior recognition from States parties is required. 
 
Article 14 of the ICERD prescribes the optional procedure by which individuals or groups 
can make communications to the Committee alleging that the State party violates 
obligations set down in the ICERD. Although it is part of the Convention, Article 14 does 
not automatically apply to States that are parties to the ICERD, since it is an optional 
procedure. This means that States parties must first assume that they are bound by the 
provision of this particular article before a communication against them can be received 
or considered. 
 
4.2.2.1.The Procedure 
 
Articles 14 (2), (3), (4) and (5), in conjunction with rule 91 of the Rules of Procedure, list 
the conditions to be met by the author of communications for them to be admissible. They 
are as follows: 
 
a)  The communications may come from an individual or group of persons (in the 
Convention’s terminology: petitioners)
253; 
b)  Petitioners must be victims of alleged violations
254; 
                                                 
252 Unlike the procedure under the ICCPR, there is no requirement from States Parties for a specific 
recognition of the Committee’s competence in this matter. At the time of writing, this inter-state procedure 
had never been invoked. 
253 Thus, the CERD is wider in scope than the Optional Protocol, which only allows communications from 
individual and NOT groups of persons. The rules on NGOs willing to represent individuals, however, 
remain; and only authors of communications have standing (locus standi).  
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c)  Petitioners must be subject (citizen as well as non-citizen) to the State party’s 
jurisdiction
255; 
d)  The communications must be in writing; 
e)  The communications must concern a violation of a human rights as set down in 
the Convention (compatibility with the convention); 
f)  The communications must not be in “abuse of rights of petition”
256; 
g)  The communications must not be anonymous; 
h)  All domestic remedies (as long as these are effective and available) must have 
been exhausted. The same principles as those of the Optional Protocol apply in 
this matter.
257 
 
Articles 14 (6), (7) and (8) prescribe the procedure that has to be followed by the CERD 
Committee when examining communications. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention, 
the Committee is permitted to develop its own rules of procedure as it deems necessary. 
In 1983, the CERD Committee adopted rules 80-97 as Rules of Procedure
258 for 
considering communications from individuals or groups of individuals. 
 
Briefly speaking, despite differences of a mainly technical nature, the CERD procedure 
for handling individual communications is much the same as that of the ICCPR. In 
connection with Article 14(6), rule 88 of Rules of Procedure requires the CERD to hold 
closed meetings when considering individual petitions until a final decision has been 
made. Like the ICCPR examination procedure, there are three stages in the handling of 
individual communications under ICERD: 
 
Stage 1: The receipt and transmission of communications 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
254 As a rule, individual or groups of persons must be directly affected by the violations. Exceptions can be 
made for those who are incapable of submitting a communication, in which case they will be 
represented by an authorized third party. 
255 In relation to the Optional Protocol, claims of the right of political participation are exempted for non-
citizens. 
256 This occurs when the alleged violations are not based on actual facts or laws. 
257 However, unlike procedure before the HRC, the CERD is allowed to consider a communication that is 
simultaneously being examined under another international procedure. 
258 UN Doc. CERD/C/65/Rev.  
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All communications are to be sent to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights which, upon receipt, channels them to the appropriate body within the UN system. 
The Office exercises no screening role or other discretionary function in relation to 
communications. If necessary, however, the Office may require the authors of 
communications to provide some clarifications about their identity and about the alleged 
violations. 
 
Stage 2: Determination of the admissibility of communications 
 
There is also a Working Group and a Special Rapporteur established under the 
Convention to assist with the work of the CERD. The former only makes 
recommendations about the admissibility of communications while the latter is concerned 
with both their admissibility and merits. As is the case for the ICCPR, there are also 
communication admissibility requirements that must be met by the petitioners, and failure 
to meet any one of them may result in a communication being declared inadmissible. 
There is no fixed format or model of communication. However, a similar format as the 
one issued under the Optional Protocol procedure has been produced as a guide (see 
appendix).
259 
 
Stage 3: Determination on the merits of communications 
 
After receiving all necessary information regarding the complaint, the CERD may refer 
this once again to the Working Group, which will then assist it in formulating its final 
opinion (that is, the decision on the merits of communications). Like the HRC, the CERD 
                                                 
259 Model adapted from Pritchard, Sharp & Rodrigues, Petitioning the CERD, Ibid., pp. 72-74.  
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is not a court, and it does not hand down judgements. The opinion of the Committee is not 
legally binding. The CERD makes its decision based on the majority opinion of its 
members, after having first tried to reach a consensus. Also, following the same procedure 
as the ICCPR, the CERD Committee is permitted only to examine written evidence. No 
examination of oral evidence is allowed. 
 
In its final opinion, the CERD Committee summarises all allegations, relevant facts and 
information pertaining to the case. Decisions on the admissibility and merits of 
communications constitute the essence of this opinion. Furthermore, the Commission may 
make recommendations and suggestions, which sometimes need to be formulated in a 
very specific manner. 
 
In general, the opinions may contain requests for States parties to: 
 
 
•  investigate threats of violence, especially when made in public and by a group; 
•  review policy and procedure concerning decisions to prosecute cases of alleged racial 
discrimination; 
•  prevent any form of racial bias from entering into judicial proceedings, and 
•  provide individual petitioners with relief commensurate with the moral damage that 
they have suffered.
260 
 
4.2.2.2 Critical Appraisal and Disadvantages of the Procedure 
 
While the ICERD provides a much-needed mechanism for protecting individual human 
rights, it is not without shortcomings. As noted above, the CERD Committee is not a 
court and does not hand down judgement. Its opinion is not legally binding on the State 
party and it does not have legal power. So, like the HRC, it can only hope that the State 
party will take the necessary steps recommended or suggested in the final opinion. There 
                                                 
260 Ibid., at p. 32.  
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is no way of forcing the State party to accept the decision. Nor is there any supervisory 
body to monitor the implementation of the decision. This is the greatest weakness of the 
procedure. 
 
Another major obstacle to the Committee's effectiveness is that it lacks an independent 
fact-finding capacity. According to the Convention, the CERD possesses no such 
mandate. Besides, some of the Committee’s members would be reluctant to undertake 
such quasi-judicial activities.
261 
 
Other limitations of the procedure are: 
 
a)  Limitations of Article 14.  The article only provides for the right of individuals to 
communicate with the CERD Committee about violations of their human rights in 
relation to acts of racial discrimination. Not all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are covered by the Convention. 
b)  Lack of State compliance. The CERD has to rely heavily on publicity to ensure 
State compliance with its opinion. So far, the Committee has only received limited 
acceptance and attention to its decisions. There is also the problem of non-uniform 
or partial implementation in federal states.  
c)  Exhaustion of domestic remedies. This raises a number of difficulties for 
petitioning individuals or groups. Pursuing all available remedies (even if only 
those which are truly effective and available) under domestic legal systems can be 
very costly or even unaffordable. This can therefore constitute an obvious obstacle 
for those who cannot afford it. 
                                                 
261 Karl Joseph Partsch (1996). “The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” in Philip 
Alston (Ed.), Ibid. at p. 368.  
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d)  Extensive time frame. In the case of Barbaro v Australia
262 it took two and a half 
years for the CERD Committee to issue its final opinion. For other cases it might 
take much longer again before a final decision can be made. 
 
In 1993, the CERD developed the so-called early warning and urgent procedures. These 
procedures enabled the Committee to take a more preventive rather than responsive 
approach in the implementation of the Convention. Apart from the fact that this 
mechanism was meant to forestall violations before they took place, the procedure did not 
give much room for the Committee to improve its effectiveness.
263 For a statistical survey 
of recent cases dealt with by the CERD, see the appendix.
264 
 
4.2.3.  Procedure Before the Committee Against Torture (the CAT Committee) 
 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT Convention) was signed on 10 December 1984 and entered into force 
on 26 June 1987. It was built particularly upon the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1975.
265 
 
Part I (Articles 1-16) of the CAT Convention contains substantive provisions concerning 
the definition of torture, State obligations, the prosecution and extradition of persons 
charged with torture, and remedies for victims of torture. The establishment of a 
                                                 
262 More on the case, see Pritchard, Sharp & Rodrigues, Petitioning the CERD, Ibid., pp. 21, 42-43. 
263 See and compare, Pritchard, Sharp & Rodrigues, Ibid., with Karl Joseph Pratsch in Philip Alston (Ed.), 
Ibid., pp. 345-348. 
264 Taken from http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat4.htm, access date: 19/09/2001. 
265 Preamble of the Convention, cf. Andrew Byrnes’ (1996) “The Committee against Torture” in Philip 
Alston (Ed.), Ibid., pp. 509-520.  
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Committee against Torture (the CAT) is provided for in part II (Articles 17 to 24) while 
provisions regarding signature, ratification and amendments are provided for in part III of 
the Convention. 
 
The Committee against Torture (CAT) was set up in accordance with Article 17 and 
commenced work in 1988. The main function of the Committee is to receive States' 
reports (Article 19) and to receive and consider communications or complaints submitted 
to it which allege that a State party has violated the rules of Convention. Communications 
or complaints exist in two forms: interstate communications (Article 21) and individual 
communications (Article 22).  
 
Unlike the ICERD, but like the ICCPR, the CAT Committee can only examine inter-state 
communications brought against a State party which is a signatory to the Convention and 
recognises the competence of the Committee to consider the communication. In other 
words, the application of Article 21 must wait for the declaration or accession of States 
parties to the Convention stating that they accept to be bound by its provisions. This 
means that although they might have already been parties to the Convention, States may 
choose not to be bound by this particular article. The article thus assumes an optional 
character. The same applies to Article 22 concerning individual communications.  
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4.2.3.1.The Procedure 
 
With a few exceptions, the Committee operates in the same manner as the Human Rights 
Committee and the CERD Committee. Its functions, powers and procedures are modelled 
on those of the other treaty monitoring bodies; in particular, those of the HRC.
266 
 
According to Article 22, for communications to be declared admissible, the petitioning 
individuals must be victims and subject to the jurisdiction of the State party being 
accused. Their communications must also be compatible with the Convention, be in 
writing, not be in abuse of right of submission, not be under investigation by another 
international procedure
267, not be anonymous, and all available domestic remedies must 
have been exhausted.
268 Third parties authorised by individual victims may bring petitions 
to the Committee on behalf of those victims. The issue raised in the communication must 
have taken place after the Convention entered into force for the State party concerned. 
Only an individual victim or a third party acting on his or her behalf may submit a 
communication, but no group of individuals may do so. 
 
Article 20 requires the Committee to make sure that any individual communications 
referred to it “contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically 
practiced in the territory of a State party”. The Committee will invite that State party to 
participate in the examination. If necessary, with the latter’s consent, the Committee may 
                                                 
266 Andrew Byrnes, Ibid., pp. 510-512. 
267 This differs from the requirement under the CERD, which permits the Committee to consider 
communications simultaneously. 
268 As with the previous mechanisms, this has been interpreted to refer to those domestic remedies which are 
effective and available, so that in some cases it remains possible for individuals to submit communications 
to the CAT even if technically not all remedies theoretically available in a state have been used.  
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designate one or more of its members to conduct an inquiry (par. 2), including a visit to 
the territory of the State party concerned (par. 3). In the light of all information available 
to it by or on behalf of the individual and State party, the Committee will then hold closed 
meetings to consider the communications brought to it (Art. 22 par. 6). 
 
In the course of this process, the Committee may, if it deems necessary and suitable, 
appoint an ad-hoc conciliation commission whose task is to achieve, where possible, a 
“friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the obligations provided for in 
the Convention”.
269 
 
At the end of the procedure, the CAT Committee will formulate its views, that is, its 
official opinion on the merits of the communication.
270 This decision is generally made on 
the basis of a majority vote. However, prior to resorting to a vote, the Committee tries to 
reach a consensus. In its final decision, the Committee can be so specific as to order and 
recommend that a State party involved in the case take immediate measures, such as to 
amend its legislation. 
 
4.2.3.2.Critical Appraisal and Limitations of the Procedure 
 
Just as was the case for the procedures of the ICCPR and the ICERD, the decisions made 
by the Committee are not legally binding on the State party concerned and do not have 
legal force. Nor does the Committee possess the means to force an implicated State party 
to comply with its final views. Like the HRC and the CERD, the CAT is not a court and 
                                                 
269 Article 21(e) of the Convention. 
270 Article 22 (7).  
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does not hand down judgement. And this once again constitutes a major obstacle that 
hinders the effectiveness of the Committee. 
 
The final views made by the Committee, which contain recommendations and suggestions 
to the State party, have so far had little effect.
271 Again, to ensure State compliance with 
its views, the Committee has to rely on publicity.
272 
 
As noted previously, exhaustion of domestic remedies is one of the conditions of 
admissibility of communications. Even when it is possible to circumvent this requirement 
to some degree (i.e. in cases where it could be claimed some so-called remedies are either 
not effective or not available), it would still be costly both in time and money for an 
individual who has to meet this requirement, especially in countries like Indonesia where 
torture and degrading treatment of detainees are, so to speak, their daily lot.  
 
Even worse, in Indonesia, the execution of a death sentence may take place without notice 
prior to court hearings, as was the case in the Petrus (mysterious shooter) campaign.
273 In 
addition, it can take a long time for a case to be completely settled by the Committee. 
 
4.2.4.  Procedure Before the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (the CEDAW Committee) 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) was adopted by the General Assembly in its Resolution No. 34/180 of 18 
                                                 
271 Andrew Byrnes, Ibid., at p. 546. 
272 For a statistical survey of recent cases dealt with by the CAT, see the appendix available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat3.htm, access date: 19/09/2001. 
273 This was a bloody campaign introduced by the then President Soeharto to combat criminals in 
      the mid 1970s.  
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December 1979 and entered into force on 3 September 1981. The Optional Protocol to the 
Convention entered into force on 22 December 2000.
274 
 
For the purpose of considering and monitoring the progress made in the implementation 
of the Convention, a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(the CEDAW Committee) was established as foreseen in Article 17 part V of the 
Convention.  
 
According to the Optional Protocol, the Committee only receives and considers 
communications brought before it by individuals, groups of individuals, or third parties 
with the consent of individuals.
275 So, unlike the three previous procedures mentioned 
above under the Optional Protocol, the CEDAW Committee does not receive nor consider 
interstate communications. Article 23 part VI guarantees that “nothing in the present 
convention shall affect” more conducive provisions contained in the legislation of the 
State party or other international conventions. 
 
4.2.4.1.The Procedure 
 
Keeping in mind that the Optional Protocol to the Convention only entered into force in 
2000, and up to the time of writing, no procedure has taken place, the following 
explanation provides only general information. 
 
                                                 
274 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/e1cedaw.htm, access date: 19/09/2001. 
275 This is similar to the procedure under the CERD Convention where groups of peoples have locus standi 
before the Committee.  
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As was the case for the three previous procedures, a number of admissibility requirements 
of communications brought before the CEDAW Committee must be met. These are 
provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of the Optional Protocol. In brief, they are: 
 
•  no anonymous communications; 
•  communications must concern States that are parties to the Optional Protocol; 
•  the matter has not been dealt with under another international procedure; 
•  compatibility with the Convention; 
•  no ill-founded or insufficient grounds; 
•  communications must not be in abuse of the right to submit a communication; 
•  exhaustion of all available and effective domestic remedies. 
 
This instrument is the latest of the human rights treaties that have been implemented to 
enable an individual to communicate with the CEDAW Committee alleging that the State 
party, to whose jurisdiction he or she is subject, is not fulfilling its obligations under the 
Convention (Article 2 of the Protocol). Unlike other procedures, under this Protocol, 
individuals, groups of individuals and third parties acting on behalf of individuals, can 
submit communications provided that they are physically located in the country involved 
in the case.
276 
 
When examining communications, the Committee is required to hold closed meetings 
(Article 7 par. 2). Like the procedure under CAT, the CEDAW Committee may, where 
appropriate and with the State party's consent, designate one or more of its members to 
conduct an inquiry including a visit to the territory of the State party concerned (Article 8 
par. 2). 
 
The Committee’s final decision on the merits of the communication comes when it 
formulates its views containing recommendations to the State party involved, requesting 
                                                 
276 Exception applies to the right to political participation.  
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that the latter take immediate measures to solve the problem in accordance with the views 
transmitted to it. 
 
4.2.4.2.Critical Appraisal and Limitations of the Procedure 
 
Just like the previous procedures, a decision made by the CEDAW Committee is not 
legally binding and has no legal power over the State party concerned. The Committee is 
not a court that can hand down a judgement which is legally binding on all parties 
involved. It has to rely largely on the commitment of the State party to ensure the 
enforcement of the decision. Publishing the views is one of the ways available to urge a 
State party to implement the Committee's recommendations made in relation to particular 
communications. 
 
Problems may arise when trying to implement decisions within a federated State. For 
instance, the communication may be against the government of a state or territory (ie. 
sub-federal level) whereas, in international relations, the federal government is the 
recognised subject. 
 
Exhaustion of all domestic remedies, even if only those which are effective and available, 
can be time-consuming as well as frustrating and prohibitively expensive for individuals. 
What if they cannot afford this? In countries like Indonesia, going through all available 
domestic procedures can be a frustrating and seemingly never-ending process. In most 
cases, the victims tend to give up hope and say, “This is our fate. May God deal with 
them and may a curse be upon them”. Cases such as Trisakti or Semanggi I and II  
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undoubtedly prove that this is still the fate facing most individual Indonesians who seek 
domestic legal remedies.
277 
 
4.3. Other Treaty-based Communication Procedures 
 
Two other treaties have already entered into force and are legally binding on States 
parties; namely the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), on 3 January 1976, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), on 2 
September 1990. Unlike previously mentioned treaties, neither of these provide for a 
procedure whereby individuals may submit petitions of alleged violations of the 
obligations or rights covered by the respective treaties. 
 
For the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the treaties and examining the 
progress made by States parties in meeting the obligations set forth in the treaties, two 
Committees have been created: the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(the CESCR) for the ICESCR, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the CRC 
Committee) for the CRC. 
 
4.3.1.  Procedure Before the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
CESCR) 
 
The ICESCR does not provide for the establishment of a Committee to monitor the 
implementation of the Covenant. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (the CESCR) was specially established in 1985 pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 
                                                 
277 Up to the time of writing, no court procedure had been put into place to bring the perpetrators to justice. 
So far, only fact-finding procedures have been completed, including one conducted by Komnas HAM. 
Even worse, the Indonesian DPR has made a recommendation that the incidents “are not human rights 
violation cases.” See, The Jakarta Post, at http://www.thejakartapost.com, 20 January 2001.  
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No. 17 (1985).
278 The establishment of the CESCR was deemed necessary by ECOSOC 
following the unsatisfactory performance of two previous bodies entrusted with 
monitoring the power of the Covenant.
279 
 
4.3.1.1.The Procedure 
 
The Committee’s work is based on many sources of information, including reports by 
States parties and information from many specialised agencies of the United Nations, 
such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and also from the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Centre for 
Human Settlements (Habitat), among others.  
 
The Committee also receives information from NGOs and other community-based 
organisations working in States that have already ratified the Covenant, as well as from 
other United Nations treaty bodies and from generally available literature.
280 
 
The main task of the Committee is to assist ECOSOC in monitoring the implementation 
of the Covenant by States parties. It strives to develop a constructive dialogue with States 
parties and seeks to determine through a variety of means whether or not the norms 
                                                 
278 See, Michael O’Flaherty, Human rights and the UN, Ibid., p. 62, cf. Philip Alston, “The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” in Philip Alston’s (Ed.) The United Nations and Human Rights, 
Ibid., at p. 473. 
279 United Nations Fact Sheet No. 16 (Rev.1), The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs16.htm, access date: 25/09/2001, in particular at p. 17 of 26. The 
two previous bodies were the Sessional Working Groups and Sessional Working Group of 
Governmental Experts. The latter succeeded the former. 
280 UN Fact Sheet No. 16, Ibid., pp. 3-4.  
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contained in the Covenant are being adequately applied by States parties, and how the 
implementation and enforcement of the Covenant could be improved; so that all people 
who are entitled to the rights enshrined in the Covenant can actually enjoy them in full.
281 
 
In accordance with Article 16 of the Covenant, States parties undertake to submit periodic 
reports to the Committee on the measures that they have taken to give effect to the rights 
laid down in the Covenant, and on progress made in achieving the observance of those 
rights. Article 17 rules that those reports may include various factors and difficulties 
which affect the level of fulfilment of the obligations of States parties. As a general rule, 
States parties undertake to submit periodic reports to the Committee within two years 
after the Covenant’s entry into force, and at least once every five years after the first 
report. 
 
Upon receipt, the reports are processed and translated by the Secretariat. A standard 
examination procedure needs to be followed by the Committee in dealing with these 
reports.
282 
 
In the first instance, the Committee reviews the reports in the pre-sessional working 
group, which comprises five members. This working group meets to examine the reports 
six months prior to consideration by the full Committee. The pre-sessional working group 
makes a preliminary review of the reports, and appoints one member to give particular 
consideration to each report. The appointed member then develops written lists of 
questions based on the disparities found in the reports. The questions are then referred to 
                                                 
281 Ibid., at p. 18. 
282 For more details, see Michael O’Flaherty, Human Rights and the UN, Ibid., pp. 64-70 compared with the 
UN Fact Sheet No. 16, Ibid., pp. 19-20.  
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the State party concerned. The States parties are then required to submit written responses 
to these questions before they appear before the Committee at its request. 
 
To assist the working group in its task, it usually has been supplied with a list of issues 
prepared by its members working as Country Rapporteurs and Country Analysts through 
the Secretariat. The preparation of this list does not involve the State party concerned. 
When examining the reports, the Committee encourages the representatives of the State 
party involved to be present. In practice, State delegations are almost invariably present 
during the examination process, which generally takes two days to complete. Delegations 
are requested to give introductory comments and responses to the questions prepared by 
the pre-sessional working group. This is followed by the presentation by the United 
Nations specialised agencies of information regarding the reports under examination. The 
Committee then puts questions and observations to the State party concerned. A period of 
time is allowed for the State party to respond to the questions and observations made by 
the Committee.  
 
At the end of its sessions, the Committee formulates its “concluding observations”, which 
constitute an assessment of the compliance of a State party to its treaty obligations. 
Concluding observations are, as a rule, adopted in a closed session and are released to the 
public on the final day of session. The decision is divided into five sections: (1) 
introduction, (2) positive aspects, (3) factors and difficulties hindering the implementation 
of the Covenant, (4) principal subjects or issues of concern, (5) suggestions and 
recommendations.
283 
 
                                                 
283 UN Fact Sheet No. 16, Ibid., p. 20 of 26.  
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4.3.1.2.Critical Appraisal of the Procedure 
 
Like other treaty-based procedures, the CESCR is not a court and does not hand down 
judgements. All that it can do is to make concluding observations which contain some 
recommendations, in the hope that the State party concerned will follow its advice. In 
cases where the Committee concludes that violations of any right in the Covenant have 
taken place, it will urge the State party to refrain from committing the same violations 
again in the future, and recommend that it takes the necessary steps to guarantee its 
citizens full enjoyment of their rights.  
 
In addition to these conclusions, letters from the chairperson are occasionally addressed to 
States parties, informing them of the Committee’s concerns. These do not have much 
effect either on the States parties involved in the alleged violations. 
 
At present, the Committee is not permitted to consider complaints or petitions brought by 
individuals or groups of people who claim that their rights under the Covenant have been 
violated. The absence of such procedure places significant constraints on the ability and 
effectiveness of the Committee to develop jurisprudence or case law. And this, of course, 
essentially limits the chances of the victims of abuses of the Covenant to obtain 
international redress. 
 
In order to address this issue, an optional protocol has recently been drafted which would 
make it possible for individuals to submit complaints to the Committee.
284 Whether or not 
this would bring a breakthrough remains to be seen. But given the precedents to date, one 
                                                 
284 Report of the 6
th Session of the Committee in 1991, E/1992/23, para. 362, cf. UN Fact Sheet No. 16, 
Ibid., at p. 23 of 26.  
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may guess that the procedure and remedy system would be no more effective than its 
predecessors. 
 
4.3.2.  Procedure Before the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the CRC Committee) 
 
Along with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), there are two Optional 
Protocols: first, the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography; second, the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed 
conflicts. Both protocols were adopted by General Assembly Resolution A/Res/54/263 of 
25 May 2000, and have not yet entered into force.
285 
 
Just like the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the CRC does not make 
provision for individual communication procedure. For the purpose of examining the 
progress made by States parties in achieving the realisation of the obligations undertaken 
in the present convention, there shall be established a Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (the CRC Committee), which shall carry out the functions provided for in the 
Convention (article 43). The procedure is generally referred to as reporting procedure.
286 
 
4.3.2.1.The Procedure 
 
Under Article 44 of the CRC, States parties are obliged to submit periodic reports to the 
CRC Committee two years after the Convention’s entry into force and every five years 
thereafter. In reports, the States parties document the measures that they have adopted to 
                                                 
285 For a complete transcript of the Protocols, see, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/dopchild.htm, access 
date: 02/05/2001. 
286 For more detail on the procedure, see, among others, Overview of the Reporting Procedure, UN Doc. 
CRC/C/33 and C. Prince Cohen (1991), “States reports: United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child” in New York Law School Journal of Human Rights, No. 8, Vol. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 367-382.  
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give effect to the rights contained in the Convention, and report on the progress made in 
the enjoyment of those rights. The article also stipulates that in their reports, the States 
should indicate any factors or difficulties which they encountered in their efforts to 
guarantee the full enjoyment of the rights laid down in the Convention. 
 
Upon receipt of these reports, the Committee, through its informal working group, holds 
closed meetings at the end of each session to examine the reports scheduled for 
consideration either at the next or another forthcoming session. The purpose of the 
examination is to identify areas or issues which require clarification or are relevant to the 
Committee’s concerns, and to prepare a list of questions to be submitted to the States 
parties with a request for a written response, which will then be considered along with the 
report. 
 
In order to assist it, the Working Group normally receives a list of issues needing 
attention, which is prepared by its members working as Country Rapporteurs and Country 
Analyses through the Secretariat. At this stage, the State party concerned is not present 
yet. The result of this examination process, which is the complete document of report, 
State replies and comments made by the Working Group, is further referred to the 
Committee for consideration. 
 
When holding meetings to consider reports, the CRC Committee will invite 
representatives of the State party involved in the case to be present. The sessions that are 
held are open to the public. At this stage, the Committee focuses its attention on the 
comments or responses made by the State party to the questions or concerns addressed to 
it by the Committee.  
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Following these public meetings to consider reports, the Committee proceeds to draft and 
then adopt its “concluding observations”. At this point the CRC Committee will generally 
include its assessment of the State’s handling of the issues, noting the positive and 
negative factors, matters that concern the Committee, and suggestions and 
recommendations. Pursuant to article 45(b), the recommendations are also transmitted to 
the relevant specialised agencies of the United Nations such as ILO, UNICEF, UNESCO, 
as well as to other competent entities. 
 
4.3.2.2.Critical Appraisal of the Procedure 
 
As in the other procedures mentioned above, the conclusions of the CRC Committee have 
no legal power. They consist mainly of recommendations and suggestions to the State 
party concerned to take measures and actions deemed necessary by the Committee for the 
comprehensive realisation of the Convention. Since they are only suggestions and 
recommendations, the implementation of concluding observations rely entirely on the 
State’s willingness to cooperate.  
 
The Committee can only put pressure on States by making the decision available for 
public information. It is hoped that in this way, at least, States parties will feel 
uncomfortable if they do not follow the Committee’s suggestions. In ensuring the 
implementation of the Convention, the role of the NGOs is also important.
287 With the 
assistance of the group it is expected that harder pressure can be made on States to 
comply with the Convention. 
                                                 
287 Article 45 of the Rules of Procedure (UN Doc. CRC/C/4). A Group of NGOs for the CRC has been 
established to help the Committee in its work and has a full-time coordinator in Geneva-based office of 
Secretariat (P.O. Box 88, CH 1211, Geneva, Switzerland).  
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There is no means available for the Committee to force the State to bow to its decision. 
The Committee is not a court. It does not hand down judgement. 
 
According to the Convention, the CRC Committee is not allowed to receive or consider 
individual communications. This places significant constraints on the ability and 
effectiveness of the Committee to develop jurisprudence and case law and, of course, 
greatly limits the probability that individual victims of abuses of the Convention will 
obtain international redress. 
 
5.  Regional Individuals’ Complaint Procedures 
 
 
Although this thesis’ focus is mainly concentrated upon the international mechanisms 
available to individuals whose rights are violated, for the sake of comprehensiveness a 
description will be given of a number of procedures that are available at the regional 
levels in different parts of the world, namely the Americas, Europe and Africa. This 
description will be brief, since none of the three regional systems are applicable to the 
Asian region and therefore have little direct relevance to the situation in Indonesia. 
 
5.1 Procedure under the Inter-American Human Rights System 
 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man adopted in Colombia in 1948, 
though not a treaty, was still the first “international” human rights instrument of a general 
nature since it was actually approved by resolution before the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. From 1959, a mechanism was put into place under the  
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American Declaration establishing an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In 
1961, the Commission began to conduct on-site visits to observe the general human rights 
situation in a country or to investigate specific situations. From 1965, the Commission 
was authorized to examine individual complaints or petitions regarding specific cases of 
human rights violations.  
 
The decisions of the Commission are, like those of UN committees under individual 
treaty complaint mechanisms, made public and published. One rather unusual difference 
between the two is that this procedure existed prior to the adoption of an actual human 
rights treaty. Up to that point, breaches of human rights under the American Declaration 
were considered more in terms of breaches of political commitments rather than breaches 
of legal obligations. 
 
This was to change in 1969 when the American Convention on Human Rights was 
adopted, and entered into force in 1978. The Convention itself is a treaty which defines 
legal human rights standards, creates the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and 
defines the functions, powers and procedures of both the Commission and the Court. 
Even though the Inter-American Commission was given powers to hear individual 
complaints under the treaty, it has preserved other autonomous mechanisms which pre-
date, and are not derived directly from, the Convention; such as the processing of cases 
involving countries which are still not parties to the Convention. 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is an actual court in the legal sense, whereas 
the various international mechanisms, such as the treaty-based UN committees, are not; as  
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has been seen previously. Briefly, the functions and powers of the Commission and of the 
Court will now be described. 
 
The Commission’s principal function is to promote the observance and defence of human 
rights by: 
 
1)  Receiving, analysing and investigating individual petitions which allege human 
rights violations through the procedure contained in Articles 44 to 51 of the 
Convention. 
2)  Observing the general human rights situation in the member States, and publishing 
special reports regarding the situation in a specific State, when it considers it 
appropriate. 
3)  Carrying out on-site visits to countries to engage in more in-depth analysis of the 
general situation and/or to investigate a specific situation. This would normally be 
followed by a published report regarding the human rights situation observed. 
4)  Stimulating public consciousness regarding human rights in the Americas by 
carrying out and publishing studies on specific subjects. 
5)  Organising and carrying out conferences, seminars and meetings with 
representatives of Governments, academic institutions, non-governmental groups, 
etc, in order to disseminate information and to increase knowledge regarding 
issues relating to the inter-American human rights system. 
6)  Recommending to the member States of the Organization of American States the 
adoption of measures which would contribute to human rights protection. 
7)  Requesting that States adopt specific “precautionary measures” to avoid serious 
and irreparable harm to human rights in urgent cases.   
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Additionally, the Commission itself can ask the Inter-American Court to issue an order 
for “provisional measures” in urgent cases which involve danger to persons, even where a 
case has not yet been submitted to the Court. The Commission can of its own initiative 
submit cases to the Inter-American Court, and it also appears before the Court in the 
litigation of cases. 
 
Finally, the Commission can request advisory opinions from the Inter-American Court 
regarding questions of interpretation of the American Convention. The author presumes 
this also to be the case with the High Court of Australia. There may not actually be any 
victim per se. This is in a sense a form of judicial review at the regional level, as what this 
procedure involves is a clarification of whether a piece of existing or proposed legislation 
would violate some of the human rights guaranteed under the treaty. 
 
Any person, group of persons or non-governmental organization may present a petition to 
the Commission alleging violations of the rights protected in the American Convention 
and/or the American Declaration. As is the case with all other human rights treaties, the 
Commission may only process individual cases where it is alleged that one of the member 
States of the OAS is responsible for the human rights violation at issue and if that specific 
State is a party to the treaty. Also, unusually, it is possible for the Commission to hear 
petitions involving States parties who have not ratified the Convention but who are 
members of the OAS. The Commission would then apply the American Declaration 
rather than the Convention. 
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The petitions presented to the Commission must show that the victim has exhausted 
domestic remedies. If domestic remedies have not been exhausted, it must be shown that 
the victim tried to exhaust domestic remedies but failed because the remedies do not 
provide for adequate due process; or in cases where there is effective access to remedies, 
there has been undue delay in the decision on those remedies.  
 
Quite differently from UN treaty bodies, the Commission also may carry out its own 
investigations, conducting on-site visits, requesting specific information from the parties, 
etc. The Commission may also hold a hearing during the processing of the case, in which 
both parties are present and are asked to set forth their legal and factual arguments.  
 
Once the various steps have been completed, the Commission then prepares a report 
which includes its conclusions and also generally provides recommendations to the State 
concerned, but this report is not made public. The Commission gives the State a period of 
time to resolve the situation and to comply with the recommendations of the Commission. 
At the end of this period of time, the Commission has two options. It can prepare a second 
report, which is similar to the first report and contains conclusions and recommendations. 
If it does that, the State is again given a period of time to resolve the situation and to 
comply with the recommendations of the Commission, if there are such 
recommendations. At the end of this second period granted to the State, the Commission 
will usually publish its report, although under the treaty the Commission can decide to do 
otherwise. Instead of this route, the Commission may decide to take the case to the Inter-
American Court. It has to do it within three months from the date in which it transmits its 
initial report to the State concerned.  
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As for the Inter-American Court created under the American Convention on Human 
Rights, it is made up of seven judges who are elected in their personal capacity from 
among jurists of the highest moral authority and of recognized competence in the field of 
human rights. As a court of law, it has both an adjudicatory and an advisory jurisdiction: 
with the former, it can hear cases of actual violation which must be adjudicated, in the 
sense that it must hand down a legally binding court decision on an issue of the 
application of these human rights. 
 
This is however not exactly a mechanism which is available to individuals, since only the 
Commission and the States parties to the Convention can actually submit cases 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention directly to the Court. In 
addition, for the court to hear a case against a State, that State must recognise the 
jurisdiction of the Court, either by a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction in all 
cases or on the basis of special agreement for a limited time or for a particular case. 
 
The Court also has a further “judicial review” or advisory function. Article 64 of the 
Convention provides that any member state of the Organization may consult the Court on 
the interpretation of the Convention or of other treaties on the protection of human rights 
in the American states. The Court can also, at the request of any member state of the 
Organization, issue an opinion on the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with any 
of these treaties. 
 
Under Article 63(1) of the Convention, the Court can order that the right involved be 
respected, and that the situation be remedied and if appropriate, fair compensation paid.  
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The Court can also issue “temporary injunctions” under Article 63(2) in cases of extreme 
gravity and urgency.  
 
5.2 Procedure under the European Human Rights System 
 
The system in Europe shares some common traits with the Inter-American system, in that 
it has an adjudicative body in the form of the European Court of Human Rights. The 
European Court, established under treaty provisions contained in the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (and optional protocols). 
 
This 1950 treaty entered into force in September 1953 and initially contained two 
complementary mechanisms for the enforcement of its human rights obligations: a 
European Commission of Human Rights (set up in 1954), and the European Court of 
Human Rights (set up in 1959). In 1998, when Protocol No. 11 came into force, the part-
time Court and Commission were replaced by a single, full-time Court. It is also with this 
Protocol that the mechanism for individuals to submit an application to the Court has 
become compulsory for all Member States to the European Convention. The number of 
judges at the Court is equal to that of the Contracting States to the European Convention 
(45 in 2006). Judges are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
and sit in their individual capacity. 
In contrast to all other mechanisms available to individuals internationally, including the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the procedure before the European Court is 
clearly judicial in nature. Matters do not necessarily involve hearings – these are usually 
only held in a minority of cases – but if there are hearings, these would normally be  
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public. Most matters are dealt with in writing, and these documents are filed with the 
Court’s Registry by the parties and are available to the public. 
The European Court can issue legally binding judgements as to the violation of one of the 
rights or freedoms protected under the Convention. 
The European Court also has a further “judicial review” power in that, at the request of 
the Committee of Ministers, it can give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning 
the interpretation of the Convention and Protocols, and could take the role of advising on 
whether certain legislation may or may not breach the human rights protected under the 
Convention. 
The responsibility for supervising the execution of judgements lies with the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe. Ultimately, it is this Committee of Ministers who will 
verify whether States are complying with the judgement and their human rights 
obligations under Article 46(2) of the Convention. It will determine what steps were taken 
by the State found to be in breach of its human rights obligations to pay any compensation 
or costs and expenses ordered by the European Court to the individual complainiants, as 
well as any other measures ordered by the Court. 
5.3 Procedure under the African Human Rights System 
 
Adopted by Member States of the Organisation of African Unity (now known as the 
African Union) on 27 June 1981, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) entered into force on 21 October 1986. Until 2004, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights was the only body under the Charter charged with the 
responsibility of promoting and protecting human and peoples’ rights. The Protocol  
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establishing the African Court on Human and People’s Rights was subsequently adopted 
on 10 June 1998 and came into effect on 15 January 2004 after ratification by 15 states. In 
July 2004, the African Union took a decision to merge the African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights with the Court of Justice of the African Union. 
 
Both the Commission and the Court now operate side by side, with the former remaining 
the main mechanism of which individuals and peoples can avail themselves in order to 
have governments comply with their rights under the Charter. 
The African Commission is composed of eleven members elected by secret ballot from 
nominees presented by the States Parties to the Charter. These commissioners serve in 
their personal capacity, and their mandate as members of the Commission is both 
protective and promotional, the former being of most concern for the purposes of this 
brief description.  
It is under its protective mandate that the Commission has the mandate to protect the 
human and people’s rights guaranteed in the Charter, and therefore can receive and 
examine individual communications (as well as inter-state ones) through the procedures 
and requirements as set out in Articles 47 to 59 of the Charter. The Commission 
determines the admissibility of individual complaints using criteria such as the need to 
exhaust local remedies, though only where these remedies are effective and accessible 
under Article 50. It should be added that the Commission has also a further (though 
limited) “judicial review” power, in that it can interpret the Charter at the request of a 
state party, an institution of the African Union or an African organisation recognised by 
the African Union.   
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In a similar fashion to the Inter-American human rights system, the Commission can 
submit cases to the Court on behalf of individuals under Article 5 of the Protocol. Unlike 
the European human rights system, it means that most individuals do not directly have 
access to this mechanism: only the African Commission, and individuals and NGOs of 
States parties which, by a separate declaration, accept the competence of the Court can 
avail themselves of the Court’s adjudicatory capacity. As of June 2006, this appears to 
exclude all individuals except for those from Burkina Faso, the only State to have 
accepted the competence of the African Court for this purpose. 
One peculiarity is that the African Court is in fact not limited to the African Charter in its 
adjudicatory (and advisory) capacities. Article 3 of the Protocol declares that the Court’s 
jurisdiction involves “all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation 
and application of the Charter; this Protocol and any other relevant human rights 
instrument ratified by the states concerned”. 
The Court’s judgements are legally binding on States, and it has the ability to order the 
payment of compensation and to issue orders for provisional measures. As with the 
European human rights system, it is ultimately the Council of Ministers of the African 
Union has the mandate to monitor the implementation of the Court’s decisions. 
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Chapter 5 
 
THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF  
GOVERNMENT ACTS AND LEGISLATION FOR BREACHES OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
 
1.  Preliminary Remarks 
 
 
From the previous discussion in Chapter 4, it appears that individuals who claim to be the 
victims of violations of human rights recognised by international standards, and who 
reside in States which do not offer adequate legal procedures for defending their rights, 
have little chance to obtain fair redress under the existing international channels. Whereas 
individuals may still hope that their rights can be defended by international law, national 
laws do little to substantiate such optimism.
288 
 
In regards to situations involving human rights in Indonesia, for example - and Indonesia 
is not the only country in the world that shows such traits - the opportunity is even smaller 
for individuals to defend themselves against the State’s acts of violence or abusive 
legislation. As mentioned above, in Indonesia, human rights abuses are “legalized” by 
laws and regulations passed by a very weak parliament working under the strong pressure 
of the executive. For even if the Government has grossly abused its citizens’ rights, either 
through actual acts of violence or discriminatory and abusive legislation or quite often 
both, no adequate legal mechanism or procedure is available whereby the Government 
may be held responsible for its unlawful acts, or the legislation may be reviewed; as 
shown in Chapter 3. 
 
                                                 
288 B.G. Ramcharan. 1989. The Concept and Present Status of the International Protection of Human 
Rights. Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 267.  
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It should be admitted, however, that the presence of various international procedures for 
dealing with human rights communications has succeeded to some extent in providing 
individuals with a broader avenue and a better chance to defend their rights. Nevertheless, 
those procedures carry with them significant constraints and limitations (see discussion in 
Chapter 4, particularly on the critical appraisal and limitations of the procedures). 
Accordingly, these conditions greatly limit the chances for individual victims to obtain 
the international redress or compensation that they need so badly. 
 
Can anything further be done to address this issue? Is there any other procedure or legal 
mechanism that would possibly provide a solution to this problem, that is to say a better 
way of countering the State’s abusive acts and/or legislation? If this was the case, what 
would such a procedure be like and would it be operative at a national or international 
level? 
 
In the author’s opinion and belief, the answer to the first two questions is “yes”. There is a 
stronger legal means that can still be put into operation, and that is international judicial 
review - from which Indonesians have yet to truly benefit. This should also be employed 
at an international level because the circumstances under which Indonesia is placed make 
any such procedure operating under the domestic legal system useless. If this procedure is 
used, both the State’s legislation and Constitution
289 will be put under the microscope to 
test whether or not they are in conformity with international human rights standards and 
norms. 
 
                                                 
289 In the context of this study, this has to be regarded as a State’s entire legislation system including court 
orders and not only the Constitution per se. However, it also has to be understood that the basic rules are 
summed up in the constitution.  
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The main issues here are: why should it be an international judicial review? Who shall 
possess the judicial review power: the United Nations Charter as well as treaty-based 
bodies, or the International Court of Justice? Legally speaking, how well-founded is it, 
and what are its advantages compared to other procedures? Is there any trend at all 
showing that the world is ready for such a mechanism? If the first question, which is the 
most important, has been answered satisfactorily, the subsequent questions can also be 
answered. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to argue that another mechanism is needed at 
the international level as a complement to procedures which have been in place for a long 
time but proved relatively ineffective as the instruments of various international bodies; 
second, to analyse the advantages of the proposed procedure in comparison to the others 
that have been implemented internationally. Prior to the discussion, I would like to 
examine the power and competence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) under the 
Rome Statute as well as various international practices (e.g. good offices, etc.). 
 
The discussion of these issues adds weight to the previous discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 
by justifying the need for international judicial review for breaches of government acts 
and for breaches of human rights. These issues will now be addressed in order of 
importance.   
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2.  Why is International Judicial Review Needed? 
 
Is judicial review really necessary? In other words, why choose international judicial 
review in particular? What are the arguments in its favour? Aren’t the international 
mechanisms currently in operation sufficient? 
 
The answer to the first question is yes, another procedure needs to be put in place because 
all the existing international procedures, particularly those aimed at defending the human 
rights of individuals against the abuses of States and their legislation cannot fulfil the 
expectations of individual victims. In the first place, the problem lies within the procedure 
itself. 
 
Under Charter-based procedures, for instance, no individual complaints are considered. 
Those procedures deal specifically with a given country’s human rights situation as a 
whole. Under treaty-based procedures, although dealing with individual petitions, the 
views or conclusions most often do not bring about the desired result. One could even say 
that the quality of the decisions which result from these procedures makes the entire 
mechanism ‘a waste of time and energy’. Why? Because those decisions have no legal 
binding force on the parties involved and thus cannot be carried into effect. Their 
implementation very much depends on the political will of States. 
 
What about strengthening the position of the Committees by permitting them to hand 
down recommendations which are legally binding for States parties? This is certainly 
worth considering but, realistically, the materialisation of this idea is highly doubtful:  
 
171
even with such moderate powers as they possess, it has taken a long time for the 
Committees to obtain recognition from States. How much longer would it take for the 
States to recognise a greater amount of power bestowed on the Committees?  
 
Moreover, even if the treaty provisions entitle the  treaty-based bodies to the same 
authority as a court, in most cases  they still currently require additional official 
recognition, because the provisions are optional. The waiting time can be very long or 
even indefinite. From the victim’s perspective, this is intolerable. Again, in this respect, 
the political will of the States plays a decisive role. Such political will can well be 
uncertain and unpredictable. With international judicial review, the door is at least 
partially opened: as a Member of the United Nations, a State is ipso facto a party to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, though as it currently stands, not all member 
States recognise the competence of the ICJ to hear a case and issue judgements on matters 
involving that State.
290 
 
There would additionally be a risk of inconsistency if some other international body was 
considered in order to deal with issues of international judicial review. For example, 
Judge  Gilbert Guillaume, the International Court of Justice’s former President, has 
recommended caution about the risk of inconsistency and conflicting judgements because 
of overlapping jurisdiction due to what he calls the “proliferation of international judicial 
bodies”. In his address to the members of the General Assembly’s Sixth (Legal) 
Committee, he asserted that the proliferation of judicial bodies was a response to the need 
                                                 
290 Article 93(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  
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to subject expanding inter-State relations and cross-frontier transactions to the rule of 
law.
291 
 
He went on to warn: 
 
Among the unfortunate consequences from that proliferation though, were the risk 
of overlapping jurisdictions, which could lead to ‘forum shopping’, the rendering 
of conflicting judgments and inconsistency in case law. While international law 
certainly has to adapt itself, it must nonetheless preserve the unity and provide the 
players on the international stage with a secure framework.
292 
 
 
This would suggest that it would be better to attempt to strenghthen judicial review not by 
creating a whole new mechanism – which might conflict or contradict others in place – 
but instead expand the mandate of an already existing institution – such as the 
International Court of Justice if possible. 
 
Another argument that can be advanced is that under all the aforementioned procedures, 
as one can see quite clearly, the main objective is to provide a broad platform from which 
individuals may exercise their right to defend themselves after their rights have been 
violated. However, would it not be better to prevent a violation of human rights, than to 
repair it after it had taken place? As the saying goes, prevention is better than cure. 
 
Is there any indication at all as to whether or not the world is ready to accept an 
international judicial institution dealing specifically with human rights violation cases? 
Professor Martin Scheinin, Director of the Finland-based Abo Akademi University 
Institute for Human Rights and member of the Human Rights Committee is clearly in 
favour of this idea. In relation to the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
                                                 
291  UN General Assembly Press Release, GA/L/3157, at http://srch1.un.org:80/plweb-cgi/ access date: 
27/10/2000. Judge Guillaume’s remark was actually made to comment on the establishment of the ICC, 
but its implication may well go beyond that. 
292 Id.  
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(ICC), seen by him as a parallel idea for possible establishment of an international human 
rights court, Prof. Scheinin argues: 
 
The entry into force of the Rome Statute in July 2002 and the subsequent period 
when the ICC will become operative will provide momentum for international 
discussion on the need of a World Human Rights Court. If individuals are made, 
on the level of international law, subject to penal procedures and penal sanctions 
for violations of certain human rights, through the International Criminal Court 
with final and binding jurisdiction, why should the primary subject of international 
law, namely states, not be made subject to the jurisdiction of a human rights court 
with the power to issue binding decision?
293 
 
The background reason for Professor Scheinin coming to this conclusion is that in recent 
years, much attention has been given to the problems and potentials of the system of 
international supervision of human rights law; although this has primarily taken place 
only in academic and non-academic analysis on how to improve the functioning of the so-
called treaty bodies established under six major human rights treaties elaborated within 
the United Nations framework
294. Pointing out a recent development that occurred within 
the ICC, Scheinin sees that this could “serve as strong support for the parallel processes of 
giving individuals also rights directly on the international level and of making states 
accountable for their acts or omissions that lead to the violations of human rights”.
295 
 
He argues that a future “World Human Rights Court” would have to be endowed with all 
necessary power to fully exercise its jurisdiction as another world court (e.g. the 
International Court of Justice), such as the power of judicial review of state parties’ acts 
covering legislative and administrative products as well as judicial decisions. A tentative 
blueprint of this world human rights court could be based on the following characteristics: 
                                                 
293 Scheinin, Martin. 2003. Paper, Towards a World Human Rights Court. Institute for Human Rights, Ǻbo 
Akademi University, Finland. p. 6 
294 Ibid, at p. 1 
295 Ibid, at p. 6  
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1)  No new substantive human rights norms need to be elaborated. The 
substantive norms of human rights are to be found in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, subsequent human rights treaties and the 
evolving institutionalized practices of interpretation based on those treaties; 
2)  In order to ratify the Statute of the World Human Rights Court, States need not 
denounce the human rights treaties they have already ratified. However, States 
will be free to withdraw from existing optional complaint procedures if they 
recognize the binding jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the same set of 
substantive human rights norms; 
3)  The process of amending existing multilateral human rights treaties need not 
be resorted to; 
4)  The World Human Rights court will be optional in nature. Any State may 
subject itself to the binding jurisdiction of the Court, in relation to the 
substantive norms provided by one or more of existing human rights treaties. 
This will result in somewhat cumbersome variable geometry in the work of the 
Court, as the applicable law will differ from case to case. By converting the 
principle of independence and indivisibility of all human rights into a legal 
one, the resulting hardship can be kept within tolerable borders; 
5)  Entities other than States, including international organisations or 
multinational corporations, may by unilateral declaration recognize the 
binding jurisdiction of the Court. Such declaration must specify a) a set of 
human rights norms contained in the existing human rights treaties to which 
the entity considers itself bound, and b) what internal remedies of the entity, or 
generally available external remedies, need to be exhausted before a complaint 
may be submitted to the Court; 
6)  The same approach might be feasible even in respect of States themselves: that 
they would have the right to specify what regional or international procedures 
constitute such remedies that must be exhausted before engaging the Court. 
The admissibility question related to “the same matter” could be resolved in a 
similar fashion, by allowing the State in question to determine whether 
previous consideration by a regional human rights body precludes a 
subsequent complaint to the new Court; 
7)  The Court will have the competence to issue binding decisions on interim 
measures of protection and binding decisions on effective remedies in cases of 
human rights violations. The Court will have an effective follow-up 
mechanism to ensure the implementation of its judgements; 
8)  So far, no blueprint exists to address the question of whether the jurisdiction of 
the Court will be limited to complaints by individual victims of human rights 
violations, or whether a case can be initiated by other actors (States, non-
governmental organisations, etc.), and whether this will require that the Court 
will deal not only with (individual) human rights violations but also with 
“unsatisfactory application”, e.g. to take positive measures.
296 
 
                                                 
296 Ibid, at p. 8.  
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One interesting point in Scheinin’s idea here is the possibility of giving such a court a 
more extensive jurisdiction not only to deal with individual complaints but also with 
“unsatisfactory application”, such as to take positive measures. Taking a positive measure 
towards international human rights standards in the case of Indonesia, for instance, has 
never been a satisfactory act. The competence of such a court to deal with unsatisfactory 
application in taking a positive measure may well be regarded as involving the review of a 
State’s acts or legislation and their conformity with human rights standards. This would 
be especially relevant in the Indonesian context in regards to legislation that “legalises” 
the acts of the Government and its branches that violate human rights. 
 
It would therefore be useful if there existed at international level a judicial review 
procedure which scrutinised the consistency of a State’s constitution and legislation with 
international human rights provisions and which took the necessary measures if 
inconsistencies were found. In this context, the availability of international judicial review 
of government acts for breaches of human rights may, in this context, prevent the 
violation of human rights from taking place and provide individuals with an avenue 
through which they can secure the exercise of their rights before any violation occurs. 
The procedure may thus function as an early-warning system for the protection of human 
rights.  
 
Nonetheless, even if a violation has taken place because a particular State has adhered to 
its national system of judicial review
297, international judicial review can still be used to 
                                                 
297 In countries such as Switzerland, a regulation will be reviewed through a referendum before it comes 
into effect. But in countries like Indonesia, a regulation enters into force first and if considered 
inconsistent, a petition may be filed with the court. On this, see discussion in Chapter 3. On various 
systems of judicial review, see, among others, Brewer-Carais, Judicial Review in Comparative Law, 
Ibid. (discussion in chapter 2).  
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bring about an amendment in the legislation of this State. The proposed mechanism may 
thus have a dual function: prevention and reparation. 
 
Judicial review as a legal regulator may ensure that government does not exercise its 
power over and above what the law has stated. There is always a possibility that a 
government will misuse its power while conducting administrative affairs as well as a 
possibility that the legislators may adopt an abusive law. In both situations, the court 
should be able to examine the lawfulness and fairness of their actions. 
 
The same notion should be applied to the international community with regard to its 
member States. After all, the purpose of the establishment of an international community 
placed under the auspices of the United Nations is to create peace and stability and to 
achieve welfare, which is also the goal of every Member State for its citizens. Thus, a 
parallel exists between the goals of the United Nations and those of its Member States; 
who can work side by side and complement each other. When a State is unable to work 
out its own goals, the international community should provide assistance. Where a 
Member State is not willing to promote world peace, security and welfare, the 
international community should take the necessary steps to guarantee the advance of these 
goals. 
 
In this effort, unfortunately, it is possible that one particular Member State or possibly 
more are not in conformity with the acceptable principles governing the international 
community and thus do not support the common goal. Inconsistencies with these 
principles and norms should be prevented and, if any exist, they have to be fixed using 
mechanisms specifically designed for the purpose. The author believes that the best  
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possible procedure by which to achieve this goal is international judicial review. Under 
this procedure, the legality and conformity of Government acts, including State legislation 
in the area of human rights protection, are examined on the basis of internationally 
accepted standards or norms. 
 
In relation to the violation of principles for the promotion and protection of international 
human rights, a range of treaties have been adopted and ratified. But mere adoption and 
ratification of treaties do not themselves decrease the incidence of violations of rights, for 
it is up to the States parties to work out how they are going to implement those treaties. 
Many of the treaties are not implemented in practice. The major obstacle to satisfactory 
implementation lies within the national laws. So, in order to secure the conformity of 
national laws with international standards of human rights, an international judicial 
review procedure must be available. 
 
But what are the international standards or norms concerning human rights that shall be 
used as the grounds for judicial review? What is the international constitution or basic set 
of laws equivalent to that of national law, against which the Government acts or 
legislation of a Member State shall be reviewed? To date, the codification of such an 
international constitution has not occurred. The only documents that the international 
community can currently resort to with a sufficient international consensus to use for this 
basis is the International Bill of Rights, which consists of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights together with its 
two Optional Protocols, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 
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Except for the two covenants, which are legally binding on States parties, the principles 
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights do not by any means represent 
legal standards which bind all Member States. Nevertheless, some of its provisions either 
constitute general principles of law or express basic humanitarian views.
298 More 
important is its status as an authoritative guide, produced by the General Assembly, for 
the interpretation of the United Nations Charter. In this capacity, the Declaration has 
considerable indirect legal effect and is regarded by the General Assembly and by some 
prominent jurists as a part of the “law of the United Nations”.
299 
 
Moreover, in the Proclamation, it is stated that the Declaration is “a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every 
organ of society, keeping this Declaration in mind, shall strive by teaching and education 
to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national 
and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both 
among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories 
under their jurisdiction.”
300 
 
                                                 
298 See Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
299 Ian Brownlie (Ed.).1995. Basic Documents in International Law. 4
th Ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 
255 and on jus cogens, see, Juergen Broehmer (1997). State Immunity and the Violation of Human 
Rights, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, particularly at pp. 145-147, excerpt of which: “… [t]he 
concept of jus cogens is based on the notion that the international legal order contains norms which 
cannot be subject to contracting out, respectively which cannot be derogated by any subsequent nor 
unless that norm is also attributed jus cogens character. In effect this postulates a set of norms higher in 
hierarchy than general norms of international law and insofar similar to public policy norms of 
municipal legal orders … In the broader context of human rights the law of genocide, the principles of 
racial non-discrimination, the rules prohibiting slavery and piracy and the rules concerning crimes 
against humanity are the least controversial jus cogens norms. However, the jus cogens catalogue of 
norms also includes “the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals”, “torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. That follows from the definition of jus cogens norms 
as rules which cannot be derogated from and which must be recognized “by the international community 
of States as a whole” (art. 53 Vienna Convention on Law of the Treaty). “The international community 
as a whole” cannot be understood in the sense of each and every state: jus cogens norms do not rely on 
state’s consent for it to be bound … it is at least not evident that there is any significant opposition 
within the international community against the very existence of these fundamental rules.” 
300 U.N. Doc. A/811.  
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Most of the human rights principles and standards laid down in the Declaration are then 
elaborated in the Covenants, which even go so far as to propose mechanisms for 
defending human rights. Unfortunately, as explained above, those defence mechanisms 
may only be invoked by individuals who are placed under the jurisdiction of the States 
which are parties to both treaties. What is needed now is a mechanism that applies to all 
the Member States of the United Nations at the very least. 
 
Several other references to the principles underlying these developments and to the 
practical modalities of their international implementation can be found in the United 
Nations Charter, particularly in Articles 1(3), 55(c), 56, 62(2), 68 and 76(c). 
 
There is all the more reason to do away with any hesitations about the use of international 
standards of human rights as a basis for judicial review because these standards also 
involve other aspects of social interaction, such as culture and ethics. What sort of cultural 
or moral value judgement would deny the principles and standards set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights? To put it another way, there should be no 
cultural or moral values that contradict the principles and standards contained in the 
Declaration; since human rights are the natural birthrights of every human being, 
universally.
301 The respective relationships of culture and ethics with human rights might 
be likened to lex generalis for the former and to lex specialis for the latter. 
 
Thus, the promotion, observance, protection and defence of human rights is an 
international concern, and not simply the business of certain states, regions or groups of 
people unless the international peace and security that all are striving for is a mere slogan. 
                                                 
301 United Nations Background Note “The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity”, supra, 
discussion in chapter 2.  
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That is why a specific procedure needs to be established whereby the possible violation of 
any right as a result of wrongdoing or abusive legislation on the State’s part may be 
prevented.  
 
But why the concentration upon the State? Because it is the State’s duty to protect 
individuals and to guarantee them the full enjoyment of their civil rights. Moreover, it is 
the State that makes legal decisions. So, generally speaking, a State may become the 
biggest violator of human rights. 
 
What about the other international machinery, such as the International Criminal Court, 
that is currently being introduced? Besides, what are the contributions of other 
international practices similar to judicial review such as mediation and good offices, 
conciliation, arbitration, etc.? How far can these mechanisms go in providing redress for 
human rights violations at an international level? A systematic examination of these is 
provided in the following two sections. 
 
3. The Power and Competence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
 
Two years before entering the new millennium, the international community under the 
auspices of the United Nations
302 successfully drafted and adopted the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.
303 The idea was supported without question by the 
                                                 
302 That is, the Preparatory Commission for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court which 
was established by Resolution F of the Final Act (A/CONF. 183/10) of the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court. On the work 
of the Preparatory Commission, see, among others, UN Press Release L/2968 of 8 December 2000; on 
the reading of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes, see, summary of 
proceedings PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.1, Add. 1 and Add. 2. 
303 On 27 July 1998 the UN Diplomatic Conference adopted the draft Statute (A/CONF. 183/9). Complete 
text of the Statute is taken from http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm, access date: 
21/03/2001.  
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General Assembly, who  emphasised even further “… the need to make necessary 
arrangements for the commencement of the International Criminal Court in order to 
ensure its effective operation.”
304 
 
The Statute contains 12 parts and 128 articles. According to Article 126, the Rome Statute 
will come into force on the first day of the month after the 60
th day following the date of 
the deposit of the 60
th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. To 
date, of the 140 countries that have signed the Statute, more than 60 have already ratified 
the Statute marking the procedure’s entry into force.
305 
 
The International Criminal Court (the ICC) is to be an independent and permanent 
judicial body with jurisdiction over “most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole” if they were committed by individuals. Nevertheless, in the 
Preamble of the Statute it is emphasised that the ICC “shall [only] be complementary to 
national criminal jurisdiction.”
306 
 
The Court was seen as the offspring of two ad hoc tribunals which prosecuted war crimes 
in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, as well as of hybrid national/international courts 
which were being established in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and East Timor.
307 But the very 
beginning of the ICC can be traced back to the second decade of the 1900s. 
 
                                                 
304 A/Res/55/155. 
305 David Howell (2001) “Yes to the World Criminal Court, but with America on Board” in International 
Herald Tribune, 6 March 2001, at http://www.golbalpolicy.org/wldcourt/icc/2001/0703us.htm, access 
date: 16/04/2001 For the number of states that have ratified the Statute, see, http://www.un.org/icc, 
access date: 24 February 2004. 
306 See, sentence “Emphasizing…etc.” of the Preamble and Article 1 of the Rome Statute. 
307 Michelle Sief (2001) “World Needs a Crimes Court” in Christian Science Monitor, 15 March 2001 at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/wldcourt/icc/2001/0315us.htm, access date: 16/04/2001.  
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The first proposals leading to the creation of a permanent and independent international 
criminal court were introduced just after the First World War, when the Permanent Court 
for International Justice was established. In the interval between the First and the Second 
World War, interest in the creation of this kind of court somehow subsided. The idea was 
revived after the Second World War, when the Nuremberg and Tokyo international 
military tribunals were created.
308 
 
The ICC functions as an organ of the United Nations. The relationship of the ICC with the 
United Nations shall be determined by an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of 
States parties to this Statute and thereafter concluded by the President of the ICC on its 
behalf (Article 2) and the seat of the Court shall be at The Hague in the Netherlands 
(Article 3). 
 
According to Article 4, the ICC shall have international legal personality and other legal 
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its 
purposes (par. 1). The ICC may exercise its functions and powers on the territory of any 
State party and, by special agreement, on the territory of another State too (par. 2). 
 
Part 2 of the Statute concerns the jurisdiction of the Court, the admissibility of a case and 
other relevant legal principles. Article 5(1) stipulates the types of crimes covered by the 
Court’s jurisdiction. It specifies that these crimes must be of concern to the international 
                                                 
308 Bernhard Graefrath, “Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an International Criminal Court” in European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1 at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol1/No1/art4-01.html, access 
date: 10/04/2001. For more details on the history of the proposals, see M.C. Bassiouni (1987), A Draft 
International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 2
nd revised and 
updated edition, Dordrecht, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, p. 1 ff., International Criminal Law, 2
nd 
edition, Vols. 1-3, Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, also B.B. Ferencz (1980), An International 
Criminal Court - A Step toward World Peace: a document, history and analysis. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: 
Oceana Publications.  
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community as a whole, such as: (a) the crime of genocide, (b) crimes against humanity, 
(c) war crimes and (d) the crime of aggression. 
 
Genocide occurs when any of the following acts is committed with intent to destroy in 
whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: 
 
•  killing members of the group; 
•  causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
•  deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
•  imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
•  forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
309 
 
 
A crime against humanity takes place when any of the following acts is committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population: 
 
•  murder; 
•  extermination; 
•  enslavement; 
•  deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
•  imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
•  torture; 
•  rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
•  persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally 
recognised as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
•  enforced disappearance of persons; 
•  the crime of apartheid; and 
•  other inhuman acts of similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body, physical and mental health.
310 
                                                 
309 Article 6 of the Rome Statute. 
310 Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Paragraph 2 of the article further defines the meanings of “attack directed 
against any civilian population” as a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
against any civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy to 
commit such attack; “extermination” includes the intentional infliction of condition of life, inter alia the 
deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population; “enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, 
without grounds permitted under international law; “deportation or forcible transfer of population”  
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War crimes occur when an act or acts of violence are committed as part of a plan or 
policy or as part of a large-scale order for such crimes to be perpetrated (Article 8 par. 1). 
According to paragraph 2, war crimes include any of the following acts: 
 
a)  grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the 
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the 
Conventions
311: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military action 
and carried out unlawfully or wantonly, compelling a prisoner of war or other 
protected person to serve in forces of hostile power, wilfully depriving a prisoner 
of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial, unlawful 
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement and taking of hostages; 
 
b)  other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict within the established framework of international law, such as attacks 
against civilians, non-military targets including those belonging to humanitarian or 
peacekeeping missions, the use of biological and chemical weapons, etc.; 
 
c)  intentionally wounding retired soldiers who are hors de combat.
312 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in 
which they are lawfully present without grounds permitted under international law; “torture” means the 
intentional infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon a person in the custody or under 
the control of the accused (pain or suffering due to lawful sanction is excluded); “forced pregnancy” 
means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant with the intent of affecting the 
ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law (this 
does not affect national laws on pregnancy); “persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation 
of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the groups or collectivity; 
“crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts committed in the context of an institutionalised regime of 
systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups with 
intent of maintaining the regime; “enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or political 
organisation, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on 
the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the 
law for a prolonged period of time. 
311 Altogether there are four Conventions and two Additional Protocols: Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick Members of Armed Forces in the Field, Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol 1), and Additional Protocol relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol 2). All four Conventions entered 
into force on 21 October 1950, while the Additional Protocol 1 entered into force on 7 December 1979 
and Additional Protocol 2 on 7 December 1978. 
312 Article 8 of the Statute of the ICJ.  
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As concerns the crime of aggression in particular, the Statute prescribes that the Court 
shall extend its jurisdiction to this type of crime once a provision has been adopted in 
accordance with Articles 121 and 123 which define the crime and set out the conditions 
under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.
313 
 
3.1. Exercise of Jurisdiction 
 
Article 13 rules that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to any sort of 
crime covered by the Statute if (a) a situation arises in which one or more of the alleged 
crimes is referred to the Prosecutor by a State party, (b) a situation arises in which one or 
more of the alleged crimes is referred to the Prosecutor by the United Nations Security 
Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, or (c) the Prosecutor has initiated an 
investigation proprio motu based on reliable information that one or more such crimes 
have indeed taken place. 
 
To assist the Court in determining whether one or more such crimes have indeed taken 
place, a set of rules on the Elements of Crimes shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority 
of the Assembly of States Parties (Article 9 par. 1). In exercising its powers, the Court is 
also to uphold the general principles of criminal law, such as ratione temporis (Article 
11), nebis in idem (Article 20), nullum crimen sine lege (Article 22), nulla poena sine lege 
(Article 23), non-retroactivity or ratione personae (Article 24), etc. 
 
                                                 
313 Paragraph 2, Article 5 of the Rome Statute. The article further requires that the provision concerning the 
crime of aggression shall not contravene the provisions or principles of the United Nations Charter.  
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The jurisdiction of the Court excludes any person who was under the age of 18 (Article 
26) when the alleged crime occurred, but no exception is made with respect to the official 
rank of a person, even if he/she enjoys legal immunity under international as well as  
national laws (Article 27). As in a normal criminal trial, the Court must exempt a person 
from criminal responsibility if the person is mentally ill, incapable, or acting in self-
defence, etc. A person’s right to presumption of innocence is also to be respected and the 
burden of proof is laid upon the Prosecutor (Article 66).
314 
 
3.2.Analysis and Comparison 
 
As noted above, the creation of the ICC is the next and perhaps the final outcome of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals, two ad hoc international tribunals 
for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the current fledgling tribunals for Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia and East Timor for the effective enforcement of international humanitarian 
law.
315 The establishment of those tribunals was meant to provide a more effective means 
of enforcing international humanitarian law after the previous mechanisms seemed to fail. 
 
The first means available for legally enforcing international humanitarianism was the 
traditional and rather controversial method of reprisals, whereby a soldier used an illegal 
means of warfare in response to violations of the laws of war by his enemy. The aim of 
this tactic is to make the enemy stop behaving illegally and to ‘punish’ him in order to 
deter him from committing further breaches. The second means was generally known as 
Protecting Power, a mechanism agreed upon by the parties to a conflict, to secure the 
supervision and implementation by the armed forces of their international humanitarian 
                                                 
314 Rules on the trial process and the enforcement of the rulings are summed up in part 6 Articles 62 – 85 
and part 10 Articles 103 - 111 of the Statute. 
315 Bernhard Graefrath, supra, note 294.  
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obligations. The third means was the existence of the Fact Finding Commission. The 
Commission was set up by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council in 
accordance with Resolution 780 (1992) to investigate violations of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. Based on the subsequent findings of this 
Commission, the Security Council decided to establish the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
316 
 
While the three previous methods concentrated on the States’ duty to uphold their 
obligations under the international humanitarian law, the ICC focuses its jurisdiction on 
individual responsibility. It should be acknowledged that, in one way, the creation of the 
ICC does represent a step forward in the effort to promote the observance of humanitarian 
law internationally. Yet, on the other hand, the mechanism is flawed as far as the effective 
enforcement of international humanitarian law is concerned, because the implementation 
of the prosecution and punishment of individuals ultimately hinges on, and depends on, 
the goodwill of States.
317 
 
Unlike the procedures which deal with individual communications under various treaties 
in which the Committees do not make legally binding decisions, the ICC does hand down 
judgements and has legal binding force on the parties concerned. This is only natural 
because the ICC is a judicial institution operating as a criminal court on the basis of 
general criminal law principles at international level. Thus, it does not work in the area of 
international human rights.  
 
                                                 
316 Feature Article, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, No. 1 at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol 
9/No1/art1-01.html, access date: 16/04/2001. 
317 Ibid.  
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Petitions or complaints alleging violations of individual human rights are dealt with by 
the Committees established for that specific purpose, but they are not vested with the 
same degree of powers or competence as the ICC. In other words, some privileges 
enjoyed by the ICC such as the power to hand down judgement are not granted to the 
Committees. This makes the work of the Committees ineffective and in many cases futile 
for law enforcement purposes.  
 
Indeed, the effective implementation of the decisions made by the ICC ultimately depends 
on the goodwill of States. Still, from this point onward, it is no longer a question of the 
court’s judicial competence, but rather a question of sanction and of moral values held by 
individual States. The issue here is in which skilful way could an effective sanction be 
formulated so that a State would have no other choice but to implement it within its 
national jurisdiction, because it felt that this sanction served its own interests as well as 
those of the international community at large, even though it might have to observe it 
under constraint.
318 For no State would ‘feel’ happy to bow to international pressure and 
besides, there could be some financial or political consequences taking place. 
 
4.  International Practices Similar to Judicial Review 
 
Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter states that all Member States “shall settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security and justice are not endangered”. This article means that there is no general rule 
requiring states to settle their grievances, but that if they decide to do so, this must be  
                                                 
318 More on the theory of sanction and punishment, see, Igor Primoratz (1989). Justifying Legal Punishment, 
New Jersey, London: Humanities International Press, particularly pp. 1-31. On the effectiveness of the 
United Nations sanctions, see, Willem J.M. van Genugten and Gerard A. de Groot (eds.) (1999), United 
Nations Sanctions, Effectiveness and Effects especially in the Field of Human Rights - A Multi-
disciplinary Approach, Antwerpen: Intersentia.  
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done in a peaceful manner. The absence of a general obligation to settle disputes is 
reflected by the fact that the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is not 
compulsory. Thus, a state cannot be compelled to submit a dispute with another state to a 
third party such as the ICJ for settlement unless it has agreed upon it.
319 
 
Under international law, many procedures to settle disputes have been implemented; 
although, from a legal point of view, these are relatively obsolete. As a matter of fact, 
such procedures for the supervision and pacific settlement of disputes have been 
developed through old-fashioned processes in which the acts and omissions of the States 
could be reviewed for their conformity with international legal norms. Most of these 
procedures have a non-judicial character.
320 Nevertheless, it is perhaps valuable to 
consider some of these procedures before possibly coming to the conclusion that an 
international judicial review is needed. 
 
The said procedures vary greatly among themselves and can be any of the following:  
 
•  consultation between States parties;  
•  settlement of disputes through mediation and good offices; 
•  inquiry and conciliation (under the direction of one or more other States, a 
commission or an organ of an international organisation);  
•  specific settlement of disputes of non-judicial supervision; 
•  pacific settlement of disputes within the framework of international organisations 
or regional machinery.  
 
 
                                                 
319 The only exception to this rule is the obligation of states under Art. 33 of the Charter which requires a 
state to submit disputes which are likely to endanger international peace and security to third party for a 
peaceful settlement. 
320 P van Dijk, Judicial Review of Governmental Action, Ibid., at p. 363.  
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In general, most of these procedures concern the settlement of disputes of a specific 
nature; such as in diplomacy, problems relating to the international economy and trade co-
operation, and other related matters such as disputes about territorial borders.
321 
 
4.1. Negotiation 
 
As in the national legal system, the most common method of settling a dispute is through 
negotiation which appears to be the best option because it is simple and it does not 
involve a third party.
322 However, the procedure can only operate if the disputants have 
agreed to adopt this method of settlement, which would then in turn affect the binding 
power of the settlement. If the parties concerned so decide jointly, the outcome of the 
procedure can become legally binding and then it may be set in the form of a treaty. 
Otherwise, the outcome can be recorded in an exchange of notes or diplomatic 
memoranda, which have no legal effect.
323 The agreement between the People’s Republic 
of China and the United Kingdom over the future of Hong Kong is an example of this 
second option. 
                                                 
321 See, for instance, M. Dixon (1993), Textbook on International Law, London: Blackstone Press Limited, 
pp. 222-245 with Malcolm M. Shaw (1997), International Law, 4
th Edition, London: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 717-774 and Ian Brownlie (1998), Principles of Public International Law, 5
th 
Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 703-706. 
322 Malcolm M. Shaw, International Law, Ibid., p. 720. 
323 M. Dixon, International Law, Ibid., at p. 223.  
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4.2. Good Offices and Mediation 
 
Unlike negotiation, the use of the procedures of good offices and mediation involves the 
service of a third party. This third party may be an individual or individuals, a State or a 
group of States, or else one or more international organisations.
324  
 
The main role of this third party is to persuade and encourage the contending parties to sit 
at the negotiating table to settle their differences. The person offering good offices must 
be a neutral and trustworthy party who is external to the negotiation, such as the 
American General Alexander Haig in the Falkland Islands war between the United 
Kingdom and Argentina. 
 
The procedure of mediation is simply an extension of good offices. A mediator is a person 
approved by the opposing parties whose task is to suggest the terms and conditions of a 
settlement, so that he or she is actively involved in the negotiation. United Nations 
envoys, for example, have been active in this type of process with regard to the conflict in 
former Yugoslavia. Mediation and good offices are thus a preliminary procedure of 
negotiation.
325 A number of rules governing these two procedures are laid down in The 
Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1899 and 1907. 
                                                 
324 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Ibid., at p. 723. 
325 More on the procedures, see International Court of Justice Report 1969, in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, pp. 3 and 47, also, ICJ Reports 1974 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction, pp. 3 and 32.  
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4.3. Inquiry 
 
Generally speaking, a commission of inquiry can be set up in which reputable observers 
investigate the evidence in detail when differences of opinion on factual matters underlie 
a dispute between parties. The parties to a dispute will agree to refer the matter to this 
impartial body who will engage in an unbiased fact-finding task.
326 It is up to the parties 
to negotiate a settlement based on its findings and just like the other procedures noted 
above, the settlement has no legal binding force. Although established as a fact-finding 
body, the commission of inquiry works according to the judicial pattern in the sense that 
its reports contain legal conclusions. This is not surprising since the majority of the 
members of the commission are usually lawyers.
327 
 
4.4. Conciliation 
 
Conciliation can be regarded either as a non-judicial or as a semi-judicial procedure for 
the settlement of international disputes. The procedure of conciliation implies the 
reference of a dispute to a third party, usually a commission or committee, whose task it is 
to propose recommendations for settlement. Conciliation commissions are different from 
commissions of inquiry because the latter do not produce concrete proposals for 
settlement. The ‘semi-judicial’ aspect of the work of a conciliation commission derives 
                                                 
326 M. Dixon, International Law, Ibid., at p. 224. 
327 The Red Crusader Case which concerned a British trawler and a Danish fisheries protection vessel which 
subsequently involved a British warship (a frigate) in 1962. The commission of inquiry came to the 
conclusion that the British frigate had ‘exceeded the legitimate use of armed force’. See Malcolm Shaw, 
International Law, Ibid., at p. 726.  
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from its competence to elucidate facts, hear the parties and formulate decisions in the 
form of proposals.
328 
 
The rules which define conciliation were drawn up in the General Act on the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes of 1928, revised in 1949. Under this procedure, a 
settlement is generally proposed by a neutral third party and has no legal binding effect. 
One example of a conciliation procedure is the Jan Meyen Conciliation Commission 
(Iceland v Norway) in 1981. In practice, the settlements proposed by conciliation 
commissions form the basis for the arbitration of further settlement procedures. 
 
4.5 Arbitration 
 
The procedure of arbitration was held to be the most effective and equitable manner of 
settling international disputes where diplomacy had failed. The procedure grew to some 
extent out of the processes of diplomatic settlement and represented an advance towards a 
more developed international legal system.
329 Like all methods of pacific settlement in 
international law, arbitration is voluntary and may take place on an ad hoc basis or 
according to any other specific arrangement that the parties involved might have agreed 
upon. Prior to this process, the States concerned must consent to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the arbitrators.
330 
 
The most notable arbitration procedure that was ever carried out and is still regarded as 
the model of modern arbitration was the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the U.S.A. and Great 
Britain. The procedure was successfully used again in the Alabama Claims arbitration of 
                                                 
328 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Ibid., p. 704. 
329 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Ibid., pp. 737-738. 
330 M. Dixon, International Law, Ibid., p. 228.  
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1872 between the two countries, and resulted in the compensation payment by Great 
Britain to the U.S.A. for breaches of contractual obligations on the building of warships. 
Subsequently, in accordance with the conventions signed in The Hague in 1899 and 1907 
(particularly Articles XV and XVIII), a permanent Court of Arbitration was established. 
 
Actually, it is not really a court as such since it does not consist of a set number of judges. 
Rather, it consists of a panel of persons nominated by the contracting States (with a 
maximum of four national representatives), and comprises individuals of ‘known 
competency in questions of international law, of high moral reputation and disposed to 
accept the duties of an arbitrator’.
331 Arbitration tribunals may thus consist of a single 
arbitrator or of a collegiate body of judges. 
 
In 1958, the General Assembly adopted the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure proposed 
by the International Law Commission.
332 These rules were, however, merely optional. In 
1992, the Permanent Court of Arbitration itself adopted the Optional Rules for Arbitrating 
Disputes between Two States
333. Generally, the law to be applied in arbitration is 
international law, but the parties may agree upon certain principles to be taken into 
account by the tribunal and specify this in the compromis
334. This principle was applied in 
the British Guiana and Venezuela Boundary dispute and in the Trail Smelter Case. 
 
It is an important characteristic of arbitration that the tribunal has the competency to 
determine its own jurisdiction and therefore to interpret the relevant legal instruments 
                                                 
331 Article XLIV of the Hague Convention as revised in 1907. 
332 General Assembly Resolution 1262 (XI) (1958). 
333 These were based on the UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) 
Arbitration Rules adopted by the UN General Assembly on 15 December 1976 in its resolution 31/98. 
See, for example, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Ibid., at p. 706. 
334 A compromis is a kind of arbitrational decision based on the parties’ consent and agreement. It is final 
and binding.  
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determining that jurisdiction. Once an arbitral award (that is, the decision) has been made, 
it is final and binding on the parties concerned, but in certain circumstances the award 
itself may be regarded as null. Nullity of award occurs when the tribunal exceeds the 
powers that it was given by mutual consent in the compromis.
335 
 
4.6 A Brief Analysis 
 
It is clear that these procedures for settlement of disputes by peaceful means deal 
specifically with grievances between states. They do not relate to individual complaints. 
Besides, the grievances dealt with under these procedures do not concern human rights 
violations by any means. As mentioned above, complaints about human rights violations 
are dealt with by special bodies under special procedures according to special laws and 
provisions. 
 
Of all the international legal resources mentioned above, not one can be invoked by 
individuals claiming that their rights have been violated as a result of State abuses or poor 
national legislation. This takes us to the next step in the search for a better protection of 
individuals in the field of human rights.  
 
5.  International Judicial Review as a Complementary Procedure 
 
The following sections deal with two crucial issues on which the possibility of making 
international judicial review available is hinged: who shall possess the power of judicial 
review and by what legal principles is it underpinned? Prior to discussing these questions, 
                                                 
335 Malcolm M. Shaw, International Law, Ibid., p. 740.  
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I will enumerate some of the advantages of international judicial review as a complement 
to other existing mechanisms. 
 
5.1. The Complementary Functions of International Judicial Review 
 
In the previous discussions, it has been noted quite extensively that the existing 
international legal tools for the promotion and protection of individual human rights only 
provided individual victims with limited redress. The disadvantages of the procedures 
came by and large from the defending bodies’ inability to produce legally binding 
decisions on the parties involved in human rights violations and from the fact that 
communications before these international bodies were generally only acceptable on the 
condition that all available and effective domestic avenues had been exhausted 
beforehand. 
 
It is precisely in connection with these frustrating limitations that the proposed 
international judicial review might constitute a breakthrough. As in national law, the 
outcome of international judicial review proceedings could have legal binding force on 
the parties involved. Besides, in order to ensure the acceptance and implementation of its 
decisions, forcible means (i.e. international sanctions
336) and other available measures 
could be authorized. The power to exercise judicial review of government acts and 
                                                 
336 To mention just one example is the IMF sanction to suspend loan and other financial assistance imposed 
by the organisation upon the Indonesian government. One of the major conditions of the loan was a 
fundamental change (amendment) of Indonesian legislation in banking. It has been proved that this 
sanction worked effectively. Currently there is a major restructuring in banking taking place in 
Indonesia. See, The Jakarta Post, 31 December 2000, at http://www.the jakartapost.com, access date: 
10/01/2001.  
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legislation might be given to the International Court of Justice - as a court, it would 
certainly deliver final and binding judgement upon all parties.
337 
 
Another major bonus of the procedure would be the bypassing of the “exhaustion of 
domestic legal avenues” requirement found in the procedures before the treaty bodies. As 
mentioned above, it can take individuals a very long time to meet this requirement – even 
if there are some exceptions possible where the existing domestic remedies are 
unavailable, ineffective or even non-existent. It is also fraught with uncertainty, not to 
mention the heavy financial and possibly psychological burden that individuals may have 
to carry in the process. In short, it is just “as good as impossible” for individuals to fulfil 
their obligation in this particular area. 
 
Under the proposed international judicial review, which targets this very issue, this 
prerequisite could be scrapped. As in domestic law, the individual could be permitted to 
file a lawsuit requesting a court review of the lawfulness of a particular act of government 
or legislation, without having to exhaust other “preliminary” procedures first
338. This way, 
if an individual claimed that, by international standards, his or her human rights had been, 
or might be, violated by certain government acts or regulations, he or she would be 
allowed to file a lawsuit directly to the International Court of Justice instituting judicial 
review (more on this in Chapter 6). 
 
Although it seems possible at this point to conclude that international judicial review is 
necessary to complement other international procedures currently in force under various 
forms, it is not a simple matter of need. It is also a matter of finding legitimate and 
                                                 
337 Articles 59 and 60 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
338 See and compare, supra, discussion on judicial review in chapter 2.  
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reasonable answers to some fundamental questions such as who shall possess that power, 
should there be judicial review power for the ICJ, what is the source of the power and 
what is the scope of this type of judicial review. 
 
5.2. Who Shall Possess the Power of Judicial Review? 
 
For cases of human rights violations based on legislation (as is the case in Indonesia), and 
considering Prof. Scheinin’s argument and idea
339, the ideal judicial institution to possess 
the power of international judicial review would be some sort of world human rights 
court.  
 
Constitutional law theory and practical national law models suggest that the competence 
of judicial review is one of a court’s functions. Judicial review is a procedure whereby an 
individual challenges an allegedly unfair or unlawful government decision or action. In 
the course of the examination process, the court shall declare whether or not the action or 
decision is legal. If it is found to be illegal or unconstitutional, the decision must be 
declared invalid and must be revoked.
340 
 
At international level, despite all the limitations due to Charter regulations, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. As a World Court,
341 the ICJ has proved to be capable and impartial in settling 
                                                 
339 See Scheinin on the “tentative characters of a World Human Rights Court”., at infra, note 296 
340 See, among others, Stanley de Smith, H.K. Woolf, A.P. le Seur & J.L. Lowell, (1995), Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action, 5
th edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell; Grahame Aldous & John Alder (1993). 
Application for Judicial Review: law practice of the Crown office, 2
nd edition, London: Buttersworth; 
Sue Arrowsmith (1988), Government Procurement and Judicial Review, Toronto: Carswell; cf., supra, 
discussion in chapter 2. 
341 First sentence of the Foreword of the booklet on the International Court of Justice at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igen…formation/ibbook/Bbookforeword.htm, access date: 23/10/2001. Sir Robert Y. 
Jennings, the former president of the Court used this term occasionally to refer to the ICJ, which  
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international disputes. In the light of these facts, the International Court of Justice should 
be entrusted with the power of judicial review.
342 
 
5.3. Should there be a Power of Judicial Review for the ICJ? 
 
While discussion on the possible establishment of a world human rights court has merit, 
overall use of the International Court of Justice is a better option. A multi-level approach 
to this issue will be used by emphasizing three of its aspects: the Indonesian domestic 
example, the inherent competence of the International Court of Justice and the ever-
increasing demand for a new world order. 
 
5.3.1.  The Indonesian Example 
 
The Indonesian legal system does not permit the court to review legislation at a higher 
level than Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) or Government implementing regulation. The PP is 
the instrument for the practical application of a law or of a parliamentary act; both of 
which are issued at a superior level and are decreed by the President. In practice, this PP 
will be further implemented in various legal documents such as Keputusan Presiden 
(Keppres) or Presidential Decree, Keputusan Menteri (Kepmen) or Ministerial Decision, 
                                                                                                                                                  
probably goes back to Judge Manley O. Mason. The term is current in legal literature in English and not 
in Spanish, French or Arabic. It is thus familiar mainly to common-law jurists. The expression 
ultimately suggests that it is a court of and for the whole world. Moreover, it is also a judicial organ of 
the international legal order, a higher court on a world level and as an instrument of world governance. 
See, Georges Abi-Saab “The International Court as a World Court” in Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice (1996), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 3-16. For an extensive essay on the ICJ as the World Court, see, Shabtai Rosenne (1995), The 
World Court, what it is and how it works, 5
th edition, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
342 For personal view of the former President of the Court, see, Nagendra Singh (1989), The Role and 
Record of the International Court of Justice: 1946 – 1988, in celebration of the 40
th anniversary, 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 76-82 (more general in chapter V) also, compare with 
Renata Szafarz (1993), The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, in particular at pp. 1-14.  
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etc. All of these regulations are lower in rank than the Law and are subject to court 
judicial review upon petition. Above the law are the Ketetapan MPR (Tap MPR), which is 
the Decree of the nation’s highest state institution or People’s Consultative Assembly, 
and, of course, the Constitution itself.
343 
 
State policies and goals, including provisions for human rights protection, are set forth in 
the Constitution and Tap MPRs and these, under the Indonesian legal system, are very 
general and vague. Laws and other lower regulations will further define those provisions 
and finally, after various presidential or executive decisions, they will be carried into 
effect. These lower regulations may not contradict the higher regulations. So, if 
provisions contained in the Constitution, Tap MPRs and Laws are in contravention with 
international standards, and this has been the case until now, they cannot be amended, for 
those regulations are not subject to national judicial review procedure.
344 
 
In the interest of Indonesian individuals, these facts should be sufficient to come to the 
position that there should be no opposition to the idea of the establishment of international 
judicial review. This can of course happen if support can be obtained from the 
international community and organisations, e.g the United Nations. In all likelihood the 
Indonesian government will reject such ideas. However, recent developments in the area 
of economic recovery programmes have proven that under intensive international pressure 
Indonesia is willing to make changes in its banking and trade laws
345.  
 
                                                 
343 See, supra, discussion in Chapter 3 on the Indonesian Legal System. 
344 The 1945 Constitution does not even make provision on judicial review. The procedure is provided for in 
various laws on judiciary such as UU Nos. 14/1970 and 14/1985, and it is a very restricted procedure. 
See, supra, discussion in Chapter 3. 
345 Government Report on Banking Law Reform Program that has been on the way since 1999 to the time of 
writing.  
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The first reason is that Indonesian law does not permit individuals to challenge national 
legislation on the strength of human rights standards recognised by the international 
community. The second reason that Indonesia has failed to provide satisfactory 
mechanisms for the protection of human rights. 
 
5.3.2. The Inherent Competence of the International Court of Justice 
 
As a court for the settlement of international disputes and as the principal judicial organ 
of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice should possess the power of 
judicial review. It is a role the Court already plays in a limited way as it gives advisory 
opinions and delivers decisions on matters such as the interpretation and implementation 
of treaties and resolutions.
346 
 
Article 92 of the Charter states that the Statute of the International Court of Justice is an 
integral part of the Charter. This statement points to at least two possible interpretations 
of what ‘integral part’ means. The first is that the Statute is essentially dependent on the 
Charter. The second and more generally accepted view is that any problem of 
                                                 
346 Since it began work in 1946, to 1996 the ICJ has given 23 advisory opinions and delivered 61 
judgements. The General Assembly has requested 14 advisory opinions of the Court 13 cases, for 
example, The Conditions of Admission of a State in the united Nations (Article 4 of the Charter); the 
Security Council has requested advisory opinion of the Court concerning the Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
security Council Resolution 276 (1970); the ECOSOC has requested advisory opinions of the Court in 
two cases, one of them is the Applicability of the Article VI section 22 of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; the Executive Board of the UNESCO has requested 
advisory opinion of the Court in the case concerning Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the 
ILO upon Complaints Made Against UNESCO; WHO has requested advisory opinions of the Court in 
two cases, one of them is the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and 
Egypt. A complete list of advisory opinions can be found at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasictext/advisoryopinions.htm, access date: 23/10/2001. 
Some of the Court’s decisions: the Provisional Measures in the Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention (Lockerbie Case - Libya Arab Jamahiriya v. United 
Kingdom) of 14 April 1992, Judgement of 30 June 1995 on the Jurisdiction of the Court and 
Admissibility of the Application (the East Timor Case). A complete list of Court’s orders and 
judgements can be seen at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ idecisions/casesbycountry.htmaccess date: 
23/10/2001.  
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interpretation is to be solved in line with the general direction and functions of the United 
Nations. This outlook implies in its turn that the Statute would certainly be able to support 
a power of judicial review even if it was not mentioned in the Charter.
347 
 
Article 24(2) of the Charter, for instance, states that the Security Council must exercise its 
power “… in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. 
Elsewhere, the Charter requires that these purposes and principles be carried out “… by 
peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.” On 
the basis of these requests, the Court should possess the power of judicial review to 
examine legally, but not politically, whether the United Nations' recommendations have 
been duly implemented. 
 
As a Member of the United Nations, a State has the obligation to introduce international 
human rights principles and standards into its national law (articles 1, 55, 56 of the 
Charter). In accordance with this principle, it is not such a huge step to go one step further 
and also adopt measures so that the Court is able to examine whether or not a member 
State has fulfilled its obligation to the Charter in the field of human rights. 
 
The Statute emphasises that the Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations 
(Article 1). The Court’s competence is outlined in Chapter II and its jurisdiction 
specifically addressed in Article 36. Although no mention is made of any power of 
judicial review, it would certainly be acceptable for the Court to be entrusted with such a 
power as the principal judicial body at international level. As Sir Robert Y. Jennings, a 
former president of the Court once maintained, it is only a matter of “… when and to what 
                                                 
347 Ken Roberts (1995), “Second-Guessing the Security Council: The International Court of Justice and Its 
Powers of Judicial Review” in Pace International Law Review, spring 1995, at http://www.igc. 
org/globalpolicy/wldcourt/roberts.htm, access date: 16/04/2001, p. 4 of 28.  
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extent the Court might or should have powers of judicial review of administrative action 
and of political decision. These are not simple but rather complex questions of basic 
importance for the legal character of the United Nations; and it is a gratifying sign of the 
maturity of the system that they should be dealt with by the ICJ, one way or another.”
348 
 
5.3.3. A New World Order
349 
 
The call for the International Court of Justice to assume a more prominent role in settling 
international disputes as part of a new world order has never been so intense as it is to 
date. The role and function of the Court as ‘the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations’ is manifold: it is at once a court for the whole world, a judicial organ of the 
international legal order, a higher court on a world level and an instrument of world 
governance, which in turn has implications that go beyond the Court’s position within the 
international legal order.
350 
 
Through its special contribution to the settlement of international disputes, the Court 
partakes in world governance by taking a preventive approach to the pursuit of the first 
purpose of the United Nations, namely the maintenance of peace and security. In playing 
this role, the Court attracts an ever-increasing volume of work and this testifies to its 
growing involvement in the establishment of a new world order and the development and 
evolution (novum) of international law.
351 
                                                 
348 “The Role and Functioning of the Court” in ICJ Yearbook 1992 – 93, p. 251. 
349 Generally, this refers to the post-Cold War era of the 1990s. 
350 Cf, supra, note 325. 
351 This is the era where the Court is beginning to be seen as ‘a resort to be employed in close relationship 
with normal diplomatic negotiations rather than as a last resort’ where all else has failed (Sir Robert 
Jennings’ address to the General Assembly as the president of the ICJ [UN Doc. A/48/PV.31] of 8 
November 1993). On the contributions made by the Court for the development of international law, see, 
Nagendra Singh, The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice, Ibid., pp. 137-164 (chapter 
IV).  
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In the cases Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark)
352 and Certain 
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia)
353, for instance, the perception that 
‘recourse to the Court might usefully be employed at an earlier stage of disputes’ has been 
more widely accepted. In those two cases the parties have settled their disputes out of 
court after pleading them before the ICJ. This kind of intervention of the Court can be 
said to partake of ‘preventive diplomacy’ lato sensu by opening the way to a direct 
settlement of the dispute.
354 
 
If it were entitled to practise judicial review, the Court would be able to play that kind of 
role in preventing human rights violations caused by government act or state legislation 
from happening. In the words of Sir Robert Jennings: “Whenever the Court or its 
procedure can help in this way, the Court is, in an important sense, still productively at 
work.”
355 
 
5.4. The Source of Judicial Review 
 
In this particular part of the discussion, it will be suggested that the International Court of 
Justice may already possess powers of judicial review. In support of this argument, four 
possible sources of power will be examined: the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, historical facts or travaux preparatoires of the Charter and 
certain developments of case law. 
 
                                                 
352 ICJ Reports, 1992, p. 348. 
353 ICJ Reports, 1993, p. 322. 
354 Georges Abi-Saab, “International Court as a World Court”, Ibid., at p. 15. 
355 Ibid., ICJ Yearbook 1992 – 93.  
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5.4.1. The U.N. Charter 
 
Chapter XIV of the Charter deals specifically with powers attributed to the International 
Court of Justice. Article 92 states that the Court shall be the principal judicial organ of the 
U.N. and shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute of the ICJ. By virtue of 
this article, especially the phrase "principal judicial organ", it may actually be implied that 
the Court possesses judicial review power if States parties agree that there should be a 
judicial body with the authority to examine the validity of acts issued by other organs of 
the United Nations or State governments. However, it is obvious that no judicial review 
power can be based solely and directly on this provision of the Chapter.
356 
 
5.4.2. The Statute of the ICJ 
 
The next possible source of judicial review power for the Court is the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Article 1 of the Statute confirms the specific existence of 
the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. The ‘complete’ competence 
of the Court is outlined in Chapter II while its jurisdiction is set down in Article 36. The 
connection between the Statute and the Charter is formalised by Article 92 of the Charter, 
which states that the Statute is an integral part of the Charter. On the strength of this 
argument, the Statute would certainly be able to support the Court’s power of judicial 
review even if it did not exist in the Charter
357. However, there is not a single paragraph 
or line in the Statute which mentions any power of judicial review in so many words. 
Once again, it can only be implicitly deduced from the phrase that the Court is the 
‘principal judicial organ of the United Nations’. A best therefore, it is a potential role 
                                                 
356 Ken Roberts, Second-Guessing the Security Council: the International Court Of Justice and its Powers of 
Judicial Review, Ibid., p. 3 of 28. 
357 Ken Roberts, supra, note 339.  
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which the Court could play, but would probably require some type of modification to the 
Statute in order to enshrine such a role from a legal point of view. 
 
5.4.3. Historical Facts 
 
The history of the U.N. Charter shows that there was originally a strong desire to grant the 
Court a power of judicial review, although the travaux preparatoires of the Charter in the 
San Francisco Conference on International Organisation was sternly against the idea. 
Belgium was the leading country proposing that a judicial review power should be given 
to the Court. The idea was based on the assumption that the Security Council might make 
decisions which would breach the essential rights of Member States. It was suggested that 
the proposed amendment would be added into the Charter's Chapter VI on the Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes. But this did not come to pass because it was feared that the 
Belgian Amendment would weaken the Security Council too much.
358 
 
Later on, still in the same Conference, Belgium once again raised the issue of 
empowering the Court with judicial review competence, but this time before the 
Committee on legal problems. The proposal was to establish a proper interpretative organ 
for certain parts of the Charter with the Court being the obvious possibility. The proposal 
was once again rejected on the ground that the General Assembly, the Court or ad hoc 
committees could fill the role themselves
359. The French amendment, which strongly 
supported the idea of giving judicial power to the court, was also rejected
360. 
 
                                                 
358 Proposal at the San Francisco Conference in International Organisation, UN Doc. 433/III/2/15 or 
Conference (UNCIO) Documents Nos. 47 and 48 (1945). 
359 UN Doc. 664, IV/2/33, UNCIO Doc. 633 (1945). 
360 That was a concept made by the French delegation to the Conference, suggesting points similar to that of 
Belgium’s.  
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It was clear that the majority of the participants were not in favour of giving judicial 
review power to the Court but they were certainly not against the procedure per se. The 
Charter itself recognises judicial review-like practices in case Member States disagree 
with each other about the interpretation of the Charter. The Court will then be asked for 
its advisory opinion on the matter. Therefore, it can be argued that what the Charter 
rejected in the wake of the conference was the idea of the establishment of permanent 
judicial review procedure.
361 
 
5.4.4. The Development of Judicial Review in Case Law 
 
Examples of the Court’s power of judicial review can also be found in the decisions of the 
Court in certain cases. 
 
a.  Certain Expenses Case 
 
In this case, the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the Court on 
whether Member States had to pay expenses related to the United Nations operations in 
Congo in 1960-61 and in the Middle East in 1950. The requested opinion was about 
Article 17(2) of the Charter which stated that the “expenses of the Organisation [should] 
be borne by Member States as apportioned by the General Assembly”. The question was 
whether or not this rule included expenses incurred by such operations. 
 
                                                 
361 Ken Roberts, Ibid., p. 6 of 28.  
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The opinion of the Court was basically in support of the view that each organ must 
determine its own jurisdiction.
362 It called for the Court to decide first whether the 
expenditures authorised by the General Assembly were in conformity with the Charter. 
Despite the fact that the request was not granted, the Court reserved for itself, if it so 
wished, the right to examine whether the act of the General Assembly was in line with the 
Charter provisions. 
 
The Court’s statement was that as long as the act fulfilled one of the stated purposes, "the 
presumption [was] that such action [was] not ultra vires." It would appear that the Court 
reserved for itself the power to review the validity of actions taken by the organs of the 
United Nations. Since then the ‘presumption of validity’ has served as the Court’s 
standard of review.
363 
 
b.  The Namibia Case 
 
In this case, the Court was asked for advisory opinion on the Security Council Resolution 
No. 270 demanding South Africa’s withdrawal from Namibia because, due to its 
apartheid practices, it had violated the Mandate that it had been given.
364 The resolution 
thus put an end to the Mandate. The Court’s opinion on this case was that the Council had 
not violated the ‘presumption of validity’ principle in its resolution despite claims by 
France and South Africa that the Council's decisions were ultra vires.
365 
 
                                                 
362 Certain Expenses Case, ICJ Report, 1962, at p. 168. 
363 Ken Roberts, Ibid., at p. 7 of 28. 
364 Mandate of the League of Nations authorising South Africa to administer the so-called Mandate for 
Namibia in the territory then known as South-West Africa following World War I. 
365 Namibia Case, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 53.  
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This opinion reflects the view that the Court, when asked to do so, may not avoid putting 
to the test the legality or validity of any resolution made by any organ of the United 
Nations. 
 
c.  Lockerbie Case (Provisional Measures) 
 
In this case the Court was asked once again to give its advisory opinion based on the suits 
filed by Libya against the U.S. and the U.K. alleging that both states had violated the 
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (Sabotage) of 1971 by continuing to attempt to gain custody of two Libyan 
nationals implicated in the case. In its application, Libya argued that the Security Council 
resolutions
366 regarding the bombing incident, upon which the U.S. and the U.K. based 
their demands, were ultra vires because they violated Article 7 of the said Montreal 
Convention. It further asked the Court to order provisional measures regarding the 
imposition of sanctions.
367  
 
Article 7 of the Montreal Convention, recognising the aut dedere aut judicare principle, 
establishes that the country of origin of the suspects of air sabotage may choose either to 
surrender its nationals to foreign jurisdiction for trial or to have its own court procedure. 
 
On 14 April 1992 the Court, in relation to the refusal to comply with Resolution 731, 
ruled that “the rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention … were not 
appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional measures; an indication of the 
                                                 
366 Security Council Resolution 731 on 21 January 1992 requested that Libya surrender its two nationals 
involved in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland [UN Doc. S/Res. 731 (1992)] 
and Resolution 748 adopted on 31 March 1992, imposing universal and mandatory diplomatic and 
economic sanctions on Libya [UN Doc. S/Res./748 (1992)]. 
367 Letter from Ibrahim M. Bishari, the Secretary of State of Libya, to the ICJ dated 3 March 1992.  
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measures requested by Libya would be likely to impair the rights which appear prima 
facie to be enjoyed by the two respondent States (the U.S. and the U.K.) by virtue of 
Security Council Resolution 748.”
368 
 
In conjunction with Resolution 748 particularly, the Libyan application essentially left the 
Court with three jurisprudential options. Firstly, it could have maintained that the 
sanctions ordered by Resolution 748 should be suspended until such time as might be 
ascertained after which, at the merit stage, it could have declared that the claims were 
groundless. Secondly, it could have decided that since no sufficient case of mala fides or 
ultra vires had been established by Libya at this preliminary stage, there were no grounds 
upon which the Court could order such interim relief. Or thirdly, the Court could have 
declared that no relief would be forthcoming at any stage of the proceedings if granting 
that relief would require the Court to find out whether the Security Council had exceeded 
its Charter-mandated power (Chapter VII). It is obvious that the first two choices imply 
the right of judicial review whereas the third implies judicial restraint or abdication.
369 
 
So what did the Court choose in the end? It appears that the Court chose a soft version of 
the second option. The majority (11-5 votes) of the Court found that “both Libya and the 
United States, as Members of the United Nations, [were] obliged to accept and carry out 
the obligations imposed by Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the 
Charter”, including obligations contained in Resolution 748. It further concluded that “the 
                                                 
368 Lockerbie Case (Libya v. U.K.), ICJ Reports 1992, p. 29. 
369 Thomas M. Franck (1992), “The ‘Powers of Appreciation’: who is the ultimate guardian of UN 
legality?” in American Journal of International Law (July 1992) at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ 
wldcourt/franck.htm, p 2 of 5.  
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obligations of the Parties in that respect [prevailed] over their obligations under any other 
international agreement, including the Montreal Convention.”
370 
 
Before handing down judgement, the Court was once again challenged to decide the 
matter in the judicial review-like manner in which it examined the lawfulness and 
conformity of the Council resolutions with the Charter and the 1971 Montreal 
Convention. 
 
d.  Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
 
In March 1993 Bosnia-Herzegovina submitted an application to the Court seeking 
provisional measures in order to stop Yugoslavia's acts of genocide. In response to this 
request, the Court ordered Yugoslavia to stop any genocidal actions and also indicated 
further measures that needed to be taken.
371 However, this order could not stop the 
violence and so another request was filed with the Court by Bosnia-Herzegovina on 27 
July 1993 asking that the Security Council’s Weapon Embargo Resolution 713 in 1991 be 
declared invalid. 
 
The resolution was adopted when Bosnia-Herzegovina was still part of federated 
Yugoslavia, but by 1993 they had split into two different states. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
based its argument on the fact that due to the weapon embargo imposed through the 
resolution, it could not defend itself against Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was clearly taking 
advantage of the provisions in the resolution. However, these provisions were in breach of 
                                                 
370 Id., at p. 3 of 5. 
371 Court Order on the case, 8 April 1993, see, Bosnia-Herzegovina v Yugoslavia ICJ Reports 1993, p. 332.  
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Bosnia-Herzegovina's inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter in 
particular and customary law in general. 
 
This request led to a second order of the Court on 13 September 1993. In this decision, 
one of the central issues considered by the Court was whether the weapon embargo 
provisions set forth in the Security Council Resolution 713 were valid or not. This time 
again, the Court could not avoid reviewing the validity of the Resolution, using as basis 
not only the Charter but also the principles of customary international law e.g. jus 
cogens
372. This proves that there have been cases dealt with by the Court in the manner of 
judicial review. Thus, without explicit power entrusted to it, the Court has been using 
judicial review procedure in its journey of work to settle international disputes. 
 
In addition, there are also statements or opinions from experts and judges in favour of the 
judicial review power of the Court.
373 Judge Bedjaoui, for example, favouring the judicial 
power of the Court as opposed to the dominating power of the Security Council, asserted 
that a degree of balance should be achieved and that "the Court should not be displaced 
from exercising its primary judicial function." He felt that its primary judicial function 
should include judicial review power on legislative acts and actions.
374 
 
In light of the cases mentioned above, it appears that from now on, it is going to be 
increasingly inevitable for the Court to be granted powers of judicial review. 
 
                                                 
372 Ad hoc Judge Lauterpacht, for example, asserted that the prohibition against genocide has long been 
established as a principle of jus cogens. See, ICJ Reports 1993, Ibid. p. 440. 
373 Brief quotations of these opinions can be read, for example, in Ken Roberts’ “Second-Guessing the 
Security Council: the International Court of Justice and its Powers of Judicial Review, Ibid., pp. 10 –15 
of 28. 
374 Id.  
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6. Summary 
 
Together with wars and armed conflicts, State acts and actions have become the main 
cause of gross violations of human rights. Abusive acts and actions of State governments, 
beside actual acts of violence, often assume the form of legislative enactments. By issuing 
laws that abuse human rights, a State legitimises its misconduct which violates the rights 
of individuals. 
 
Despite the availability of a number of international procedures for the protection of 
human rights against abusive State acts or regulation, these provisions may still be 
regarded as insufficient due to the limitations of these procedures and the unwillingness 
of a State involved in such a case to comply with international decisions. The decisions 
made under such procedures are not legally binding on the States parties. The Committees 
that make these concluding remarks are not courts in the true sense. They do not hand 
down judgements, they merely give their opinion or views in which recommendations and 
suggestions are formulated. The implementation of these recommendations heavily 
depends on the willingness of the State party, despite the fact that their contents can be 
very specific (e.g. amendment of legislation). 
 
Other major weaknesses in the implementation of this system are time and material as 
well as immaterial costs e.g. feelings of frustration. This is mainly caused by the 
individual’s endeavour to meet the requirement of ‘exhaustion of all domestic legal 
avenues’. Having to first trail through of domestic legal procedures can cause more 
suffering than any individual may experience when his or her rights are being abused. 
This phenomenon can be found in countries in which the legal system does not provide  
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adequate procedures for individuals who claim that internationally recognised violations 
of their rights have taken place.  With regard to this issue, Indonesia certainly is a case in 
point. 
 
Therefore, it is time to make available another procedure, in addition to the already 
existing instruments, by which a State may be brought to task for being in breach of its 
legal international human rights obligations. Hopefully, this measure will be able to better 
protect individuals against the State’s refusal to comply with its legal obligations and its 
abuses against its own nationals. The proposed procedure is the international judicial 
review of any government act or legislation that breaches human rights. 
 
Any decision coming from this procedure will be legally binding and have legal force on 
all Member States of the United Nations because it will be issued by the International 
Court of Justice. By becoming part of the United Nations, every Member State recognises 
the judicial competence of the ICJ to hand down judgement as the principal judicial organ 
of the United Nations. 
 
It is of course true that at this stage there is no explicit legal basis for the Court to hold a 
power of judicial review. But as the principal judicial organ of the world, and on the 
strength of historical facts as well as of the development of case law, it is no longer 
inconceivable the Court could be given such a power, despite States’ obvious desire to 
protect their sovereignty, when one considers all of the recent developments in 
international law that have recognised – in areas such as human rights, world trade and 
even the environment – that such sovereignty must give way to the needs of the  
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international community in areas of mutual concern such as peace, security – and of 
course human rights. 
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Chapter 6 
 
A PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
 
1.  Preliminary Remarks 
 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that international judicial review was necessary in order to 
complement the other existing international procedures for dealing with individual 
complaints of human rights violations. I also recommended that powers of judicial review 
should be entrusted to the International Court of Justice and demonstrated that such 
powers had actually been put into operation in various cases (essentially with treaty 
powers). Logically, the next queries are now: “How would this procedure operate? What 
are the possible rules of the procedure?” 
 
These questions are narrowly connected to certain issues such as who may bring a case to 
the Court, what are the conditions of admissibility of an application and what are the 
different stages of the procedure. However, first of all, what needs to be determined is 
who the parties to the procedure are. This issue is related to one basic problem that this 
study needs to address, namely, can an individual person or a group of people, besides a 
State, be party to a case before the International Court of Justice? Or is a person or a 
group of people eligible to submit a petition to the Court? This question needs to be 
answered satisfactorily before other queries are discussed. 
 
Although this chapter will be dealing with those issues, it should be noted that the rules 
and stages of procedure proposed in this section are by no means final. At this stage, they 
only exist as theories or ideas. Nonetheless, they are not carelessly or groundlessly 
formulated since they follow the patterns and standard procedures generally adopted for  
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the petitions which are brought before the International Court of Justice and the existing 
Committees. 
 
2.  Who Can Bring a Case to the Court? 
 
Article 34(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice confirms that only States 
are eligible to initiate proceedings before the Court. International organisations, other 
collectivities and private persons are not entitled to bring a case to the Court. All Member 
States of the United Nations (plus Switzerland, which is not a Member of the United 
Nations but has become party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice) are 
entitled to be heard before the court.
375 
 
Under no circumstances is an individual, a private person or a group of people allowed to 
bring a petition i.e. have any locus standi before the Court. The only possible way of 
permitting individuals to submit an application to the Court is via amendment to the 
Statute. It can be amended only in the same way as the Charter, i.e. by a two-thirds 
majority vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of member States, 
including the permanent members of the Security Council.
376 Should the ICJ consider it 
desirable for its Statute to be amended, it must submit a proposal to this effect to the 
General Assembly by means of written communication addressed to the Secretary-
General.
377 
 
                                                 
375 See “Who can bring a case”, ICJ homepage at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/iba…sictext/ibasic_who 
bringcases.html, access date: 21/03/2000. 
376 Article 108 of Charter of the United Nations in conjunction with Article 69 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
377 Article 70 of the Statute of the ICJ.  
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The amendment proposal should, in the first instance, apply to Article 34(1) which 
declares that “only states may be parties in cases before the Court”. It should be added to 
this particular paragraph of the article that individuals are also entitled to submit their 
cases to the Court. The article could be formulated as follows: “States as well as 
individual persons or a group or groups of people may be parties in cases before the 
Court.”  
 
However, this formulation still needs to be elaborated further since, in this context, 
individual persons would not be allowed to bring just any kind of case before the Court 
but only petitions specifically related to violation of international human rights. This takes 
us to the next step of the amendment proposal; namely the addition of another paragraph 
to Article 34 stipulating the specific type of cases in which a private person or a group of 
people may submit a petition to the Court to institute a judicial review procedure.  
 
The additional paragraph would then read “The Court, subject to and in conformity with 
its Rules and other applicable international provisions of human rights, may hear and 
decide communications brought to it by individuals, or a group or groups of people, 
seeking judicial review of Government acts and/or State legislation, to which jurisdiction 
they are subject, alleging that the act and/or legislation is inconsistent with the 
international human rights provisions.” 
 
Finally, an alteration or exception to the rule concerning the Court’s jurisdiction is also 
necessary. According to Article 36(2) the Court can only deal with a dispute when the 
States concerned have recognised its jurisdiction. Only then does the Court’s jurisdiction 
in contentious cases become compulsory for the parties concerned. Otherwise the  
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jurisdiction stipulated in Article 36 is optional or non-compulsory. This is a fundamental 
principle governing the settlement of international disputes in which the States are 
sovereign and free to choose the means of resolving their disputes. 
 
The proposed exception should be addressed to the provisions stipulating the necessity of 
prior recognition of States before the Court’s jurisdiction can be compulsory. Considering 
this factor, Article 36(2) could best be amended as follows:  
 
(2) The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognise as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in, with the exception of 
human rights related violation cases, all legal disputes concerning …etc.  
 
 
The complete amendment proposal of Chapter II comprising of Articles 34 to 38 would 
read as follows: 
 
Chapter II. Competence of the Court 
 
Article 34 
 
1.  States as well as individuals or a group or groups of people may be parties in cases 
before the Court. 
2.  The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules and other applicable 
international provisions of human rights, may hear and decide communications 
brought to it by individuals or a group or groups of people seeking judicial 
review of Government acts and/or state legislation, to which jurisdiction they are 
subject, alleging that the act and/or legislation is in contravention of 
international human rights provisions. 
3.  Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present Statute remain, but now become paragraphs 3 and 4. 
 
 
Article 35 --- unchanged --- 
 
 
Article 36 
 
1.  --- remains --- 
2.  The States Parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognise as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in, with the exception  
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only of human rights violation related cases as mentioned in Article 34(2), all 
legal disputes concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
(b) any question of international law; 
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation. 
 
 
The rest of the provisions in this chapter should remain unaltered. 
 
 
One cannot dismiss, however, the issue of whether such an amendment is in any way 
realistic. In response, it could be argued that it certainly is, because the Statute is not a 
holy book that cannot be altered. Pantha rei; everything changes. Nothing is eternal. 
What is eternal is change itself. Within the Court itself, amendments are by no means 
“taboo”, firstly by virtue of Articles 69 and 70 of the Statute and secondly, because it has 
already happened to the Rules of Court twice.
378 
 
A more reasonable question may perhaps be whether such a change could take place in 
the near future. This is of course a matter which depends on whether there is sufficiently 
strong political support from the international community for such a substantial shift, but 
as noted earlier these changes have already begun to appear on the international horizon. 
 
What is needed is the kind of eagerness that has been the driving power behind the 
creation of the International Criminal Court. The maxim ‘where there is a will there is a 
way’ will find its true meaning in this exceptionally challenging situation. One could also 
say that desperate cases require desperate remedies. In addition to this, if one takes into 
                                                 
378 The first amendment was in 1972. The latest took place on 5 December 2000 and constitutes a revision 
of Articles 79 and 80 of the Rules of Court of 14 April 1978, and entered into force on 1 February 2001. 
Details of the changes can be seen in the Background Note by the Registry at htt://www.icj-cij.org 
/icjwww/ibas…ic_RulesofCourtbackgroundNote.htm, access date: 26/102001.  
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account the results that have been achieved so far in trying to secure the protection of 
human rights under existing mechanisms, one realizes that such a wish already exists, just 
waiting to become a reality. 
 
Under this proposed procedure, there would not be any interstate communications. As a 
matter of fact, this procedure does not concern a treaty under which all States parties have 
agreed to fulfil their obligations or under which a State party may object and allege that 
another State party is not observing the terms of a mutual agreement. This principle is 
also in line with the concept of state sovereignty whereby it would be considered as an 
interference with domestic affairs for a state to submit complaints against another state's 
government acts or policies.
379  
 
Under the proposed amendment, it is understood that not only citizens are entitled to 
bring cases to the Court but also non-citizens provided they are ‘subject to the State’s 
jurisdiction’. 
 
3.  Stages of the Procedure 
 
Applications to the Court for judicial review should be dealt with under the proceedings 
of contentious cases and not of advisory cases. The stages of the proposed judicial review 
procedure would, therefore, comprise three inseparable examination processes: receipt of 
                                                 
379 For a quite comprehensive discussion on the subject, see Juergen Brohmer. 1997. State Immunity and 
Violation of Human Rights. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.  
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communication, determination of the admissibility of communication and delivery of 
judgement.
380 
 
A further amendment to the Rules of Court would be necessary to accommodate these 
stages of procedure, for the present Rules do not make provisions for this procedure. 
Materiae of this possible amendment should cover the following issues. 
 
3.1. Receipt of Communication 
 
By virtue of the provisions set out in the present Statute and Rules of Court, all 
communications with the Court must be channelled through the Registrar.
381 In this 
proposed procedure, too, the Registrar should carry out his function accordingly.  
 
In accordance with Article 40 of the Statute, on receipt of a communication, the Registrar 
will forward it to all the parties concerned (paragraph 1) and also, through the Secretary-
General, to other Members States of the United Nations and other States which are not 
Members but entitled to appear before the Court (e.g. Switzerland). 
 
As noted, all communications including memorials, counter-memorials, replies and other 
documents in support of the evidence shall be addressed to the Registrar before the latter 
transmits them to all the parties concerned. Exception to this rule is made under Article 
30(1) of the Rules of Court which states that “any request made by a party shall be 
addressed to the Registrar unless made in the course of the oral proceedings.” 
                                                 
380 Details on the Proceedings before the Court provide Chapter III, Articles 39 – 64 of the Statute and Part 
III, Articles 30 – 101 0f the Rules of Court. Details on the examination procedure under treaty 
monitoring bodies, refer to supra, discussion in Chapter 4. 
381 Articles 40 of the Statute, 26(1)(a), 30 and 31 of the Rules of Court.  
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Pursuant to Articles 23 and 27 of the Rules of Court, a Deputy-Registrar shall assist the 
Registrar in the exercise of his function. Article 27 rules that if both the Registrar and the 
deputy-Registrar are unable to carry out their duties, the President of the Court shall 
appoint an official of the Registry to discharge those functions for a period of time as may 
be necessary (paragraph 1). 
 
Unlike the High Commissioner for Human Rights in treaty-based procedures, the 
Registrar is not permitted to request additional information relating to the application 
from the parties to a case. Under Article 31 of Rules of Court, the President shall, in every 
case submitted to the Court, ascertain the views of the parties with regard to questions of 
procedure. For this purpose, he or she shall summon the agents or representatives of the 
parties to meet him or her as soon as possible after their appointment and whenever 
necessary thereafter. This first phase of procedure may be called registration of 
application. 
 
3.2. Admissibility of Communication 
 
In order to decide whether a judicial review communication is admissible or not, the 
Court would base its judgement on certain conditions. Rules concerning the admissibility 
requirements of such judicial review communications should be added to the Rules of 
Court. The present Rules of Court do not make any provision in this regard. With some 
adjustments, by using the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR as a model, the rules of the 
admissibility of communications may well be stipulated as follows: 
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a)  The communication must be compatible with the competence of the Court in 
accordance with (proposed) Article 34(2) of the Statute (i.e. to review Government 
act and/or State legislation allegedly in violation of international human rights 
provisions); 
b)  The communication must allege a violation of human rights provision contained in 
the international bill of rights and other accepted international human rights 
standards as deemed applicable by the Court; 
c)  The communication must be in writing; 
d)  The communication must come from an individual or a group or groups of people 
subject to the jurisdiction of the State being petitioned; 
e)  The communication must not be an “abuse of rights of submission” (that is, it 
must have something in fact or law to support it); 
f)  The communication must not be anonymous; 
g)  The violation referred to in the communication, although under examination by 
another international investigation or settlement procedure, may still 
simultaneously be submitted to the Court.
382 
 
 
The first two requirements specify the characteristics of the cases that the Court will 
consider, namely it must be a request to review a government act or legislation the 
purpose of which is to clarify whether or not the said government act or State legislation 
contradicts, in fact and law, the internationally-recognised principles and standards of 
human rights and other applicable international norms.
383 
 
Consequently, the submission of other sorts of communications that do not conform to the 
proposed Article 34(2) of the Statute will be rejected. Moreover, in such communications, 
it is not permitted to include any political motives or background as a basis for the Court’s 
consideration. The basis for consideration is only legal if it concerns the wording or 
interpretation of the constitution, government acts and/or other relevant national law. The 
State’s acts, constitution or legislation  which is thus placed under scrutiny must be the 
current ones, that is to say the ones legally in force at the time when the communication is 
submitted. 
                                                 
382 See and compare with Sarah Pritchard and Naomi Sharp, Communicating with the HRC, Ibid., at p. 19. 
383 That is, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights together with its two Optional Protocols and the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and also jus cogens norms as may be applicable. See and compare with, supra, discussion in 
Chapter 5, particularly at note 285.  
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Furthermore, no communication will be declared admissible if it is not submitted in 
writing together with all necessary documents such as any official text and interpretation 
(where applicable) of the legislation in support of the communication. Oral 
communications will not be permitted. Although there will be no official or fixed form of 
written communication, a model communication shall be developed by the Court for 
efficiency's sake.
384 
 
This particular condition enables individuals, citizens as well as non-citizens, to 
communicate with the Court in order to seek judicial review of government acts or State 
legislation that is allegedly inconsistent with international human rights provisions. A 
group or groups of people may also bring a case before the Court. Sometimes, the 
circumstances of a particular violation mean that an individual cannot make a 
communication. In such a case, an authorised third party or representative may act on 
behalf of the individual. 
 
Individuals or a group or groups of people or their representatives requesting judicial 
review from the Court must support their applications with strong evidence which clearly 
demonstrates the actual violation of international human rights norms as a result of 
Government policies based on abusive national laws. Failure to meet this requirement 
leads to a declaration of inadmissibility. The said evidence should consist of a detailed 
explanation of the national legal system, court decisions and other relevant decrees or 
regulations violating international principles. To assist the Court in its examination, the 
                                                 
384 For a comparative purpose, see model communication developed under Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
in appendix to Chapter 4.  
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complete report of action and/or text of laws including their official elucidation (if any) 
shall be provided in the original language, English and French.
385 
 
The author(s) must be clearly identified when submitting communications to the Court. 
No anonymous communications will be accepted. In the case of a communication being 
submitted by an individual, his or her name and signature must be clearly written at the 
end of the document. Where possible, the position, occupation and other relevant details 
of the individual are specified. If a communication is brought to the attention of the Court 
by a group or groups of people, the head and the secretary of the group, or other members 
appointed specifically for that purpose, are to sign the application. In the former situation, 
the individual concerned must enclose proof of personal identification while, in the latter 
situation, all members of the group(s) must put their signature to the letter of 
authorisation. 
 
Finally, under the proposed procedure, the Court is competent to hear and decide of a case 
that is simultaneously being investigated under another international procedure. However, 
both procedures shall be regarded as separate from each other. As a matter of fact, they 
are two different kinds of procedures. The former consists in reviewing the conformity of 
State government acts or national laws with international human rights legislation 
whereas the latter consists in examining the State’s treaty compliance. 
 
However, it should be noted that if a communication invoking judicial review of the 
Court has already been submitted, be it by a private person, a group or groups of people, 
the same application will not be accepted a second time. This is understandable since this 
                                                 
385 Article 39(1) rules that the official languages of the Court shall be French and English.  
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subsequent communication will be seeking the same rule or order from the Court, namely 
to declare that the Government act or legislation is in breach of a treaty obligation and 
must therefore be modified or ceased in order to be in line with international human rights 
standards.  
 
The Court will decide this matter with the assistance of the screening function of the 
Registrar. In order to assist the Registrar to carry out this function, a summary of the 
communication needs to be completed by its authors. In this summary, the applicant 
should briefly explain what the complaint is all about (ratione materiae), who the parties 
are (ratione personae) and when the violation took place (ratione temporis). This last 
point is clearly related to the time when the legislation comes into force. 
 
If it is discovered that a communication pursues the same objectives as an earlier one, the 
Registrar will let all parties concerned know that the initial communication is currently 
being examined by the Court and that, for this reason, the later communication will not be 
considered. In deciding the matter the Registrar only needs to consult the Judge(s) 
assigned for that specific purpose and not necessarily during the official hearing 
proceeding. A proceeding within the Chamber should be enough.
386 
 
The entire process of determining the admissibility of an application at this particular 
stage can be referred to as pre-trial proceeding, which was the case with the trial of the 
former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic.
387 
                                                 
386 Compare with the Proceedings before the Chambers as laid down in Articles 26 and 29 of the Statute 
and Articles 90 – 93 of the Rules of Court. 
387  The Jakarta Post, 31 October 2001 at http://www.thejakartapost.com, access date: 31/10/2001 and 
Australian SBS Television in World News program on 30/10/2001. In that Court’s pre-trial hearing, Mr. 
Milosevic denies as unfounded all the charges pressed on him by the Prosecutor, Ms. Del Ponte. This  
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3.3. Determination of the Merits of Communication and Delivery of Judgement 
 
As is the case for treaty-based procedures, once the Court has decided that the 
communication is admissible, the parties concerned are asked to explain what the problem 
is and to indicate whether anything has been done to resolve it. It may be that, during the 
period of registration of communication and pre-trial proceeding, the State government 
concerned has changed its constitution or has put into place a new court procedure under 
which the validity of the provisions regarding human rights laid down in the constitution 
may be reviewed, whether or not they are in conformity with international human rights 
norms.  
 
Otherwise, it may also be that the State party that is being challenged wishes to counter 
the argumentation upon which the application is based. In countering the applicant's 
argumentation, for example, the State may present evidence indicating that the application 
is legally unfounded due to abuses of ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione 
personae, or that the same application is currently being examined under the same 
procedure. In such cases, the Court will refer the matter back to the pre-trial Judges and 
the latter will decide it in Chamber-like proceedings (see above). 
 
According to Article 30 of the Rules of Court, all these disputes must go through the 
Registrar if the parties intend to put down their differences in writing. If the parties wish 
                                                                                                                                                  
type of proceeding would also be instituted to determine the admissibility of judicial review applications 
brought before the Court by individuals, or a group or groups of people.  
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otherwise, they can also explain their case orally and the Registrar will document the 
proceedings accordingly.
388 
 
Once all these issues have been sorted out, the Court shall proceed to the next step of the 
procedure, which would be referred to as a determination proceeding. According to 
Article 43 of the Statute, the Court proceeding exists under two forms: written and oral 
(par. 1). The written proceeding shall consist of the communication to the Court and to 
the parties of memorials, counter-memorials and, if necessary, replies; also of all papers 
and documents in support of the evidence (par. 2) and all these shall be made through the 
Registrar in the order and within the time determined by the Court (par. 3). The oral 
proceeding shall consist of the hearing by the Court of witnesses, experts, agents or 
representatives, counsel and advocates (par. 5).  
 
Both the oral and written proceedings can be referred to as an examination of evidence 
proceeding. In this examination proceeding, the Court will gather all the relevant 
information that it will use later on as a basis for its judgement directly from the parties 
involved, including witnesses and experts. Unlike proceedings under treaty-based 
procedures, the Court will collect this information not only in writing but also orally. In 
the examination procedure under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, for instance, the 
HRC does not hear oral testimonies and relies solely on the written information provided 
by the author of communication or State party, as well as relevant supporting 
documentation.
389 
 
                                                 
388 The complete rules of written proceedings are set forth in Subsection 2, Articles 44 – 53 while the 
complete rules concerning oral proceedings provides Subsection 3, Articles 54 – 72 of the present rules 
of Court. 
389 See, supra, discussion on the procedures before various Committees in Chapter 4.  
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The Court should set a general rule as to what type of evidence it will consider 
admissible. Such a rule will serve only as a guideline. Amongst other things, the Court 
could make provision that any information or documentation can be regarded as evidence 
as long as it has a direct connection with the case. The information or documentation 
might include statements from the parties including their witnesses and experts, medical 
and/or psychiatric reports, texts of domestic court judgements and texts of relevant laws, 
policies, and codes of practice, guidelines, decrees, executive orders and other relevant 
documents. 
 
Like the procedure before the Committees, the burden of proof should not rest upon the 
applicant alone. Sometimes, or even in many situations, the State which is party to the 
case has easier access than the applicant to information that can be used as evidence. The 
burden of proof should, therefore, also rest upon the State. However, the applicant must at 
least be able to establish that there is prima facie a case to be heard.
390 
 
The Court should also determine the standard of proof it will use in the procedure. Unlike 
the standard of proof under treaty-based procedures, which is the “balance of 
probabilities”, the Court must at least measure its decision by the higher standard of 
“beyond reasonable doubt”.
391 
 
When all these proceedings have been completed, the Court may deliver its judgement. 
But prior to handing down judgement, the Court shall, as in a normal court of law, hold 
deliberation sessions. These should be held in closed meetings and not be open to the 
                                                 
390 See Sarah Pritchard & Naomi Sharp, Communicating with the HRC, Ibid., pp. 20-22. 
391 Ibid., at p. 22.  
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public.
392 By virtue of the provisions of the present Rules of Court, when the Court has 
completed its deliberations and subsequently adopted its judgement, the parties shall be 
notified of the date on which it will be read and this should take place in a session which 
is open to the public.
393 
 
In the same way as decisions made under treaty-based procedures, the said judgement, 
which shall state whether it is made by the Court or the Chamber, should include: 
 
•  the date on which it is read; 
•  the name of the judges participating in it; 
•  the names of the parties; 
•  the names of the agents, counsel and advocates of the parties; 
•  a summary of the proceedings; 
•  the submissions of the parties; 
•  a statement of the facts; 
•  the reasons in point of laws; 
•  the operative provisions of the judgement; 
•  the necessary steps to be taken by the State (e.g. adjustment or amendment of 
legislation); 
•  the decision, if any, in regard to costs; 
•  the number and names of the judges constituting the majority, and 
•  a statement as to the text of the judgement which is authoritative.
394 
 
 
Under the proposed international judicial procedure, there will also be interim measures. 
If the Court considers it necessary, it may, in the middle of the examination proceedings, 
order the State party to postpone the coming into force of any legislation that allegedly 
contravenes international human rights provisions. 
 
The judgement made by the Court should be similar to the decision made in cassation 
trials in the domestic legal system. The decision is thus final and without recourse to 
                                                 
392 Compare with Article 54 of the present Statute of the Court. 
393 By virtue of, and compare, Article 58 of the Statute and Article 94 of the Rules of Court. 
394 Compare Article 95 of the Rules of Court and the content of the views of the Human Rights Committee 
in Prichard & Sharp, Ibid., at p. 23.  
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appeal.
395 The judgement shall become binding on the parties on the day of the reading.
396 
According to Article 58 of the Statute, the President and the Registrar shall put their 
signature to the decision. 
 
Pursuant to Article 88 of the present Rules of Court, the parties may, either jointly or 
separately, discontinue the proceedings before the final judgement has been delivered. 
Such request must be submitted to the Court in writing via the Registrar and he or she will 
issue an order indicating the discontinuance of the proceedings and the removal of the 
case from the list (par. 1). 
 
If the parties have agreed to discontinue the proceedings resulting in the settlement of the 
dispute, the Court may record it in the aforementioned order.  Otherwise, the terms of the 
settlement may be entered into the order itself or else added on to it in an annexure (par. 
2). These rules would not be applied under the proposed international judicial review 
simply because the application concerns the abuse of the international obligations of 
Member States of the United Nations to implement international standards of human 
rights within national laws. So, once the allegation that national law contradicts the 
international human rights norms is legally substantiated, the Court would not be allowed 
to discontinue the proceedings notwithstanding any request by the parties. 
 
4.  Appraisal and Prospects 
 
Unlike decisions made under treaty-based bodies, the judgement of the Court has legal 
binding force on the parties. To ensure compliance with their decisions, the treaty bodies 
                                                 
395 Article 60 of Statute of the Court. 
396 Compare Article 94(2) of the Rules of Court.  
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must heavily rely on the publicity. On the contrary, State compliance with the Court’s 
decision is a must and is mandated by the Charter of the United Nations.
397 Moreover, 
according to the Charter, the Court has forcible means to ensure State compliance - using 
the “hand” of the Security Council. 
 
Pursuant to the provisions laid down in Article 94, each Member of the United Nations 
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to 
which it is a party (par. 1). This article goes even so far as to warn any State which is 
party to a certain case that if it does not comply with the Court's decision, it will incur 
sanction by the United Nations. Paragraph 2 of the same article states that “if any party to 
a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under the judgement rendered by 
the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it 
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures [sanctions] to be taken 
to give effect to the judgement”. 
 
The underlying implication of this provision is that failure to comply with a decision of 
the International Court of Justice would create a new political problem, and the Security 
Council is given wide powers to deal with the consequences. This type of situation would 
be similar to that which confronted the federal authorities of the United States in Brown v. 
Board of Education
398 case in 1950. 
 
In the case mentioned above, the local educational authorities in Little Rock, Arkansas 
refused to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision not to remove black students from a 
                                                 
397 Article 94 of the Charter. 
398 Shabtai Rosenne, The World Court: what it is and how it works, Ibid., pp. 43-44.  
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high school. The situation forced former President Eisenhower to send federal troops to 
ensure compliance with the judgement. 
 
This kind of law enforcement is certainly not ideal as a means of ensuring State 
compliance with the judgement rendered by the International Court of Justice in human 
rights related violations, especially in the proposed judicial review procedure. Not only 
could this sort of sanction lead to another human rights problem, but it could also be 
deemed rather ‘inhumane’, rash and very costly.
399 
 
Unlike the decisions resulting from treaty-based procedures, and even though the means 
available to the Court might not be as effective as those of a national legal system, the 
Court’s decisions, as the voice of an international organisation, have generally been 
complied with satisfactorily; even in cases which were emotionally charged and involved 
important questions of national prestige and honour.
400 
 
So far, in the history of the Court, no such step towards enforcement has ever been taken 
by the Security Council following a failure to comply with a Court judgement. Based on 
an extensive study, a prominent observer of the ICJ concludes: 
 
It is evident that a State will be far less likely to fail to comply with [even] an 
unfavourable decision in a case which it has specifically agreed to submit to the 
Court’s jurisdiction than in a case in which - for whatever reason - it has little 
interest in resolving the dispute on the basis of the existing law or legal 
considerations in general.
401 
                                                 
399 More details on the problems and difficulties in imposing United Nations sanctions including their types 
and effect so far and the guidelines to future use of sanctions, see, Willem van Genugten and Gerard A. 
de Groot, United Nations Sanctions: A Multi-disciplinary Approach, Ibid., particularly at pp. 135 – 152. 
400 Shabtai Rosenne, the World Court, Ibid., at p. 48. 
401 Ibid., at p. 47.  
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Chapter 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
History has proven that methods of pursuing and prosecuting human rights violators have 
failed in many ways. The reasons behind this failure range from state sovereignty issues, 
resource and funds shortages, lack of determination in the investigations and prosecutions 
due to political content of the case, to the dearth of cooperation (if any) from the country 
whose nationals are being implicated in the investigation or prosecution. With respect to 
the latter, a country like Indonesia is not only reluctant to cooperate, but in many cases, it 
even protects the perpetrator.  
 
The availability of a power to review government acts or legislation for breaches of 
human rights at the international level that could be vested with the International Court of 
Justice could certainly provide a more effective means to fight “state-endorsed” human 
rights violations. And this should not be just a dream if sumum ius (supreme justice) is on 
the agenda of the international community under the auspices of the United Nations. A 
country like Indonesia certainly serves as a good (or bad) example of how systematic and 
grave violations of human rights remain untouched, thanks to three typical features of 
Indonesian legal system: executive heavy legislation, corrupt judiciary and state impunity 
which can be described as Human Rights Disaster Triangle: 
 
 
                 Executive-Heavy  
              Legislation 
 
 
 
  Corrupt Å                Æ Impunity 
  Judiciary           
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Executive-heavy legislation provides the platform for corrupt court practices and legally 
unaccountable government agencies that lead to impunity. A corrupt judiciary and 
impunity make a perfect combination for a State to systematically violate individual rights 
without having to worry about the consequences and responsibility. And this remains 
protected by and “legalised” through legislation that ends up sanctioning the breaches of 
human rights. Persons suffering rights abuses under such a legal system will have to seek 
remedy from other sources, and that seems to be none other than international remedy 
systems. 
 
There are at international law a number of procedures available that may be employed by 
individuals who believe that their rights have been violated as a result of State conduct. 
Those procedures are divided into two categories: Charter-based procedures and treaty-
based procedures. The most important Charter-based procedures are the procedures under 
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations which covers the procedures 
before the Commission on Human Rights with its thematic reports and the “1503” 
procedure. Currently, these procedures are just a “waste of time and energy”.  
 
Under treaty-based procedures there are currently four Committees established to 
consider individual complaints: the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee against Torture, and the Committee 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women. Each of the 
Committees works in accordance with the provisions contained in the respective 
Covenant or Convention. The limitation of these procedures lies on the fact that their 
conclusions have no legally binding power. They are just recommendations or views to 
the State party concerned. Besides, in order to be permitted to invoke one of these  
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procedures a person must first exhaust “all the domestic legal remedies available (and 
effective)”. Fulfilling this obligation has proven very costly and time consuming for 
individuals, especially those who are living in a country like Indonesia. 
 
In light of all this, it is perhaps time to consider on the desirability of putting in place an 
additional and complementary procedure - an international judicial review - even if such a 
mechanism still appears highly unlikely in the current international political climate. 
Under this procedure, a State’s legislation or activities could be placed under the 
microscope to see whether or not they are in conformity with international standards of 
human rights. By invoking this procedure, a person alleging that his or her rights have 
been violated by a State may bypass the costly and time consuming requirement set forth 
in the other international instruments mentioned above. The procedure will also serve as 
an early warning system for State governments in that it will prevent the latter from 
violating human rights through examination of the provisions laid down in legislation 
(including the constitution and other regulations). 
 
The question of whether States will follow this procedure cannot easily be answered with 
“yes”, since this would of course involve issues such as a State’s sovereignty. States are 
still very protective of their sovereignty and do not lightly subject themselves to the 
control of an international body in terms of its policies or legislation. The desire to 
achieve international peace and cooperation, however, requires States to have the attitude 
of willingness to accept judicial review of their actions and legislation that breach human 
rights. In any event, it is noteworthy that there is in fact an increasing trend in 
international law for states to willingly limit their sovereignty through treaties and various 
dispute resolution mechanisms, not only in matters such as trade and intellectual property,  
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but also of human rights: there are now three “regional human rights courts” covering the 
Americas, Europa and Africa. Furthermore, there are steps being undertaken to establish a 
regional human rights mechanism for the Asia-Pacific region.
402 While the climate may 
not be immediately conducive for a “world court of human rights”, it is not such a 
quantum leap. This type of development ought to be the subject of discussions of the 
direction international law seems to be evolving and should continue to do so. 
 
A tendency towards complying with the views of the international community can be seen 
in Indonesia, although at the present stage only in the field of economic and trade 
relations and cooperation. Hope shouldn’t be given up that one day in the near future - as 
discussions on the academic and non-academic (that is, practitioner) level have shown - a 
world court dealing with human rights violations can be established. While waiting for 
this to come to operation, the ICJ should be entrusted with power of judicial review. 
 
The most appropriate international organ to posses the power of judicial review is 
arguably the International Court of Justice. The entrusting of this competence to the ICJ is 
in line with its function as the ‘principal judicial organ’ of the United Nations, with 
obvious changes needed to its Statute. The need simply results from the fact that more has 
to be done ‘to promote respect for and protection of human rights’. 
 
It is true that from an international law standpoint, there is still no legal basis available yet 
upon which such a procedure may be employed. As a matter of fact, the present principles 
of international law forbid the International Court of Justice and other international 
institutions to posses such a power. And that’s exactly the reason to ask ourselves, ‘Isn’t it 
                                                 
402 “Establishing a Regional Human Rights Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific Region”, February 2004, 
Report of the Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, available at 
http://www.asiapacificforum.net/annual_meetings/eighth/ngo_regional.doc.  
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time the Court was provided with the regulations which would allow it to exercise the 
power of judicial review?’ Is this some kind of daydream? Perhaps. But one thing is not a 
dream: violations and abuses of human rights and dignity in this age are more prevalent 
than when the law was still considered sufficient to defend. A strong political will is 
necessary to make this possible. The rest is just technicalities. 
 
In his speech at the conclusion of the Rome Conference, which has adopted the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, Secretary General of the 
United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, suggested that: 
 
There can be no global justice unless the worst of crimes - crimes against 
humanity - are subject to law. In this age more than ever we recognise that the 
crime of genocide against one people truly is an assault on us all. The 
establishment of an International Criminal Court will ensure that humanity’s 
response will be swift and will be just.
403 
 
 
The morale and spirit of this statement can certainly be a driving power towards the 
establishment of the international judicial review procedure of government activities and 
legislation for breaches of human rights. 
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Appendix 2 
THE 1945 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
Department of Information 
Republic of Indonesia 
First Edition 
1. THE OPENING TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTION 
Whereas Independence is the natural right of every nation, colonialism must be abolished 
in this world because it is not in conformity with Humanity and Justice. 
And the Struggle of the movement for the independence of Indonesia has now reached the 
hour of rejoicing by leading the People of Indonesia safe and sound to the gateway of the 
Independence of an Indonesian State which is free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous. 
Thanks to the blessing of God Almighty and impelled by the noble desire to lead their 
own free national life, the People of Indonesia hereby declare their independence. 
Following this, in order to set up a government of the State of Indonesia which shall 
protect the whole of the Indonesian People and their entire native land of Indonesia, and 
in order to advance the general welfare, to develop the intellectual life of the nation and to 
contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon independence, 
abiding peace and social justice, the structure of Indonesia's National Independence shall 
be formulated in a Constitution of the Indonesian State which shall have the structural 
state form of a Republic of Indonesia with sovereignty of the people, and which shall be 
based upon: Belief in the One, Supreme God, just and civilized Humanity, the unity of 
Indonesia, and democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising 
out of deliberation amongst representatives, meanwhile creating a condition of social 
justice for the whole of the People of Indonesia. 
2. THE 1945 CONSTITUTION 
Chapter I. Form and Sovereignty. 
Article 1 
1. The State of Indonesia shall be a unitary state which has the form of a Republic. 
2. Sovereignty shall be in the hands of the People and shall be exercised in full by the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. 
Chapter II. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. 
Article 2  
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1. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat *) shall consist of members of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat**) augmented by delegates from the regional territories and the 
groups in accordance with regulation prescribed by statute. 
2. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall sit at least once in every five years in the 
capital of the State. 
3. All decisions of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall be determined by majority 
vote. 
Article 3 
The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall determine the Constitution and the guidelines 
of the policy of the State. 
Chapter III. The Powers of Government of the State 
Article 4 
1. The President of the Republic of Indonesia shall hold the power of government in 
accordance with the Constitution. 
2. In exercising his duties, the President shall be assisted by a Vice-President. 
Article 5 
1. The President shall hold the power to make statutes in agreement with the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat. 
2. The President shall determine the Government Regulations necessary to implement 
statutes. 
Article 6 
1. The President shall be a native-born Indonesian. 
2. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by the Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat by majority vote. 
Article 7 
The President and Vice-President shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be 
eligible for re-election. 
Article 8 
Should the President die, ceased from executing or be unable to execute his duties during 
his term of office, his office shall be taken by the Vice-President until the expiry of that 
term.  
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Article 9 
Before assuming the duties of office, the President and Vice-President shall take an oath 
according to the requirements of religion, or shall make a solemn promise, before the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat as follows: 
Oath of the President (Vice-President). 
"I swear before God that, to the best of my ability, I will fulfill as justly as possible the 
duties of the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia; that I will hold 
faithfully to the Constitution and conscientiously implement all statutes and regulations, 
and that I will devote myself to the service of Country and Nation". 
Promise of the President (Vice-President). 
"I solemnly promise that, to the best of my ability, I will fulfill as justly as possible the 
duties of the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia; that I will hold 
faithfully to the Constitution and conscientiously implement all statutes and regulations, 
and that I will devote myself to the service of Country and Nation". 
Article 10 
The President shall hold the highest authority over the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. 
Article 11 
The President, with the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, declares war, makes 
peace and concludes treaties with other states. 
Article 12 
The President declares the state of emergency. The conditions governing, and the 
consequences of, the state of emergency shall be prescribed by statute. 
Article 13 
1. The President appoints diplomatic representatives and consuls. 
2. The President receives the diplomatic representatives of other states. 
Article 14 
The President grants grace, amnesty, abolition and restoration of rights. 
Article 15 
The President grants titles, decorations and other marks of honour. 
Chapter IV. The Supreme Advisory Council  
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Article 16 
1. The structure of the Supreme Advisory Council shall be prescribed by statute. 
2. This Council shall submit replies to issues raised by the President and shall have the 
right to submit proposals to the Government. 
Chapter V. The Ministers of State 
Article 17 
1. The President shall be assisted by the Ministers of State. 
2. These Ministers shall be appointed and dismissed by the President. 
3. These Minister shall lead the Government Departments. 
Chapter VI. Local Government 
Article 18 
The division of the area of Indonesia into large and small regional territories together with 
the structure of their administration, shall be prescribed by statute, with regard for and in 
observance of the principle of deliberation in the governmental system of the State, and 
the traditional rights in the regional territories which have a special character. 
Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (The Legislative Body) 
Article 19 
1. The structure of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall be prescribed by statute. 
2. Dean Perwakilan Rakyat shall sit at least once a year. 
Article 20 
1. Every statute shall require the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
2. Should a draft law not obtain the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the draft 
may not be submitted again during the same session of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
Article 21 
1. Members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall have the right to submit draft laws. 
2. Should those drafts, although agreed to by the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, not be 
ratified by the President, those drafts may not be submitted again during the same session 
of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
Article 22  
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1. Should exigency compel, the President shall have the right to determine Government 
Regulations in lieu of statutes. 
2. Those Government Regulations must obtain the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat in its next session. 
3. Should that agreement not be obtained, the Government Regulation shall be revoked. 
Chapter VIII. Finance  
Article 23 
1. The estimates of revenue and expenditure shall be fixed each year by statute. Should 
the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat not agree to the estimates proposed by the Government, the 
Government shall work to the estimates of the previous year. 
2. All kinds of taxes for the needs of the State shall be based upon statutes. 
3. All kinds and values of the currency shall be prescribed by statute. 
4. Further matters of the finances of the State shall be regulated by statute. 
5. In order to investigate the accountability for state Finances, a Body for the investigation 
of finances shall be set up, the regulation for which shall be prescribed by statute. 
The results of that investigation shall be made known to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
Chapter IX. The Judicial Powers 
Article 24 
1. The judicial powers shall be exercised by a Supreme Court and other courts of law in 
accordance with statute. 
2. The structure and powers of those courts of law shall be regulated by statute. 
Article 25 
The conditions for becoming a judge and for being dismissed shall be prescribed by 
statute. 
Chapter X. Citizens 
Article 26 
1. Citizens shall be persons who are native-born Indonesians and persons of other 
nationality who are legalized by statute as being citizens. 
2. Conditions with regard to citizenship shall be prescribed by statute.  
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Article 27 
1. Without any exception, all citizens shall have equal positions in Law and Government 
and shall be obliged to uphold that Law and Government.  
2. Every citizen shall have the right to work and to a living, befitting for human beings. 
Article 28 
Freedom of association and assembly, of expressing thoughts and of issuing writing and 
the like, shall be prescribed by statute. 
Chapter XI. Religion 
Article 29 
1. The State shall be based upon Belief in the One, Supreme God. 
2. The State shall guarantee freedom to every resident to adhere to his respective religion 
and to perform his religious duties in conformity with that religion and that faith. 
Chapter XII. Defence 
Article 30 
1. Every citizen shall have the right and the duty to participate in the defence of the State. 
2. Conditions concerning defence shall be regulated by statute. 
Chapter XIII. Education 
Article 31 
1. Every citizen shall have the right to obtain an education. 
2. The Government shall establish and conduct a national educational system which shall 
be regulated by statute. 
Article 32. 
The Government shall advance the national culture of Indonesia. 
Chapter XIV. Social Well-Being 
Article 33 
1. The economy shall be organized as a common endeavour based upon the principle of 
the family system.  
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2. Branches of production which are important for the State and which affect the life of 
most people shall be controlled by the State. 
3. Land and water and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the State 
and shall be made use of for the people. 
Article 34 
The poor and destitute children shall be cared for by the State. 
Chapter XV. Flag and Language 
Article 35 
The Flag of the Indonesian State shall be the Honoured Red-and-White. 
Article 36 
The Language of the State shall be the Indonesian Language. 
Chapter XVI. Alterations to the Constitution 
Article 37 
1. In order to alter the Constitution, at least two-thirds of the total members of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat must be in attendance. 
2. A decision shall be taken with the agreement of at least two-thirds of the total number 
of members who are in attendance. 
3. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Clause I 
The Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence shall regulate and execute the 
transfer of government to the Indonesian Government. 
Clause II 
All existing institutions and regulations of the State shall continue to function so long as 
new ones have not been set up in conformity with this Constitution. 
Clause III 
The President and Vice-President shall be elected for the first by the Preparatory 
Committee for Indonesia's Independence. 
Clause IV  
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Before the Majelis Permusyarwaratan Rakyat, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat and the 
Supreme Advisory Council have been set up in conformity with this Constitution, all their 
powers shall be exercised by the President with the assistance of a National Committee. 
4. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Within six months after the end of the Greater East Asia War, the President of 
Indonesia shall regulate and implement all things which are stipulated in this Constitution. 
1. Within six months after the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat has been set up, the 
Majelis shall sit in order to determine the Constitution. 
5. ELUCIDATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
GENERAL 
I. The written Constitution, a part of Fundamental Law. 
The written Constitution of a state is only a part of the Law that forms the basis of the 
state. The Constitution is that part of the Fundamental Law which is written down, while 
besides that Constitution there also prevails a Fundamental Law which is not written 
down, namely, the basic rules which arise and are maintained in the practice of running a 
state, although they are not written down. 
Certainly, in order to study the Fundamental Law (Droit Constitutionnel) of a state, it is 
not enough only to study the articles of its written Constitution (Loi Constitutionnel) 
alone, but one must also study how it is applied and what is the spiritual background 
(Geistlichen Hintergrund) of that written Constitution. 
The Constitution of any state whatsoever can not be understood if merely its text is read 
alone. Truly, to understand the meaning of the Constitution of a state, we must also study 
how that text came into being, we must know the explanations made of it and we must 
also know under what conditions that text was made. 
In this way we shall be able to understand what is the meaning and purpose of the 
Constitution we are studying, and what current of thought it was which became the 
foundation of that Constitution. 
II. Fundamental ideals in the "Opening" (Preamble). 
What are the fundamentals contained in the Preamble to the Constitution? 
1. The State - so the text runs - is what "shall protect the whole of the Indonesian People 
and their entire native land of Indonesia...based upon...unity...meanwhile creating a 
condition of social justice for the whole of the People of Indonesia". 
2. In this Preamble, the current of thought is accepted of the unitary state, the state which 
protects and covers the whole of the people. Thus the state encompasses every kind of 
group opinion, encompasses all opinions of individuals. The state, in accordance with the  
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concept of this Preamble, seeks unity, and extends over the whole of the Indonesian 
People. This is one foundation of the state which may not be forgotten. 
3. The third fundamental idea contained in the Preamble is that of sovereignty of the 
people, based upon democracy and deliberation amongst representatives. Therefore, the 
system of state which is given form in the Constitution must be based upon sovereignty of 
the people and must be based upon deliberation amongst representatives. Indeed, this 
current of thought accords with the character of the Indonesian society. 
4. The fourth fundamental idea contained in the Preamble is that the state is based upon 
that Belief in the One, Supreme God which conforms with the principles of just and 
civilised humanity.  
Therefore, the Constitution must oblige the Government and other authorities of state to 
nurture the nobility of human character and to hold fast to the fine moral ideals of the 
people. 
III. The Constitution gives form in its articles to the fundamental ideas contained in 
the Preamble. 
The above fundamental ideas pervade the spiritual background of the Constitution of the 
State of Indonesia. These fundamental ideas give rise to those ideals of law (Rechtsidee) 
which dominate the Fundamental Law of the State, both written law (the constitution) and 
unwritten law. 
The Constitution gives form to these fundamental ideas in its articles. 
VI. The Constitution is short and flexible in character. 
The Constitution has only 37 articles. The other paragraphs contain only additional and 
transitional provisions. This draft is thus very brief when compared, for instance, with the 
constitution of the Philippines. 
It is enough if the Constitution contains only fundamental rules, contains only guidelines 
of instruction to the Central Government and to other authorities of the State for 
conducting the life of the State and providing social well-being. Especially for a new state 
and a young state, it is better if that written Fundamental Law contains only basic rules, 
whilst the provisions implementing those basic rules are left to statutes which are more 
easily drawn up, altered and revoked. 
This is the system of the Constitution. 
We must always remember the dynamic of the life of the Indonesian society and state. 
The Indonesian society and state are growing, the era is changing, especially during this 
present period of physical and spiritual revolution. 
Therefore, we must live dynamically, we must watch every kind of movement in the life 
of the Indonesian society and state. In that connection, let us not precipitately crystallize, 
provide form to (Gestaltung), ideas which can still easily alter.  
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Certainly, it is the nature of those written rules to be binding. For that reason, the more 
flexible ("elastic") those rules are, the better. Thus we must guard against the 
constitutional system being left behind the times. Let us not go so far as to make a 
constitution which is quickly out-moded (verouderd). What is extremely important in the 
administration and in the life of the state is the spirit, the spirit of the authorities of the 
state, the spirit of the leaders of the administration. Although a constitution is drawn up 
which, according to the letter, is charactersized by the family principle, if the spirit of the 
authorities of the state, the leaders of the administration, individualistic, that constitution 
is certain to have no meaning in practice. On the other hand, although that constitution is 
not perfect, if the spirit of the authorities of the administration is good, that constitution 
will certainly not obstruct the course of the state. Thus what is most important is the spirit. 
That spirit is a living thing, or, in other words, it is dynamic. In this connection, only the 
fundamental rules alone must be laid down in the constitution whilst what is necessary for 
executing those fundamental rules must be left to statutes. 
6. THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE 
The system of the government of the State which is stipulated in the Constitution is: 
I. Indonesia is a State based on Law ("Rechtstaat"). 
1. The State of Indonesia is based upon law (Rechtstaat), it is not based upon more 
power (Machtstaat). 
I. The System is Constitutional 
2. The government is based upon constitutionalism (Fundamental Law) not absolutism 
(authority without limits). 
III. The Highest Authority of the State is in the hands of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat ("die gesamte Staatsgewalt liegt allein bei der Majelis"). 
3. The sovereignty of the people is held by a body named the Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat as the embodiment of the whole of the People of Indonesia (Vertretungsorgan 
des Willens des Staatvolkes). This Majelis determines the Constitution and the 
guidelines of the policy of the State. The Majelis appoints the Head of State (President) 
and the Vice-Head of State (Vice-President). 
It is this Majelis which holds the highest authority of the State, whilst the President must 
execute the policy of the State according to the guidelines which have been determined by 
the Majelis.  
The President who is appointed by the Majelis, is subordinate to and responsible to the 
Majelis. He is the "mandatory" of the Majelis, he is obliged to execute the decisions of the 
Majelis. 
The President is not "neben" but is "untergeordnet" to the Majelis. 
IV. The President is the Highest Executive of the Government of the State below the 
Majelis  
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Below the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the President is the Highest Executive of the 
government of the State. 
In conducting the administration of the State, authority and responsibility are in the hands 
of the President (concentration of power and responsibility upon the President). 
V. The President is not responsible to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
Besides the President there is the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. The President must obtain 
the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat in order to make laws (Gesetz gebung) 
and in order to fix the estimates of the revenues and expenditures of the State 
(Staatsbegroting). 
Because of this, the President must work together with the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, but 
the President is not responsible to the Dewan, which means that the President's position is 
not dependent upon the Dewan. 
VI. The Ministers of State are Assistants to the President: the Ministers of State are 
not responsible to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
The President appoints and dismisses the Ministers of State. Those Ministers are not 
responsible to the Dean Rakyat. Their positions are not dependent upon the Dewan but 
are dependent upon the President. They are the assistants of the President. 
VII. The Authority of the Head of State is not unlimited. 
Although the Head of State is not responsible to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, he is not 
a "dictator", which means that his authority is not unlimited. 
It has been stressed above that he is responsible to the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. 
Apart from this, he must carefully and thoroughly pay attention to the voice of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat. 
The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
The position of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat is strong. The Dewan can not be dissolved 
by the President. (This is at variance with the parliamentary system). Apart from this, 
members of the Dewan are all of them concurrently members of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat. For that reason the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat can at all 
times control the acts of the President, and if the Dewan considers that the President has 
in fact transgressed against the policy of the State determined by the Constitution or by 
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. The Majelis can be called for a special sitting so 
that can ask the President to account for his responsibility. 
The Ministers of the State are not ordinary high-ranking Civil Servants. 
Although the position of the Ministers of State is dependent upon the President, 
nevertheless they are not ordinary high-ranking civil servants, because it are those 
Ministers who, in the first place, in practice execute the authority of the Government 
(pouvoir executif).   
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As the leaders of Departments, the Ministers know the ins and outs of matters connected 
with their jurisdictions. In this connection, Ministers have a great influence upon the 
President in determining that part of the state's policy with which their Departments are 
concerned. Indeed, what is intended is that the Ministers are Leaders of the State. 
In determining Government policy and in co-ordinating the administration of the State, 
the Ministers work together as closely as possible, one with the other, under the 
leadership of the President. Appendix 3 
 
 
Unofficial Version of the Amended Provisions of Articles 28A –J  
Concerning Human Rights Guarantees in 1945 Constitution  
of the Republic of Indonesia 
 
 
 
Art. 28 A on the right to live reads: 
 
“Every person has the right to live and to defend his/her life.” 
 
Art. 28 B regulates the right to build a family and have children. It reads: 
 
“(1) Every person has the right to build a family and to continue procreation 
            through a lawful marriage. 
    (2) Every child has the right to live, grow up and develop as well as the right to 
            protection from violence and discrimination.” 
 
Art. 28 C regulates the right to personal development and esteem. It reads: 
 
“(1) Every person has the right to develop himselfs/herself through meeting 
his/her 
            basic living needs, right to education and to benefit from science and  
            technology, arts and culture, for the sake of his/her better quality of life and 
            the welfare of human being. 
(2) Every person has the right to better self-esteem by utilising his/her rights 
collectively to develop the society, nation and country.” 
 
Art. 28 D concerns the right to legal protection and access to work, government and 
citizenship. This article containing four verses reads: 
 
“(1) Every person has the right to recognition and protection and guarantee of 
            law certainty that is fair and equal before the law. 
(2) Every person has the right to work, fair treatment and be rewarded accordingly 
in every employment relation. 
(3) Every citizen has equal opportunity to get involved in the government. 
(4) Every citizen has the right to his/her citizenship.” 
 
Art. 28 E regulates freedom of religion, association and expression. Having three 
verses it reads: 
 
“(1) Every person is guaranteed the freedom of worship, each according to 
            his/her own religion or belief; freedom to choose their preferredable education, 
job,   
            place to live, change of citizenship and the right be repatriated. 
(2) Every person has the right to express and act according to his/her faith and 
consciousness. 
(3) Every person is guaranteed the freedom of association and expression.”  
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Art. 28 F is a constitutional guarantee for access to communication and information. It 
reads: 
 
“Every person has the right to the communication and information in order to 
       develop his/her personality and the living environment including the right to 
       obtain, to treat, to keep and to pass information using every available means or 
       channel.” 
 
Art. 28 G constitutionally guarantees a person of possession and freedom from torture 
and other inhuman treatment. This article stipulates that: 
 
“(1) Every person has the right to protection of his/herself, family, honor, 
            dignity, possession under his/her power as well as the right to personal 
            security and to be free from fear of not and doing something that is 
            considered his/her human right. 
(2) Every person has the right to be free from torture or inhuman treatment and the 
right to pursue political asylum in another country.” 
 
Art. 28 H regulates the right of a person to have a happy life, health service, healthy 
environment, social security, justice and respect of human dignity and honour. It 
reads: 
 
“(1) Every person has the right to a happy life, physically as spiritually, 
            accommodation, healthy environment and health service. 
(2) Every person has the right to be treated favourably to get opportunity and 
benefit for the sake of equality and justice. 
(3) Every person has the right to social security enabling development of his/her 
personality as a whole for the sake of human dignity and honor. 
(4) Every person has the right to personal possession and no one can, by force or 
inappropriate way, take this right away.” 
 
Art. 28 I regulates the basic human rights and the principle of non-retroactive. It also 
regulates the freedom from discrimination, cultural rights, indigenous people, duty of 
the State, the promotion and protection of those rights by law: 
 
“(1) Right to live, not to be tortured, freedom of mind and conscious, freedom of 
            religion, freedom from slavery, right to recognised as a human being before 
            the law and the right not to be prosecuted retroactively are basic human 
            rights which cannot be reduced under whatsoever circumstances. 
(2) Every person has the right to be free and protection from discrimination for 
whatever reason. 
(3) Cultural identity and the rights of indigenous people shall be respected in 
accordance with the development of time and civilisation. 
(4) The State, in particular the government is responsible for the protection, 
promotion and fulfilment of human rights. 
(5) The promotion, protection and guarantee of human rights shall be regulated by 
law in accordance with the principles of the rule of law and democracy.” 
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Art. 28 J regulates the limits of human rights and the relation of a person’s rights to 
other person’s and the society. It reads: 
 
 
“(1) Every person is obliged to respect the human rights of another person in the 
            harmony of life within the society, nation and country. 
 (2) In exercising his/her rights, very person is subject to limitations stipulated by   
      law and regulations in order to solely guarantee and respect the rights and 
      freedom of other person and to fulfil the demand for justice and equality in 
      accordance  with  moral,  religious,  security  and  public  order  consideration 
within  
      a democratic society.” 
 
 